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1.  INTRODUCTION 
In the past two years, the issue of policies to reduce greenhouse gas emissions has attracted 
an increasing amount of public attention, at the international level as  well as within the 
Community. Last year, the members of working group N° 1 of the Intergovernmental Panel 
on Climate  Chan~e (IPCC) have concluded that they are certain that emissions resulting 
from human actiVIties are substantially increasing and that these increases will enhance the 
greenhouse effect, resulting on average in an additional warming of the earth's surface. At 
the  same  time,  the  ongoing  debate  concerning  the  appropriate  policy  response  is 
characterized by  some degree  of controversy.  Moreover,  economists  have  only  recently 
started to address the issue. In order to assist policy-makers in the elaboration of a policy 
response to the risks  of global climate change,  the present paper reviews  the economic 
issues that are involved and now have to be addressed. 
The purpose of this paper, more precisely, is mainly twofold: 
(i) 
(ii) 
first, to set out how, from an economic point of view, the design of policies directed 
at the "greenhouse issue" should preferably be approached conceptually; 
second, to survey what is  currently known empirically on the economic effects of 
different policies aimed at a reduction of greenhouse gas emissions and particularly 
COz emissions. 
Concerning the first aspect (economic concepts), the area covered by  this paper touches 
upon a large number of policy areas beyond traditional economic policy analysis (notably 
energy,  environment,  transport,  research  and  development,  indirect  taxes  and 
development).  This  broadness  was  nevertheless  felt  necessary  in  order  to  arrive  at a 
comprehensive and consistent approach concerning the greenhouse issue. As the ongoing 
policy debate sometimes appears to be characterized by a lack of understanding between 
natural scientists,  environmentalists,  economists  and  politicians,  an attempt  is  made  to 
bridge  the  gap  in  terms  of analytical  approach  and language.  Thus,  this  paper aims  at 
encouraging a process of communication and mutual understanding. 
As to the second aspect (empirical analysis), two issues are of importance. First, throughout 
this paper the focus will be on the next two decades. Thus, the question of a possible large-
scale (e.g.  60%)  reduction of COz emissions by  the middle of the next  century and the 
appropriate policies to reach such a target are beyond the scope of the present study. This 
is  not to deny that the issue of global climate change is  essentially a long-term question. 
However, the high degree of uncertainty associated with such a long time horizon, both in 
terms of the effects of higher atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases and in terms 
of the available technologies for response strategies would render such an analysis highly 
speculative. The design of the presently elaborated policy response has to reflect this fact. 
Second,  it  must  be  stressed  that  at  present  only  very  limited  and  sometimes  even 
contradictory evidence  is  available.  In particular, for  many  Community  countries  there 
appears to be relatively little information available at this stage, while comparatively more 
studies in the public domain have been elaborated for the United States. As time evolves, 
new  information is  likely to modify  the picture.  Nevertheless, the available information 
allows  not  only  the  priority  areas  for  future  research  to  be  identified,  but also  some 
tentative conclusions to be drawn. -2-
The structure of this paper is organized along the following lines: 
As a starting point, chapter 2 sets out the need for policy action by giving the factual 
background for  the analysis  in terms of both present as  well  as  projected future 
greenhouse gas emissions and their expected effects. 
Chapter  3  then  briefly  describes  the  concepts  and  definitions  underlying  the 
economic approach to the greenhouse problem. 
This analytical framework is then applied in chapter 4 when addressing the issue of 
how economically optimal greenhouse policy targets should be defined. 
Chapter 5 addresses the question of the appropriate choice of policy  instruments 
and  the  instrument  setting  req_uired  to  reach  the  policy  targets.  It  focuses  on 
emissions related to the production and use of energy and analyses where and how 
these emissions could best be reduced. 
Chapter  6,  in turn,  looks  at the  somewhat  different  issue  of deforestation  and 
reforestation. What role can forests play in mitigating the greenhouse effect? 
Chapter 7 then addresses more specifically the international dimension (within the 
European Community and at the worldwide level) of both the definition of targets 
and the application of instruments. What are the main options and how  can an 
agreement be reached? 
Chapter 8, finally, summarizes the main points of the study and tries to draw some 
tentative policy conclusions. 
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2.  THE  STf\RTING  POINT:  EMISSIONS  AND  EMISSION  REDUCTION 
TARGETS 
2.1.-Present emissions 
Two· aspects· of the present emission of "greenhouse gases" are of particular importance in 
the context of this note:  · 
the share of different greenhouse gases in total emissions and 
the regional distribution of carbon dioxide emissions. 
· GRAPH 2: C02 E.MISSIONS FROM FOSSIL FUELS 
BY WORLD REGION 
1987 and 2010 
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First, in order to be able to calculate a meaningful s  are of individual different  reenhouse 
gases in contributing to the overall "greenho}lse-- feet",  it is necessary to distinguish three 
dimensions of the problem:  .  ~- ..--~  ·  · ·  .  · 
-------
1.  'the ·quanti.ti of emissionS for each gas;  .  .  ·.  . 
2.  the s~ecific radiative forcing per molecu,le of the different gases;2 
3.  the bfetime of the different types of gases. 
1 For a good factual introduction to the "greenho~se" issue see, iD particular, the reports established by 
the Inter-Governmental Panel for  Climate  Change  (IPCC(1990a),  IPCC(1990b),  IPCC(1990c))  and 
appendix A of the US National Academy of Sciences Report (NATIONAL ACADEMY(1991)).  2 "Radiative forcing" is a process which influences the earth's radiation balance, i.e. it changes the balance 
between the energy absorbed by the earth and the energy reflected by it in form of long-wave infrared 
radiation.  According  to  the  Inter-governmental  Panel  for  Climate  Change. (IPCC),  this  radiative 
forcing potential of different greenhouse gases relative to that of carbon dioxide (  C02) is: 21 times for 
methane, 290 times for nitrous oxide and between 3500 and 7300 times for CFCs (all calculated on a 
100 year horizon). See IPCC(1990a). -4-
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Taking into account these different dimensions,  it becomes clear that at present carbon 
dioxide  (COz)  contributes more than half to the overall (man-made) greenhouse effect, 
methane  (CH4)  and  ~hlorofluorocarbons  (CFCs)  contributing  between  10-20%, 
respectively (see graph 1  ). 
Second, from the economic (policy) point of  view (and contrary to the atmospheric point of 
view), it is important to know where the &reenhouse &ases are emitted in order to devise 
appropriate response policies. The origin has again two dimensions: 
3 In addition to the gases directly contributing to the greenhouse effect (CO:o CH4, N20, CFCs), there 
are some gases (e.g.  CO and NOx) that result from  the combustion process, which are contributing 
indirectly to the greenhouse effect (e.g. by prolonging the atmospheric life-time of direct greenhouse 
gases or by encouraging the formation of tropospheric ozone). However, due to the complexity of the 
mechanisms involved, the relative contribution of such gases to the anthropogenic greenhouse effect is 
largely  unknown  (see  RAPPORT  DU  GROUPE  INTERMINISTERIEL  SUR  L'EFFET  DE 
SERRE(1990) on this issue). -5-
the distribution by  re~n: as  is illustrated in graph 2 with respect to COz 
emissions from fossil  els,  OECD countries are responsible for over 40%, 
slightly  more  than  the  (formerly)  centrally  planned  countries  and 
approximately twice  as  much  as  developing  countries.  The Community is 
currently estimated to contribute approximately 13% (graph 3); 
the  distribution  b.y  economic  activity:  as  can  be  seen  in  table  1,  the 
production and use of energy is  the source  of almost  half of the overall 
radiative  forcing,  followed  by  industry  and  forestry.  Graph 4  illustrates, 
though, that the shares of the different activities and therefore also of the 
different greenhouse gases differs markedly between countries. 
·:·,"·':-··::·  _:-:: 
•'  '  .:-:-:,::··  .. :.::: . 
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ANTHROPOGENIC  GREENHOUSE  GAS  SOURCES  BY  ECONOMIC ACTIVITY 
Activity/ 
Sector 
Energy 
production and 
use 
Industry 
Gases 
Cf4 
CFCs 
Sources 
Combustion of fossil fuels for 
industrial, commercial, residential, 
transportation and other purposes 
Coal mining and venting of natural 
gas 
Production and use in various 
industrial processes 
Relative contribution 
to radiative forcing 
in the 1980s  (in %) 
> 46 .±. 8 
24 
Forestry  C02t  Cf4,  N20  Deforestation, biomass burning, 
including fuel wood and other changes 
in land use practices  18 .±. 8 
Agriculture  ca. 
Other sources  C02 
CH4 
Source:  IPCC (1990c) 
Rice cultivation, livestock 
Use of nitrogeneous fertilisers 
Cement manufacturing 
Land fills 
9.±.4 
)  3.±.1 -6-
GRAPH 4: GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS BY GAS 
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2.2.  Forecast future emissions and their expected effects 
Concerning  future  emission  trends,  projections  show  a.  continued.  strong  increase  in 
&reenhouse · gas  emissions from  human ·activities  under  the  assumption  of unchanged 
policies  ("business  as  usual").  Worldwide  C02 emissio,ns,  for  example,  are projected  to 
Increase by roughly 60% in· only 20 years. Developing countries will significantly increase 
their share in world emissions (see table 2 and graph 2).  ·  . 
For the European Community as well, carbon dioxide emissions are projected to increase 
noticeably  (COMMISSION(1990a)).  However,  as  can be seen. in graph 5  and  table  3, 
forecast  emission trends vary  significantly between countries.· France and Germany, for 
example, may witness negligible increases, whereas for the new Southern Member States· 
the increases may range from 30% (Spain) to nearly 90% (Portugal). The major part of the 
overall increase is  expected to come from  p~wer generation and the transport sector (see 
graph 6).  ·  ·  .  . 
Based on these emission forecasts - and taking into account the natural time lags  - it is 
considered  to  be  certain  that  atmospheric  concentrations  of greenhouse  gases  will  be 
increasing substantially, thereby enhancing the greenhouse effect and resulting, on average, 
in an additional warming  of the Earth's surface.  On the basis  of the  present scientific 
knowledge,  it is  predicted that the  ~lobal mean temperature could  rise during the next 
century by about 0.3°C per decade {wtth an uncertainty range of 0.2°C to 0.5°C per decade), 
more than that seen over the past 10,000 years.  IPCC members conclude that "this  will 
result in a likely increase in global mean temperature of about 1  oc above the present value 
by 2025 and 3°C before the end of the next century" (IPCC(1990a)). -7-
:·:·  ':·'  :=.::.=:  ,: 
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FORECAST WORLD C<>l EMISSIONS UNTIL THE YEAR 2010 
Variations of C02 emissions 
Absolute  ----------------------------------- co'  emissions  1987- 1987-
Country/  198  2000  2010 
Region  (in M t of C)  (in%) 
EC12  746  19  24 
USA  1395  23  37 
Canada  122  31  51 
Japan  260  23  32 
RestofOECD  180  32  56 
TotalOECD  2703  23  35 
CPE  2228  36  64 
LDC  1299  57  114 
WORLD  6230  34  62 
S.ourg_:  Commission (1989b) 
"Conventional wisdom"scenario 
As a consequence, the global mean sea level is predicted to rise by about 20cm by the year 
2030 and by 65cm by the end of the next century. All these projections are not only subject 
to a high degree of uncertainty, but also hide a considerable - although not yet fully known 
- degree of regional variation. However, it is important to stress two points: 
1.  Due to the as yet unknown net effect of different natural feed-back mechanisms, the 
uncertainty  concerning  the  climatic  impacts  of  a  multiplication  of  the  pre-
industrialized atmospheric concentration levels of greenhouse gases can play in both 
directions: while it 1s  possible that temperatures would rise less, it is  also possible 
that  without  policy  changes  the  rise  would  be  significantly  higher  and  faster, 
exceeding the adaptability of the natural fauna and flora and leading to catastrophic 
impacts  on our  eco-system  (for  a  discussion  on the  likely  impacts  from  global 
warming see IPCC(1990b);  for  three regional  assessments  of the socio-economic 
impact see PARRY/MAGALHAES/NINH(1991)). -8-
FORECAST C<>l EMISSIONS UNTIL THE YEAR 2010 IN THE EC 
Absolute 
Variations of CD2 emissions 
---------------------------------------- coij emissions  1990- 1990-
199  2000  2010 
(in M t of C)  (in%) 
EC12  753  9  14 
Belgium  31  12  4 
Denmark  18  9  20 
Germany  198  0  0 
Spain  51  20  30 
France  103  5  5 
Greece  18  33  72 
Ireland  9  19  43 
Italy  106  12  24 
Luxembourg  3  0  -3 
Netherlands  42  14  15 
Portugal  9  33  86 
United Kingdom  165  13  12 
) 
Working Document N°4 
Balance Sheets of  Pollutants S02, NO» C02 
"Conventional wisdom" scenario 
2.  Most climate studies to date apply a technique economists call "comparative-static". 
In fact,  the analysis  only compares two  (assumed equilibrium) situations, namely 
today's situation and one where the atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases 
are twice today's level. Nothing (or at least very little) is yet known on the transition 
path from one situation to another (would more frequent and more severe storms 
occur? How would changes in cloud formation influence the climate? Would the 
present  ocean  currents  that  shape  regional  climate  patterns  change?  Would 
temperate forests, already weakened by acid rain, survive? Would regional droughts 
lead to massive migration? etc.). It is Important to stress this point. as the problem 
of  ~lobal climate change most of all is one of transition. -9-
GRAPH 5:  C02 EMISSION TRENDS IN THE EC  - 1960 TO  2010 
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GRAPH 6: FORECAST C02 EMISSIONS IN  THE 
EC BY SECTOR (as % of total) 
Scenario 1:  Conventional wisdom 
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Against this back~round, several countries have announced their commitment to stabilize 
or reduce the ermssion of greenhouse gases in order to slow down ~lobal warming. In the 
Community,  several  Member  States  have  either  adopted  emission  limitation  targets 
(phasing-out of CFCs and stabilisation/reduction of C02) or have pronounced themselves 
in favour of such orientations. However, these objectives differ in many respects between 
countries  (degree  of commitment,  conditionality,  reference  year,  target year etc.)  and, 
moreover, cover only a limited number of Member States. 
In addition to these national targets, a joint Council of the European Community's Energy 
and Environment Ministers declared, on October 29,  1990, that the European Community 
and Member States are willing to take actions aimed at stabilizing total C02 emissions by 
the year 2000 at 1990's level in the Community as a whole. The Council also noted that the 
Commission will  present in  due  time  a  proposal  for  establishing  Community  emission 
reduction tariets separately for C02 and other greenhouse gases, and including possible 
strategic options aimed at progressive reductions at the horizon 2005 and 2010. 3) 
- ll-
3.  ECONOMIC  CONSIDERATIONS  CONCERNING  THE  POLICY  DESIGN: 
CONCEPTS AND DEFINITIONS 
3.1. The overall objective 
Before  starting  the  discussion  of the  economic  aspects  of "greenhouse  policies"  it  is 
necessary to briefly set out the general objective of economic policy and tndeed of any 
economic analysis tn general. To put it in the most general terms, an economist's objective 
is to maximise - subject to given constraints - overall human welfare on the basis of a given 
set 0f citizens' individual preferences. Economic policy objectives like price stability, full 
employment, economic growth etc. are only targets derived from this basic objective. 
Given that people's preferences are seen as being determined exogenously, an economist's 
aim is  in principle  not to influence  these preferences.  Instead,  the aim is  to  reach the 
highest possible  level  of sustainable  social  welfare.  This  implies  most  importantly that 
economic analysis focuses on the question of how given targets (including, for example, the 
preservation of specific environmental properties or the well-being of future generations) 
can be reached most efficiently, i.e.- in economic terms- in the most cost-effective way. It 
is  this search for the most efficient set of policies addressing the greenhouse issue that is 
the basic objective of this study. 
3.2. The notion of costs and benefits 
The expression of "cost-effectiveness" requires a brief discussion in order to avoid some of 
the misconceptions sometimes encountered in public discussion. As has been set out in the 
previous paragraph, the overall policy aim is  to maximize social welfare. True "costs"  of 
policies would therefore refer to reductions in social welfare. There is  also the notion of 
economic opportunity cost. Opportunity costs arise from the fact that a certain amount of 
resources  can only  be used  once.  The  opportunity  costs  of a  certain  investment,  for 
example, consist of the foregone  alternative use of the resources (e.g. for consumption). In 
the case of perfect markets without externalities, opportunity costs equal expenditures at 
market prices. 
In preparation for the subsequent discussion the following  additional distinctions are of 
particular importance: 
private versus  social  costs:  private  costs  are those  costs  faced  by  the  individual 
economic agent. These costs may differ from the costs to society (so-called social 
costs)  to  the  extent  that  prices  do  not  fully  reflect  all  the  costs  (i.e.  also  the 
environmental costs) of a certain activity or product to society. To give an example, 
pollution does usually not imply any costs for the polluter, while the damage to the 
environment  caused  by  the  pollution  constitutes  a  cost  to  society.  Measures  to 
reduce the pollution unambiguously raise the costs for the private economic agent. 
However, provided the costs of the pollution abatement measures are lower than 
the  damage  to  the  environment,  society  as  a  whole  would  be  better  off  by 
undertaking such measures. As these "externalities" are at the heart of the issue of 
pollution,  they will  be discussed  in more detail further below.  It is  important to 
retain for the subsequent discussions, however, that private (expenditure-based) cost 
estimates may be a poor measure for social cost (for an empirical demonstration see 
HAZILLA/KOPP(1990)). 
marginal  versus  average  costs:  when  discussing  cost  figures  it  is  important  to 
distin~ish marginal  from  avera~e costs.  As  the  costs  per unit  produced  or per 
emission abated normally vary with the amount produced or abated, average costs -12-
differ  from  marginal  costs.  As  the  costs  of reducing  greenhouse  gas  ermss1ons 
usually  increase  with  the  amount  of reduction,  the  marginal  costs  of reducing 
emiss1ons  by  an additional  unit  normally  exceed  the  average  costs  of the  total 
emission reduction. 
adjustment costs: in addition to the resource costs of efficiently producing a given 
output  as  traditionally  focused  upon  by  economic  theory,  there  may  Jllso  be 
adjustment  costs  arising  when  the  factor  infut combination  is  changed.  These 
adjustment costs of course also represent rea  resource or opportunity costs. Thus, 
even when a change from a highly l'olluting production process to a less polluting 
process implies welfare gains to soc1ety, the size of these gains may be reduced by 
the occurrence of costs of adjustment. It is therefore important to take into account 
adjustment costs when evaluating different policy options. 
A final  definition is  required before proceeding with the analysis.  In this study,  the term 
'benefit' is used in the sense of 'negative social cost'. 
4 BOERO/Cl.ARKE/WINTERS(1991)  use  the  terms  "continuing  costs"  and  "transitional  costs"  for 
describing this important distinction. -13-
4.  ON THE DEFINITION OF POLICY TARGETS 
4.1.  The search for the optimum 
4.1.1.  The cost-benefit approach 
Does the increase in atmospheric concentrations require a change in policies? What policy 
targets should be set? The economic approach to answering these questions is to com1?are 
the cost of action - preventive (e.g. investments to reduce greenhouse gas emissions) or , 
adaptive  (e.g.  coastal protection measures)  - with  the benefit arising  from  action  (e.g. 
reduced damage due to floods). It is interesting to note that the Community is even legally 
obliged to do so: Article 130r of the Treaty specifies that "in preparing its action relating to 
the environment, the Community shall take account of(  ... ) the potential benefits and costs 
of action or lack of action".  While such a  comparison is  preferably done in quantitative 
terms,  it  is  also  possible  to  do  it  on  a  merely  judgemental  basis  in  cases  where· 
quantification is impossible. 
The advantage of adopting a cost-benefit view can be illustrated by reference to the issue of 
greenhouse gas emission targets. As has been calculated by the IPCC Working Group N°l, 
stabilizing  atmospheric  concentrations  of  lon~-1ived greenhouse  gases  at  today's  level 
would  require  immediate reductions  in emissions  from  human activities  of over  60%. 
Reversing  the  rise  in concentrations  due  to past man-made  emissions  would  therefore 
require even larger emission reductions. However, only few propose such drastic action and 
some  might  even argue  that the  rise  in average  temperatures  observed  over  the past 
hundred years does not seem to have harmed our lives.  Thus, what is  the economically 
desirable amount of emission reduction? 
70 
eo 
eo 
40 
80 
20 
10 
GRAPH 7: AGGREGATE EMISSION REDUCTION 
COST AND BENEFIT CURVES 
·  (Purefy  llluatratlva) 
Billion ECU 
... .... 
............  t ..........  .... .... ............. _____ _ 
Coote 
~  •  ~  H  ~  H  ~  U  ~ 
Greenhouae gu ••lealon reduction In .. 
Assume that the marginal costs of reducing greenhouse gas emissions tend to increase with 
the  amount  of reduction  (see  graph  7).  Such  a  marginal  cost  curve  alone  is  clearly 
insufficient to determine the desirable degree of emission reduction. It shows that, ceteris -14-
paribus,  an emission  reduction by  45% would  be  many  times  more  expensive  than a 
reduction by  25% percent,  but it  does  not  show  whether  such  a  reduction  would  be 
worthwhile or not. In fact, in order to answer this question, knowledge on the benefits from 
the different amounts of emission reduction is required. The optimal amount of emission 
reduction therefore depends on the shape of the marginal benefit function (e.g. high versus 
low benefit case in graph 7). This illustrates the need for thinking about costs and benefits 
when defining policy targets. 
4.1.2.  A comprehensive approach covering all the dimensions of the problem 
As has been set out above, from the economic point of view,  the general objective is  to 
maximize the net benefits (welfare gains) from greenhouse policies. The question then is of 
how such a set of optimal policies can be identified analytically. 
From the theoretical point of view, the overall cost minimum (or net benefit maximum) of 
such a  set of policies can only be reached in the context of a  comprehensive approach 
covering  all  options  and  dimensions  of the  problem.  Incidentally,  this  has  also  been 
highlighted by the IPCC's Response Strategies Working Group (see IPCC(1990c)). 
From the  methodological  point  of view,  such  a  truly  comprehensive  approach  would 
require that: 
all  types  of ~reenhouse gases  are taken into account.  5 As the economic costs  of 
reducing ennssions differ between the different greenhouse gases, it is  sensible to 
identify emissions of those gases that are cheapest to reduce. Limiting oneself to 
only one type of gas is likely to increase the overall cost of reaching a given target in 
terms of radiative forcing. 
all sectors of economic activity and all available technologies are considered. Given 
the fact that the costs of emission reductions vary across sectors of economic activity 
and technologies, focusing only on a subset cannot lead to the cost-minimum. 
all regions are covered. As greenhouse gas emissions themselves have no (or only 
very  limited)  local,  regional  or national  effects,  any  isolated  national  policy  of 
emission  reduction  is  potentially  ineffective  and  therefore  also  economically 
inefficient as it does not attain the objective of reducing the greenhouse effect. In 
fact,  it even cannot be ruled out that the relocation of C02-intensive production 
sites  from  countries  with  strict  greenhouse  gas  reduction  policies  to  countries 
without  restrictions  and  with  low  energy  efficiency  technologies  might  increase 
worldwide emissions. 
both greenhouse gas "sinks" and sources are integrated into the analysis. Since from 
the climatic point of view  it is  not emissions as  such  that cause the greenhouse 
effect,  but only  atmospheric  concentrations  (i.e.  emission  minus  absorption)  of 
greenhouse gases,  any policy only focusing  on emissions is  unlikely to be efficient 
and may  indeed be totally  ineffective.  The more greenhouse  gas  emissions  (e.~. 
C02)  can  be  absorbed  by  greenhouse  gas  sinks  (i.e.  the  less  atmosphenc 
concentrations increase), the less  emissions need to be reduced to reach a  given 
target in terms of mitigating global warming. 
5 For an attempt to follow such an approach by using the concept of "Global Warming Potential (GWP)" 
for  aggregating  different greenhouse gases,  see CRISTOFAR0(1990) or MORGENSTERN(1991). 
See also ECKAUS(1990) for an economist's criticism of using a GWP index as a policy guide and his 
proposal to use the concept of "Emissions Opportunity Cost (EOC)" instead. -15-
emission  abatement  measures.  adaptation  measures  and  inaction  have  to  be 
considered. There is no a priori reason for assuming that emissions of greenhouse 
gases necessarily have to be avoided. In fact,  at least in the long-run, a number of 
alternatives are available (see graph 8) and from the purely economic point of view 
the least costly one(s) should be used. 
Thus, on the emission side for example, it is either possible to avoid burning fossil 
fuels  (therefore not generating emissions) or to abate emissions by using so-called 
end-of-pipe technologies for flue-gas removal (therefore not releasing them into the 
atmosphere) to prevent an increase in the atmospheric concentration of greenhouse 
gases.  Alternatively,  one  could  also  envisage  a  process  of COz separation and 
recovery by converting coal into synthetic gas (see e.g. CHANGE{l991)). While at 
present no such technologies appear to exist, ongoing work suggests that this option 
could  well  be  available  in  the  future,  at  least  for  stationary  sources  (see  e.g. 
FINANCIAL  TIMES{1990)).  However,  at  ~resent  the  problems  of  such  a 
procedure  seem  to  be  enormous  (high  techmcal  and  financial  effort,  reduced 
efficiency of energy conversion, unsolved question of long-term storage). 
On the effects side, one option consists of adapting - either now  or later - to the 
effects  of global warming.  After all,  the climate has  never been "constant".  As a 
matter  of  fact,  some  authors  emphasize  that  only  a  very  small  amount  of 
industrialized  countries'  economic  activity  is  directly weather dependent (mainly 
agriculture). Moreover, there is no consensus as to whether higher atmospheric COz 
concentrations would reduce agricultural productivity or not. It is therefore argued 
that it might be economically preferable to adapt to global warming by undertaking 
measures  to  protect  coastal  zones  (for  an  economic  assessment  see  e.g. 
RIJSBERMAN(1991)), to move human and economic activities to other areas etc  .. 
Theoretically,  a  second  option  exists  on  the  effects  side,  naxnely  to  attempt  to 
mitigate the effects of increased greenhouse gas concentrations by means of curative 
action, for  example through measures to increase the earth's surface reflection or 
through "climatic engineering" (see e.g. NORDHAUS(1990c)). However, in view of 
the  almost  complete  lack  of knowledge  and  the  high  stakes  involved,  the  latter 
approach  represents  a  high-risk  option and  will  not  be considered  as  a  serious 
option in this paper. 
Admittedly,  the  comprehensive  approach  described  above  is  too  complex  to  be 
immediately and fully implemented empirically. Often the knowledge required for such an 
analysis is unlikely to be readily available. In addition, there are political and geopolitical 
realities and constraints to be considered. However, it is crucial to adopt a policy approach 
as  broad  as  possible.  The  reason  for  this  is  fairly  straightforward:  The  broader  the 
approach, the cheaper it is to reach a given overall policy target, or, in mathematical terms, 
a limited approach at best only allows one to attain a local cost minimum. The overall cost 
minimum can only be attained if all  options are evaluated and the cheapest are chosen. 
Thus,  to put it differently,  economic theory suggests  that the broader the approach, the 
more ambitious the environmental policy targets that can be met for a given amount of 
money. A comprehensive approach therefore should not be interpreted as being in conflict 
with a precautionary philosophy. I
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4.1.3.  Conceptual and empirical complications 
Although from a theoretical point of view the cost-benefit approach to the evaluation and 
desi~ of greenhouse gas emission reduction policies is  the appropriate way to deal with 
the Issue from the economic perspective, the implementation of this approach is hampered 
by numerous conceptual as well as empirical problems. Although these complications by no 
means only arise in the case of global warrmng, they nevertheless have to be addressed in 
this context. 
First,  there  is  the  problem  of uncertaing  or imperfect  information.  This  uncertainty 
effectively relates to several dimensions of t  e problem: 
the amount of future emissions (uncertainty concerning economic and population 
growth, behavioural changes, technological developments etc.); 
the increase in future  atmospheric concentrations (e.g. uncertainty concerning the 
functioning of carbon sinks); 
the effects of global warming on the eco-system; 
the effects of changes in the eco-system on the economic system; 
the  effects  of the  application  of policy  instruments  to  reduce  emissions  (i.e. 
uncertainty concerning the effectiveness and/  or the costs of different measures). 
From the economic point of view, the uncertainty with respect to the economic impacts of 
global warming is particularly important as such effects have to be quantified in order to 
perform a  cost-benefit evaluation.  Contrary to a  situation of risk,  however,  uncertainty 
relates to contexts in which probabilities are unknown and therefore where mathematical 
approaches based on expected values are not applicable. 
It is important to stress, however, that the existence of uncertainty does not imply that "no 
action" is the optimal strategy from the economic roint of view. All it requires is that the 
decision analysis takes into account the existence o  uncertainty. A priori, two ways exist to 
deal with  the existence of uncertainty in this  context: either the available  resources are 
focused on reducin~ uncertainty (achieved by financing more scientific research), or they 
are  spent  on limiting  the  likelihood  of negative  outcomes  (achieved,  for  example,  by 
reducing emissions). 
In this context, it is also necessary to address the issue of risk neutrality versus risk aversion. 
The available evidence suggests (see BARBIER/PEARCE(1989) for details) that society is 
likely to be willing to pay a certain sum only in order to avoid the future risks of climate 
change. This risk-aversion premium (the so-called option value) has to be added to the 
expected welfare costs of taking action when undertaking a cost-benefit comparison. 
Second, there are a number of valuation problems, including the issue of irreversibility and 
the treatment of coincidental benefits. 
When  undertaking  a  (quantitative)  cost-benefit  analysis,  an  important  difficulty 
arises from the fact that monetary values are required for companng the costs with 
the benefits. Often, however, environmental goods and services are not marketed. 
(These market externalities are exactly the cause of the environmental problem in 
the first place.) Thus, there are no market prices that can be used for the economic 
valuation of these  environmental values.  In  order  to  overcome  this  problem,  a -18-
valuation  of these  environmental  values.  In order to overcome  this  problem,  a 
number of monetization methods  have  been developed which  at least allow the 
calculation of proxies,  notably based on the willingness to pay principle  (e.g.  the 
hedonic price approach, contingent valuation or the travel cost approach; for details 
see PEARCE et al. (1989)). 
As regards irreversibility, the question of how to valuet for example, extinct species 
(flora and fauna)  is  of significant importance  ..  Moreover, the existence  of lags  of 
several  decades  between the  emission  of greenhouse  gases, and  the  consequent 
climate warming aggravates the irreversibility problem: .by the time climatic effects 
are known 'with certainty', it is probably too late to act~ . 
The  same  is  true  for  the  integration  of  coincidental  or joint  benefits.  This  is 
particularly important for the evaluation of policies to reduce COz emissions as any 
reduction In fossil fuel consumption due to energy efficiency gains at the same time 
also  reduces emissions of other gases, particularly SD2, CO and NOx..  Neglecting 
such joint benefits  is  likely  to lead to an amount of e.mission  reduction that lies 
below the social optimum.6 
Third, there is  the issue  of discount rates and intergenerational justice. The problem of 
discount  rates  arises  from  the  fact  that  the  costs  and  benefits  of measures  to  reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions occur at different periods in time. In the case of global warming, 
for  example,  the  cost  of emission  reduction  investments arise  in  the present while  the 
benefits of the emission reduction will only arise several decades into the future. In order 
to compare the costs with the benefits, it is necessary to discount future monetary flows  to 
present values.  The  application  of a  discount  rate  is  usually justified  by  reference  to 
Individual economic agents' time £references and the marginal productivity of capital (see 
e.g.  MARKANDY  A/PEARCE (  1988) ):  it  is  assumed  that individuals  generally  prefer 
consumption now  to consumption later. Individuals only forego present consumption (i.e. 
they save/invest), if the rate of return on these savings/investments is at least as high as the 
rate of individual time preference. Analogously, society as a w~ole is consider'  , to have an 
ag~regate time  preference. Capital, on the other hand, will only be investe<l  (instead of 
being consumed), if the productive use is  expected to yield a higher· product in the future 
compared to what has to be invested today. 
The question is then of which discount rate to use and whether differentiated discount rates 
should be used as  a policy instrument. A high  discount rate ·has the effect of leadin~ to 
small  present  values  for  even  catastrophic  economic  losses.  To  give  an example,  If  a 
discount  rate  of 10%  per annum were  used,  any  single  ECU spent .  today  on emission 
reduction investments has to reduce future damage in the year 2090 by at least ECU 13780 
in order to be "profitable". 
This  raises  the  question  of whether  it  is  ethically  permissible  to  discount  the  damage 
brought about  on future  generations  in  this  way.  The, answer  to  this  question  depends 
mainly on whether it is possible to compensate future generations as well as on the ethical 
standards applied (for details see PEARCE et al.(1989) and D'ARGE et al. (1982)). If one 
adopts a narrow notion of 'sustainable development' as a basis for the policy evaluation, 
future  generations have  to  be guaranteed to  be endowed with a natural capital stock at 
least as high as the present stock in order to be able to satisfy their needs. (Note that the 
Treaty of Rome as  amended by the Single European Act requires Community action "to 
preserve, protect and improve the quality of the environment" (Art.  130r).) On the other 
hand, using a lower discount rate for public investments in mitigating global warming than 
6 The coincidental benefits from planting trees in terms of reduced soil erosion and higher ground water 
level are another example in this context. -19-
for  other  public  investments  (e.g.  education  or  infrastructure)  is  difficult  to  justify 
economically (see e.g. NORDHAUS(1990c)).  .  ·  · 
In view  of the  above  discussion· it  is  hardly  surprising  that,  up  to  now,  only  very  few 
attempts  have  been made  to  apply  the  general  cost-benefit · approach  to  the  issue  of 
greenhouse  policy.  The  most  comprehensive  attempt  so  far  has  been  made  by 
NORDHAUS, who investigated - primarily on the basis of data for the United States - the 
design of an. (economically). optimal greenhouse policy (for details, see the· attached box). 
The main conclusion of the Nordhaus analysis is that, in a medium damage scenario, cost-
benefit analysis would suggest  an econotmcally efficient amount of total greenhouse gas 
emission  reduction .of  the  order  of 11%  (see  NORDHAUS(1991a)).  However,  other 
authors arrive at substantially higher optintal emission reduction levels,. either because they 
base the  it analysis o~  higher climate change damage (e.g. CLINE( 1990b) ), or because they 
arrive at both higher damage a.nd lower costs of emission abatement than Nordhaus (e.g. 
AYRES/WALTER(1990)).  ·  ·  . 
In any  event, there appears to. be broad agreement on  the fact  that present knowledge 
about  the.  likely  damage  from  global  climate  change  is  extrem·ely  sketchy  and  that, 
therefore,  any  cost-benefit· analysis  has  to  be  interpreted  with  great caution.  What  is 
important for the proper .utilisation of such analyses, however,  is  the distinction between 
the (likely) damage.from global warming and the (potential) benefits from. greenhouse gas 
emission reduction  Rolicies.  Both .are  not  identical  because;  on the  one  hand,  not  all 
damages will be avoided by emission limitation policies .(unless atmospheric concentrations 
are .stabilized),  and~ on the other pand, the benefits of. greenhouse gas emission limitation 
polici~s are larger than. the  benefit~ from only slowing down climate change (coincidental 
benefits).  ·  .  .  ·  .  .  · -20-
By estimating aggregate cost and benefit functions, William NORDHAUS(1989. 1991a. 
1991b) has attempted to identify the point at which the marginal cost of an additional 
reduction in greenhouse gases just balances the marginal damage from the additional 
climate change from the higher concentration of greenhouse gases. The main tentative 
conclusions of this empirical evaluation were that: 
(a) 
(b) 
(c) 
(d) 
about 10-20% of greenhouse gas emissions can be reduced at low cost. Above that 
level, the marginal costs of abatement rise sharply; 
on the basis of a middle damage function implying a shadow price of$ 7.3 per ton 
of C02 equivalent (carbon weight), the optimal policy would consist of reducing 
total  emissions  of ~eenhouse gases  by  11%.  On the basis  of a  high  damage 
function {shadow pnce of$ 65.9 per ton of carbon), it would be optimal to reduce 
emissions by slightly over 30% (see graph B1); 
most  of the greenhouse  emission  reduction would  come  in both cases  from  a 
virtually complete phase-out of CFCs, while C02 emissions would only be reduced 
by 2% and 20%, respectively. This illustrates the potential economic gains from 
using a framework integrating all, or at least several, greenhouse gases; 
concerning  the  instruments  of  reducing  emissions,  a  ~lobal  carbon  tax  is 
economically superior to a  US gasoline tax,  while  the option of reforestation is 
never economically justified. 
Although the  Nordhaus analysis  is  a  very valuable  contribution to the discussion  on 
greenhouse  gas  policies,  it  is  subject  to  a  number  of  serious  short-comings  and 
limitations (which, however, are not limited to only this specific analysis): 
1. 
2. 
First,  it  can  be  questioned  whether  at  present  there  is  sufficient  scientific 
knowledge  to quantify the damage function.  This concerns, first  of all,  regional 
climate  changes.  In fact,  a  reliable  quantification  of the likely  damages would 
require much more information than the presently available estimates of average 
temperature and sea level increases. However, the present generation of climate 
models  (General  Circulation  Models)  do  not  yet  provide  the  regional  detail 
necessary  for  a  sound  calculation  of  the  economic  impacts  (see  also 
COOPER{1991) on this issue). 
Second, the comparatively low damage figures partly arise from the fact that only 
agriculture and forestry are considered to be significantly climate dependent in a 
comparative-static analysis  comparing present and future  average  temperatures 
and  precipitation  levels.  (In  fact,  due  to  possible  increases  in  crop  yields  in 
response  to  a  "C~ fertilisation  effect"  agriculture  could,  according  to  some 
researchers, even benefit in such an analysis.) However, such an analysis assumes a 
smooth transition from one "equilibrium" to another and therefore neglects any 
costs of transition. Should the frequency and intensity of certain weather events, 
for example (tropical) storms, increase during the transition process, other sectors 
of the economy would potentially be directly affected as well. However, at present, 
scientific  knowledge  on the  impacts  of the  global  warming  process  on  storm 
patterns is still in its infancy. -21-
3.  Third,  the  Nordhaus  analysis  only  considers  the  benefits  from  slowin~ global 
warming. However, greenhouse gas emission reductions will at the same time lead 
to reductions in stratospheric ozone depletion (CFCs), acid rain (S02), local air 
pollution etc  .. Thus, takin~ into account these coincidental benefits (see above) the 
optimal  emission  reduction  is  likely ·to  be  larger.  While  some  authors  (e.g. 
GLOMSRO D et al.(1990)) come to the conclusion that the additional benefits 
(in terms of improved health conditions etc.) of a reduction in fossil fuel use could 
amount  to  roughly  2/3 of the  calculated  GDP loss,  others  (e.g.  ECONOMIC 
SURVEY(1991))  suggest  that  the  benefits  in  terms  of reduced  traffic-related 
external costs as well as of reduced negative health effects due to NOx emissions 
could  even  almost  be of the  same  order as  the  GDP losses.  This  leads  some 
observers (e.g. BARRETI(1990b)) to suspect that the economic benefits from the 
(automatic) reduction in SOz emissions may  even exceed  the benefits from  the 
reduction in COz emissions. 
4.  Fourth, to some extent, the restriction of the analysis to an assumed doubling of 
atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases by  the end of the next  century 
(and the  corresponding degree of warming)  cuts off the analysis  at a somewhat 
arbitrary point in time. As has been argued by William CLINE (1990), considering 
a  lon2er  time  period  could  imply  significantly  higher  temperature  rises  and 
possibly geometrically (instead of linearly) rising economic effects as a function of 
the absolute warming level. 
5.  Fifth, Nordhaus only looks at damage from global warming to the extent to which 
they are reflected in our traditional system  of national accounts.  Thus,  damage 
affectin2 the ecosystem. but not valued by the market, (for example, losses of bio-
diversity,  wet  and dry  lands,  coral reefs  etc.),  are not  captured.  There is  broad 
agreement,  however,  that  such  damage  is  likely  to  be  significant  (see  e.g. 
INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE(1990)). 
6.  Sixth, as the discussion further below in section 5.3 will show, there appear to be a 
number of possibilities for reducing greenhouse gas emissions (in particular COz 
emissions) by undertaking energy conservation measures which would result in an 
economic gain rather than an economic loss. This potential has not been taken into 
account  in  the  Nordhaus  analysis,  as  Nordhaus  assumes  perfect  markets  and 
thereby neglects any inefficiencies in the use of energy. 
Although the above  observations  by  no  means  invalidate  the  analysis  undertaken by 
William Nordhaus (and, indeed, several of the points are explicitly acknowledged by the 
author), they nevertheless tend to indicate that there is likely to be a certain bias in the 
analysis. Thts bias can be e~ected to imply that the "optimal" emission abatement level, 
as  derived  from  cost-benefit  analysis,  would  be higher  if the  above  limitations were 
removed. -22-
GRAPH 81: GREENHOUSE GAS REDUCTION COSTS 
AND BENEFITS 
· Marginal coata and benetlta ($/t C) 
100~----------------------------------------~ 
0~~~~---L----~----L---~-----L----~--~ 
0  10  16  20  2&  80  40 
Percentage reduction of total GHGa 
-Coate  - Medlum.damaae  ·---~·High damage 
8ouroe: NORDHAU8 (1881a) -23-
4.2. Simplifying the analysis 
It has become clear from the discussion in the previous section that the application of a 
comprehensive  policy  al?proach  is  associated  with  formidable  -though  not  necessarily 
insoluble- difficulties. This is not invalidating the approach. On the contrary, as the IPCC's 
Response Strategies Working Group states: "It is imperative that further work on the cost 
and  benefit  implications  of  response  strategies  be  undertaken"  (see  IPCC(1990c)). 
However, this is a medium- to long-term task. In the short-term, ways have to be found to 
simplify the task. 
4.2.1.  Fixing quantities: the absorption approach 
One of the possibilities of addressing the problem of defining  ~reenhouse gas limitation 
policies is  to define atmospheric concentration targets and denve emission targets from 
these concentrations. The underlying philosophy for such an approach is  to identify the 
absorptive capacity of the ecological (and economic) system  (both in terms of size  and 
speed of temperature change). The emission target would then be set so as to limit the 
(expected)  temperature rise  due  to the greenhouse effect  to what is  considered to be 
without  serious  disruptive  effects  to  environment  and  economy  ('acceptable'  or 
'ecologically  manageable'  warming).  K.RAUSE/BACH/KOONEY(1990),  for  example, 
argue that the average rate of warming should be limited to about 0.1 oc per decade, while 
currently a warming commitment of 0.2-0.5°C per decade is being added. However, there is 
no general agreement yet on whether such a limit can be specified. The Commission, for 
example, has stated in its Communication on Cow..munity policy targets on the greenhouse 
issue (SEC(90)496) that it is not yet possible to fix such levels in a scientifically sound way. 
Thus, in the absence of complete information, the precautionary principle has to serve for 
identifying the desirable target. 
In order to evaluate  the "absorption approach"  from  the  economic point of view,  it is 
important to come back to the issue. of uncertainty. How robust is the absorption approach 
towards errors in the definition of the absorptive capacity, i.e. to deviations of the assumed 
capacity from the "true" capacity? The answer to this question depends on the shape of the 
cost  and  benefit  curves  of greenhouse  gas  emission  reductions.  The  steeper  the  cost 
function and the flatter the benefit function, the higher the costs of errors will be. To put it 
in non-technical  terms:  if the  economic costs  of reducing  emissions  by  25% are much 
higher than the costs of reducing emissions by only 20% while the benefits of both policies 
are broadly the same, then errors in defining the appropriate emission reduction target can 
be costly.7 Under such circumstances, fixing quantitative targets is not the best approach to 
the problem from the purely economic point of view.  (Note that this is  by no means an 
argument against emission reductions, but only against this approach of achieving them!). 
4.2.2.  Fixing prices/costs: the "insurance" approach 
The  alternative  approach  to  tackling  the  problem  of  uncertainty  when  defining  a 
greenhouse policy Is to start by asking what society is willing to pay in order to reduce the 
7 This can be illustrated by the very preliminary C02 emission reduction cost curves established in the 
European  Community's  JOULE  programme  (see  COHERENCE(1991)).  From  these  tentative 
calculations  (illustrated in  graph 13)  it would  appear, for  example,  that in  the case of Belgium  the 
reduction of C02 emissions by close  to 15% (compared to the 1988 level)  could cost approximately 
four times more than reducing emissions by only 10%. In some other Member States the cost curves 
appear to be even steeper than in the case of Belgium, pointing to significant costs of choosing the 
"wrong" quantitative target. -24-
risk  of global warming  (therefore  the  analogy  of buying  an insurance  against  possible 
catastrophic effects of ~lobal warming). All measures to reduce greenhouse gas emissions 
which cost less than this upper lir!t are then implemented, independently of the resulting 
quantity  of emission  reduction.  The  cost  limit  can  easily  be  adjusted  whenever  new 
information leads to a reassessment of the risks of global warming. 
Contrary to the case of the absorption approach described above, the flatter the cost curve, 
the  higher  are the  economic  costs  of errors  in  defining  the  appropriate  cost  limit  for 
emission reduction measures.  Thus, if it is "cheap" to reduce emissions by  an additional 
amount while the benefits of such a reduction are high, then the welfare losses of fixing too 
low a limit are potentially high. 
4.2.3.  Concentrating on carbon dioxide 
Another possibility  of reducing the dimensions  of the greenhouse problem in order to 
simplify the analysis is to focus only on carbon dioxide. Such a procedure can be justified 
on three main grounds: 
First, C02 is the most important single greenhouse gas, accounting for over half of 
the greenhouse effect (see graph 1). 
Second, not only are sources and sinks of carbon dioxide emissions comparatively 
well  understood  and statistical  data relatively  comprehensive,  but the  necessary 
response technologies are also readily available. For other greenhouse gases, such 
as methane and nitrous oxide, this is currently not the case. 
Third, C02 is a "key" gas in the sense that its emission is usually combined with the 
emission of other gases that - directly or indirectly - have negative environmental 
consequences (e.g. CO, NOx, S02 etc.). 
On  the  other  hand,  the  economic  costs  of neglecting  the  other greenhouse  gases  in 
elaborating a J?Olicy framework for emission reductions can be high. In fact, the more low-
cost  opportunities there are to reduce emissions  of the other greenhouse gases  (CFCs, 
nitrous oxide, methane), the higher are these costs. This is of particular importance in the 
case of CFCs, even after the recent London agreement. Also, the more possibilities there 
are of substituting C02 emittin~ activities  by activities emitting other greenhouse gases 
(e.g. methane in the case of fossil fuel substitution towards natural gas), the higher are the 
costs of considering only carbon dioxide. 
8  This  approach  can  also  serve  to  illustrate  the  economist's  insistence  on  a  comprehensive  and 
economically efficient policy approach: the more efficient policies are designed, the more greenhouse 
gas emission reduction can be attained with the money society is willing to spend. -25-
5.  ENERGY USE: CHOICE OF INSTRUMENTS AND INSTRUMENT SETTING 
As the production and use of enerw is considered to account for approximately 50% of 
the enhanced overall radiative forcing resulting from human activities (see IPCC(1990c)) 
and for an even higher share of COz emissions in the Community, the following analysis 
will only focus on the issue of energy. 
5.1.  Categories of available instruments and choice criteria 
For a discussion of the available policy instruments to reduce enerw related emissions of 
greenhouse gases, it is useful to distinguish three broad classes of Instruments (even if in 
the end a combination of different instruments were to be used): 
traditional regulatory instruments and voluntary agreements 
traditional market-based instruments 
regulatory  /institutional  reform  to  enhance  or install  the  market 
mechanism 
The subsequent discussion will in particular focus on the criteria of static and dynamic 
efficiency for evaluating the desirability of these different types of instruments from the 
economic point of view.  Static efficiency implies that a  given environmental target is 
attained With the least cost. Dynamic efficiency, in turn, requires that this also holds true 
over  time.  From an analytical  point  of view,  an important mechanism for  ensuring 
economic efficiency is the application of the 'polluter pays' principle, even if in practice 
there  may  be  circumstances  in  which  the  implementation  of this  principle  may  be 
difficult and a more pragmatic approach has to be retained. In addition to the criterion 
of efficiency,  other aspects  are  of importance  for  the  choice  of policy  instruments, 
notably the question of equity (income distribution, inter-generational justice etc.).  , 
5.1.1.  Traditional non-market-based instruments 
In the past, environmental policy mostly relied on different types of standards or norms 
set by  reitllation (so-called  command-and-control approach). Concerning the issue of 
energy use, such standards fall in two broad classes: 
efficiency standards defining (minimum) degrees of energy efficiency for 
products or processes; 
emission standards setting (maximum) limits to the emission of pollutants 
(mainly gases). 
Standards  can  be  a  highly  effective  instrument  for  environmental  policy.  This  is 
particularly the case when it is important that specific limits are respected (e.~. to avoid 
threats to human health) or when economic instruments would be ineffective  due to 
market imperfections (for example,  consumers might not notice energy inefficiencies). 
However, some standards have the disadvantage of not being directly linked to emissions 
(e.g. building standards) and thereby offering some scope for evasive action. 
In addition, there is a conflict inherent in any standard setting: from the point of view of 
static efficiency,  the more types of equipment which are in reality different are treated 
equally by one uniform standard, the higher are the social costs of regulation. The reason 
for  this  is  that a  uniform standard for  several types  of equipment does not take into -26-
account the specific shape of the individual marginal cost curves, i.e. it does not exploit 
the specific advantages of individual technologies. On the other hand, the regulator is 
normally unable  to set  equipment-specific standards.  In fact,  this  would  require  the 
knowledge of all the individual cost curves. The administrative cost of dealing with such 
a complexity would clearly be enormous. Moreover, a.S  only producers are likely to have 
such detailed equipment  -specific information, there is  a  potential cortflict of interests 
and it cannot be ensured that governments would get unbiased information. 
With a view to dynamic efficiency, the main disadvantage of standards is that they do not 
provide  a  permanent incentive  to economic  agents 'to  look for  new ways  to reduce 
emissions or to improve efficiency beyond the le~al standard. The regulator, though, is 
unlikely to change the standards whenever techmcal or other developments would call 
for such a  change implying therefore that standards would normally be set either too· 
high or too low. 
An attempt to achieve results in terms of environmental quality similar to those attained 
by  re~lation without,  however,  incurring  the  considerable  administrative  costs  and 
infleXIbilities consists of voluntary agreements between producers or codes of conduct. 
These agreements have sometimes proved successful in the past and may be particularly 
suitable in situations where the number of producers (of a certain polluting product) is 
small. 
5.1.2.  Traditional market-based instruments 
Market-based  instruments  are  generally  characterized  by  their · use  of  the  price 
mechanism for reaching a given environmental target. Their general advantage is  that 
they give  a  permanent incentive to reduce pollution while  at the same time allowing 
choice among different possibilities of reaching the same target. They therefore often 
allow a given reduction of emissions to be achieved at the lowest cost to society. 
Generally, two classes of market-based instruments can be distinguished according to the 
way they use the market mechanism (see e.g. BONUS(1990) on this issue): 
Taxes  and charges, which  aim to "fix  the price of emissions",  thus leaving the 
decision on the size of the emission reduction to the individual economic agents. 
Tradable emission quotas, certificates or rights, which aim to "fix the amount of 
emissions",  leaving  the determination of the  price  (marginal cost) per unit  of 
emission to the market.9 
Although, in analytical terms, both instruments lead to equivalent results in equilibrium, 
there is clearly a link to the question of targets (section 4.2.). If an approach for limiting 
emissions  is  retained· that relies  on a  quantitative  emission  target,  a  quantity  based 
instrument a priori appears to be the logical choice. However, the final choice will also 
have to take into account the transaction costs of different instruments. 
To  the  extent  that environmental  policy  concerning  air  pollution  has  made  use  of 
market-based instruments in the past, this has traditionally been in the spirit of the "price 
9 In a certain sense, environmental policy has traditionally relied on a quantity approach when fiXing 
pollution or emission norms. However, such norms have been mostly been in the form of unitary 
limit values without using the market mechanism for equalising marginal emission reduction costs. -27-
approach" and making use of existing markets. In the C~  context four main types of 
such instruments are of potential importance: 
(a)  Taxes 
Carbon tax: 
From the economic point of view,  the most evident tax would be a  tax on the 
cause  of the  problem,  namely  on  carbon dioxide  emissions10,  i.e.  a  type  of 
"climate protection tax".  Theoretically, the most efficient way to define the tax 
base would be to levy the tax directly on actual emissions (in line with the Polluter 
Pays Principle), to apply the same tax rate to each emission unit and to locate the 
tax at the point where the technical possibilities for. emission reduction exist (for 
details see EWRINGMANN/ HANSMEYER/STAHLER (1990)). Under these 
circumstances, each individual "polluter" will tend to reduce his /her emissions of 
COz  up  to  the  point where  the  marginal  cost  of reducing  emissions  by  an 
addttional unit would equal the level of the tax rate on this pollution unit. 
INDICATIVE  C02  EMISSION  FACTORS  FOR  SELECTED  FOSSIL  FUEL 
PRODUCTS 
Hard coal 
Coke 
Brown coal 
Primary oil 
Motor spirit 
Kerosene 
Diesel oil 
LPG 
Natural Gas 
Source:  Commission (1986) 
TC02 /TJ 
94 
108 
105 
75 
72 
72 
74 
65 
55 
As there is - at least at present - a  direct linear relationship between fossil  fuel 
input and C!22 emissions, both approaches are basically equivalent.11 From the 
practical point  of view, the choice between these two possibilities then has to be 
10 In principle, the tax should be on ~  emissions, as it is not gross emissions that cause atmospheric 
concentrations  to  change.  However,  as  carbon  sinks  are  largely  unrelated  to  energy  use,  the 
distinction between gross and net emissions is of little importance for the design of a carbon tax on 
fossil fuels. Thus, only if  a global C02 emission tax were envisaged, either would net emissions have 
to be taxed or could tax credits for C02 'sinks' be given. 
11 In the long-run, it would have to be ensured that a tax on fossil fuel use as opposed to a tax on C02 
emissions  does  not  work  as  a  disincentive  to  the  development  and  use  of end-of-pipe  C02 
abatement technologies. -28-
made on the basis of where the transaction costs are lower. However, due to the 
different carbon content of different types of fossil fuels (see the emission factors 
in table 4  ), a uniform tax rate on carbon emissions would imply, per thermal unit, 
a higher tax rate on coal than on oil and, in particular, than on natural gas (see 
table 5). A carbon tax therefore gives an economic incentive to substitute non-
fossil fuels or fossil fuels with a low carbon content for fuels with a high carbon 
content. 
CONVERTING AN ECU SO PER TONNE CARBON TAX TO AMOUNTS PER UNIT OF OIL, 
NATURAL GAS AND COAL 
FUEL  C()AL  OIL1  GAS 
Physical unit  Tonnes of coal  Tonnes  GigaJoule 
equivalent  (Gross Calorific 
Value) 
Price per  physica~  unit 
EC January 1987 
Household sector 
Tax paid prices  ecu 228.25  294.40  6.55 
Giga Joule 
(Net Calorific Value)  29.3  40.0  0.9 
Price per GJ  ecu  7.79  7.36  7.28 
Tonnes of carbon per GJ  0.0257  0.0200  0.0153 
Tax per tonne C  ecu 50  50  50 
Carbon tax per GJ  ecu 1.29  1.00  0.77 
Percent of price in 
January 1987  17  14  11 
1 
2 
Heating gasoil  · 
Weighted by the 1987 structure of consumption in the different countries 
Source:  Eurostat -29-
With respect to the definition of the appropriate tax base, basically four possibilities 
exist: 
(i) 
(ii) 
(iii) 
(iv) 
Direct measurement of emissions: as set out above, this would appear 
to  be the  most  effective  way.  However,  the  transaction  costs  are 
bound to be very high, probably overcompensating the advantages in 
terms of efficiency. 
Declaration  of  emissions:  although  such  a  procedure  would 
significantly lower  the costs,  the control  problems are likely  to be 
enormous. 
Direct measurement of fossil fuel use: while for liquid fuels this might 
be a good solution both for stationary and for mobile sources (e.g. 
cars),  the  case  of solid  fuels  like  coal  would  probably  pose  some 
problems. 
Declaration  of fossil  fuel  use:  although  the  transaction  costs  are 
bound to be lower than in the case of direct measurement, such a 
procedure realistically can only be envisaged for the business sector. 
Concerning the question of whether a tax on emissions or a tax on fossil fuel input 
should be retained, one additional aspect is of importance: a tax on the use of fossil 
fuels  could  either  be  levied  on  those  using  the  energy  (consumption  tax),  or 
alternatively on those producing.  importin~ or delivering fossil  fuels  (production 
tax).  This  would  undoubtedly  have  sigmficant  advanta~es  in  terms  of  lower 
transaction costs,  in particular as  existing administrative Infrastructures  could be 
used. 
However, it would also  represent a shift away from an emission tax to a  form of 
product tax. As a result, the tax would no longer be directly paid by the "polluter". 
Instead, the tax burden on the COz-emitter would only be determined indirectly, 
depending on how much of the carbon tax the fossil  fuel producer/importer can 
pass on to his/her customer. This so-called tax incidence is essentially a function of 
the market conditions as  is  illustrated by graph 9:  ceteris paribus, the flatter the 
demand curve for energy products (DD)- i.e. the more sensitive demand is to price 
changes - the less  the tax  can be passed on to the  customer. In graph 9 this  is 
represented by the respective size, 1n the two diagrams, of the area ABGF (loss of 
producer surplus) and BCDG (loss of consumer surplus). It can be seen that the 
gross burden of taxation is shared differently between individual economic agents, 
depending on the price elasticity of demand. The more price elastic demand and the 
less price elastic supply are, the higher the producer's burden. -30-
GRAPH 9: TAX  INCIDENCE 
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The total burden of the tax may exceed the tax revenues collected (area ACDF) 
because  of  an  excess  burden  (DEF).  This  excess  burden  (or  deadweight  loss~ 
measures the distortions introduced by interfering with the consumer's free choice.1 
It  is of crucial importance, however, to take any accompanying benefits into account. 
Thus,  if the original  market equilibrium (E) represented a  sub-optimal resource 
allocation (e.g. because of the existence of external costs or an insufficient provision 
of public services), then the introduction of the new tax may imply a net gain and 
not a loss for society. It is important to keep this in mind, as the main argument for 
the  introduction  of a  carbon  tax  is  prectsely  the  existence  of externalities  and 
therefore the correction of a sub-optimal allocation of resources through the free 
market. 
Although  the  issue  of tax  incidence  represents  a  short-coming  of a  product tax 
compared  to  a  pure  emission  tax,  a  carbon tax  imposed  on fossil  fuel  use  and 
administered  at  the  level  of fossil  fuel  producers  or importers  on the  basis  of 
declared quantities would appear the most preferable solution in view of the existing 
administrative infrastructure. 
The main characteristic of a  carbon tax compared to a carbon charge  (discussed 
further  below)  is  that the  tax  revenues  are allocated to  the general government 
budget. When analyzing the (macro  )economic impacts of a carbon tax (see section 
12 If, for example, a consumer can no longer afford to buy a certain product after the tax increase, this loss 
in utility is not compensated by an increase in tax revenues. -31-
5.2.2.), the budgetary repercussions of the tax are of crucial importance. Basically, 
the following two distinctions have to be made: 
budget balance improvin~ versus budget neutral tax: Given a plausible set of 
demand and supply elasticities, the introduction of a carbon tax leads to an 
increase  in  tax  revenues  and  - with  unchanged  expenditures  - to  an 
improvement in the government balance.  In  a  Keynesian  framework,  this 
improvement  in  the  government  balance  corresponds  to  a  reduction  in 
aggregate demand and may, therefore, lead to a negative GDP response. In 
order  to  avoid  such  a  response,  either  government  expenditures  can  be 
increased or other revenues can be decreased such  as  to  keep the budget 
balance unchanged. 
revenue raising versus revenue neutral tax:  if the additional revenues from 
the introduction of a (carbon) tax  are not compensated by  a  reduction in 
other taxes, the overall tax burden in the economy increases. This, in turn, 
may have a negative effect on aggregate supply. In the revenue-neutral case, 
on the other hand, other taxes are lowered such as  to leave the overall tax 
burden of companies and households unchanged. Thus, a revenue neutral tax 
only chan~es the structure of taxation - thereby inducing a change in relative 
prices -without changing the overall level of taxation. 
This issue of a change in the structure of taxation (or "fiscal reform") merits 
some further discussion. Analytically,  energy can be seen as  one of several 
production factors.  If, therefore, one takes the position that presently more 
energy is used than would be optimal from the point of view of society (e.g. 
because energy prices do not reflect the full social costs of energy use), while 
other  production  factors  (for  example  labour)  are  under-used  (high 
unemployment),  a  redistribution  of the  tax  burden from  one  production 
factor  to another would  not only  incur no  resource  costs,  but would  even 
increase  social  welfare  as  it  would  eliminate  an  economically  inefficient 
allocation  of resources.  Such  a  chan~e would,  however,  imply  short-run 
adjustment costs associated with the shift from one factor input combination 
to another (e.g.  the replacement of existing  ener~-inefficient equipment). 
Moreover,  there  would  of  course  still  be  significant  net  impacts  at  the 
microeconomic level:  those burning large quantities of fossil  fuel would be 
worse off, while those using non-fossil energy would be better off. Although 
this  is  exactly  the  intended  incentive  effect  of  the  tax,  undesirable 
distributional consequences might have  to be compensated for  (see section 
5.2.2.). 
Clearly, while revenue neutrality implies budget neutrality, budget neutrality does 
not imply revenue neutrality. In envuonmental terms, a budget balance improving 
carbon tax  tends to  reduce emissions by  more  than a budget neutral tax.  This  is 
because  the  emission  reduction  is  not  only  the  result  of a  substitution  process 
between products subject to the carbon tax and products less affected or unaffected 
by the tax, but is also the result of an income effect. In economic terms, on the other 
hand, the revenue neutral introduction of a carbon tax is particularly appealing as it 
offers  the  potential  for  reaching .a  given  emission  reduction  target  with  least 
(macro  )economic cost. 
This  aspect  is  crucial  in  understanding  the  difference  between  the  historical 
experience of the oil price shocks and a budget-neutral domestic  increas~ in energy 
taxes. While in the former case there is  a flow  of real resources to oil-producing 
countries, in the latter case there is only a change in (domestic) relative prices. This -32-
distinction can also  be illustrated with  the  help of the standard textbook figures 
depicted in graph 10. Before the introduction of the tax, a representative consumer 
consumes quantity A of product A and quantity B of product B. To the extent that 
the introduction of a tax on product A leads to a price increase for product A with 
the price of product B being unchanged, the household income constraint implies 
that the consumer can now only afford quantities A' and B', respectively, implytng a 
lower overall level of utility (indifference curve II instead of 1'1'). If, however, the tax 
induced price increase of product A is  compensated by a tax (cut) induced price 
decrease for product B, the consumer can maintain his utility level and now reaches 
a new equilibrium by consuming A" and B" quantities, respectively. If product A is 
assumed to be the C04 emitting product, it can be seen from this illustration that 
while the pure substitution effect implies a higher emission level than the combined 
income and substitution effect (A"  Instead of A'), it also implies a higher level of 
consumer utility. 
•• 
GRAPH 10: SUBSTITUTION AND INCOME EFFECT 
(Purely Illustrative) 
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One further characteristic of the carbon tax,  and indeed of taxes in general, has to 
be mentioned in  this  context.  Due to  the imperfect knowledge  of the  respective 
elasticities,  the  quantitative  outcome  of a  tax  in terms  of emission  reduction is 
difficult to forecast. Thus, if the attainment of a specific emission reduction target is 
of importance (which, as  has been argued in chapter 3, is not necessarily the case 
concerning carbon dioxide), tax rates probably have to be adjusted in a process of 
"trial-and-error". Such tax rate adjustments may, however, increase uncertainty with 
respect to future tax  rates (and thus prices) and therefore have some undesirable 
effects on expectations. -33-
Energy (Joule/Btu) tax: 
One alternative to a carbon tax  (which  taxes  energy products according to their 
carbon content) would be a tax based on the thermal content of energy products. 
From the economic point of view, it is difficult to justify such a general energy tax. 
As there is little reason to ar~e  that, from the point of view of society, energy use 
per se is inherently negative, It is unclear why it should be taxed (and therefore in a 
sense be implicitly "punished").  It is  therefore not surprising that in the ongoing 
discussion, two mainly political arguments are used for advocating a general energy 
tax. 
First, a carbon tax would tend to affect gml the most, due to its high carbon 
content. This might be considered undesirable both from the domestic policy 
point of view (in countries with domestic coal production) and from the point 
of view of supply security (coal, contrary to natural gas, is in comparatively 
abundant supply and a large part of coal reserves are located in "politically 
stable" industrialized countries). In economic terms, both these issues should 
really be dealt with by using other, more appropriate policy instruments (e.g. 
social policy and an oil import tax). In fact, basing the choice of a general 
energy tax  on such  arguments  implies  th~t a  more costly approach to  the 
greenhouse problem is retained than would be necessary. 
Second, carbon taxes increase the price of fossil  fuels relative to non-fossil 
fuels.  With unchanged  policies,  this  also  leads  to  an improvement of the 
competitive position of nuclear enerGY -which  might,  in turn, be politically 
unacceptable. 
Again,  seen  from  an economic  stand-point,  such  a  line  of reasoning  is 
untenable.  As  a matter of fact,  there are two  possibilities:  either nuclear 
energy is  economically viable from the point of view of society (i.e.  taking 
into account the full cost of nuclear energy and considering the welfare losses 
occurring  through  the  fact  of  imposin~ a  technology  which  is  strongly 
opposed by a large part of society). In this case there is no economic reason 
to neglect the "nuclear option". Or nuclear energy only appears economically 
profitable because some of its_ (hidden) costs  are borne by  society.  In this 
case the appropriate policy strategy would not be to avoid a carbon tax but 
instead to ensure that the full cost principle is applied to all forms of energy 
and not only to fossil fuels. 
Road transport fuel tax: 
Another policy option that is  sometimes proposed in the context of a reduction of 
COz emissions is an increase in gasoline and diesel taxes. Such an increase is usually 
advocated by reference to the lar~e (and in many countries rising) part of transport 
in overall emissions and the adnunistrative ease with which it can be implemented. 
However,  economically  a  petrol  tax  on  its  own  is  an inefficient  instrument  for 
reducing COz emissions. This is  not only intuitively clear (as emissions should be 
reduced  where  this  is  cheapest  and  there  is  no  reason  to  believe  that  this  is 
necessarily in the area of personal transport), but has also been shown empirically. 
NORDHAUS(1989)  as  well  as  CHANDLER/NICHOLLS(1990)  have 
demonstrated that a petrol tax  would  be significantly more expensive  to reach a 
given emission reduction target. -34-
Concerning the choice between a carbon, energy or petrol tax,  it has to be emphasised, 
though, that it is necessary to clearly define the policy aim. If the aim is to find the most 
cost-effective  policy  instrument  to  reduce  CD2  emissions,  the  carbon  tax  is  clearly 
preferable. However, if other objectives are of importance, for example increased supply 
security or improved  trade balance,  a petrol tax may under certain circumstances offer 
higher overall benefits (see CHANDLER/NICHOLLS(1990)). Moreover, when evaluating 
the economic impacts of different types of taxes, it has to be taken into account that the 
sectoral effects are likely to differ significantly. 
(b)  Charges 
Instead of a carbon 1M, a carbon charge could be envisaged. Whilst a charge would 
have basically the same characteristic as a tax with respect to the direction of effects 
on the price of different fossil  fuels,  the main difference concerns the use of the 
revenues  arising  frqp1  the  imposition  of  the  tax  or  charge  (see  e.g. 
TEWINKEL/HANSJURGENS(1991) on the issue of taxes versus charges). In the 
case of a tax, the corresponding revenues would be attributed to the general budget 
and could be used for a restructuring of the general budget as set out above. In the 
case  of a  carbon charge,  on the other hand,  the  revenues would,  in the scheme 
currently under discussion, be earmarked to finance measures to reduce emissions 
(for  example  the  funds  could  be  allocated  to  a  climate  protection  fund).  The 
purpose of a charge therefore can be described as raising the revenues needed to 
pay  for  certain specific  expenditures  from  those  who  are benefiting from  these 
expenditures (a well-known example is waste water treatment charges). 
Thus, while the main emission reducing mechanism of a carbon tax is normally the 
incentive  effect,  the purpose  of a  carbon  charge  is  mainly  (but not exclusively) 
revenue raising. The advantages of a charge over a tax are mainly twofold. The first 
main advantage lies in the availability of an emission reduction potential that would 
be difficult to exploit by mere reliance on the price mechanism. Pr  ~  ~icly funded 
information campaigns, for example, might result in higher emission reouct1ons than 
limited increases in energy tax rates as many small consumers might be unaware of 
the existing saving potent1al. As a result, the rate of carbon charge needed to raise 
the required amount of funds could be much lower than the carbon tax would have 
to be 1n  order to  reach  a given  COz emission  reduction target.  Second,  as  the 
revenues  from  a  charge  would  be  earmarked  for  specific  emission  reduction 
measures,  the  revenue  use  would  be relatively  transparent  and  a  charge  might 
therefore face fewer acceptance problems than a tax. 
On the other hand,  there are three main objections that can be raised against a 
carbon charge: 
First,  from  a  public  finance  point  of view,  the  decision  on  the  optimal 
allocation  of public  expenditure  should,  in  ~eneral, not  be linked  to  the 
decision on the sources of revenue. Althou~h  1n certain circumstances such a 
link may be justified (e.g. user charges), th1s is unlikely to be the case in the 
context  of  COz  emissions.  A  COz  charge  would  therefore  introduce 
undesirable budgetary rigidities. 
Second, without any adjustments,  a carbon charge would tend to raise the 
overall  burden  of taxes  and  charges  in  the  economy.  It would  therefore 
increase the share of GDP that is controlled by the public sector (although 
not  necessarily  by  the  government  and  therefore,  indirectly,  by  the 
parliament), which might be politically and economically undesirable. (c) 
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Third, the funds raised by the carbon charge would in all likelihood also be 
used to finance - at least partly - emission reduction investments undertaken 
by  private  economic  agents  (companies  or households).  However,  against 
such  a  procedure the same  methodological  reservations  can be raised  as 
against subsidies in general (see below). 
Fourth, in order to  adequately administer the use of the  revenues from a 
carbon tax, a new bureaucracy is likely to be required. 
In addition to these objections, there are also a number of legal questions that are of 
importance:  While  taxes  are  part  of the  general  budget  and  can  thereby  be 
redistributed according to standard budgetary rules (nationally and internationally), 
charges are ~enerally considered to require a closer link to the user (user charge) or 
emitter (  etrussion charge). This renders a reassignment of the funds legally more 
difficult. 
Fiscal incentives 
The last category of ill&truments  of importance in the context of greenhouse gas 
emissions  consists  of different  forms  of financial  incentives.  Such  incentives  can 
either take the form of tax incentives (e.g. reduced tax rates, tax exemptions etc.), or 
they can consist of fiscal  incentives in the form  of direct financial  transfers  (e.g. 
grants, "soft"  loans etc.). Tax incentives are often easier to administer than direct 
financial transfers, while the latter can frequently be focused more easily on specific 
target  groups.  As  already  stated  above,  the  amount  of emission  reduction  per 
monetary  unit  can be  much  higher .for  such  a  fiscal  incentive  than  for  a  tax. 
However, (implicit or explicit)  subsidies are in clear contradiction to the Polluter 
Pays Principle (PPP), as the polluter is not (or at least not fully) paying for the cost 
associated with the abatement of the emissions. The risk therefore arises that the 
polluter undertakes less pollution abatement investment on his own than he would 
have done otherwise, in anticipation of public subsidies. For these reasons, there are 
severe economic objections to a general and widespread use of subsidies as a policy 
instrument (static and dynamic inefficiency). 
In addition, it has to be kept in mind that fiscal  incentives imply either a loss  of 
government revenue  (tax incentives),  or an increase  in government  expenditure. 
Both would have to be compensated for by raising (other) revenue in order to keep 
the government  budget balance  unchanged.  The economic costs  of raising  such 
additional revenues  have  to  be deducted from  the  (emission  reduction)  benefits 
arising from the fiscal  incentives. As far as the implementation in the Community 
context is  concerned,  there is  also  the legal question of to what extent Member 
States are allowed to pay subsidies (to promote energy saving investments in the 
business sector) without Community agreement. Within the GATT as well, legal (or 
political) complications might arise. 
Nevertheless, there are specific circumstances in which fiscal incentives can be an 
effective  and  even  efficient  instrument.  This  is  particularly  the  case  when  the 
transitory use of subsidies helps to create a market where it would otherwise not 
exist or where subsidy schemes specifically accelerate the rate of penetration of new, 
"green" technologies. -36-
5.1.3.  Regulatory  /institutional reform to enhance or install the market mechanism 
While the instruments described in the previous section all rely on existing markets, there 
are at least two broad classes of policy instruments which attempt to solve the pollution 
problem by creating new markets. 
(a)  Tradable permits 
The basic idea of tradable emission rights13  is  to use the market mechanism for 
equalizing  the  marginal  cost  of  emission  reductions  undertaken  by  different 
emitters. Tradable emission rights can be used either as a national policy instrument 
for  limiting  a  country's  emissions  or as  an  international  policy  instrument  for 
limiting  aggregate  emissions  of  a  group  of  countries  (see  e.g. 
MARKANDYA(1991)). The underlying philosophy of tradable emission rights can 
be illustrated by  an example: if a producer (A) is  only allowed to emit a certain 
amount of COz, this target has to be met irrespective of the costs associated with it. 
Even if another producer (B) could reduce his emissions by the amount for only half 
the cost,  fixed  quotas would  not allow  these cost differences  to be exploited.  If, 
instead, trading IS permitted, producer A could offer producer B a side-payment for 
reducing his emissions by more than he would have done otherwise. As the size of 
this side-payment would be lower than the emission reduction cost of producer A, 
but higher than the emission reduction cost of producer B, both producers would 
gain from such a "trade". Economists call this a "pareto-superior" situation. 
Concerning the design of a marketable permit scheme for dealing with the issue of 
COz emissions,  it is  necessary  to rely principally  on the  (moderately successful) 
practical  experience  made  in  the  United  States  (see  e.g.  HAHN(1989), 
HAHN/HESTER(1989a+b), TIETENBERG(1990)). The main mechanisms  that 
have been used in these trading schemes are: 
(i) 
(ii) 
Netting:  In the US,  netting allows  modifying or  expan~~rtg emission 
sources to avoid stringent review processes so long as the net increase 
in the emissions from  a  specific pollution source is  below a  certain 
threshold (so-called internal trading). If,  for  example,  there were a 
COz  emission  trading  scheme  for  utilities  in  the  European 
Community, each utility could expand its fossil fuel based generating 
capacity provided increased efficiency or fuel  switching would allow 
the overall level of its COz emissions to be kept constant. 
Offsets: The basic idea is that new or expanding pollution sources are 
required  to  secure  sufficient  offsetting  emission  reductions  from 
existing pollution sources so that after their entry or expansion the air 
(or water) is cleaner than before (both internal and external trading). 
Transposed to the COz issue, offsets could, for example, mean that a 
company wishing to increase its C02 emissions either would have to 
find  another company willing  to  reduce  its  emissions  by  the  same 
13 In this paper, the terms "emission rights"  and "emission permits" are used as synonyms. However, the 
"right"  to emit can take  two  forms:  on the one hand, it  can be in  the form  of a certain quantity of 
emission  per  unit  of time  (e.g.  per year);  in  the  literature,  the  term  "tradable  permit"  is  usually 
understood in this sense. On the other hand, the right can also be in the form of a certain quantity of 
emission  independently of the time of emission. This can be implemented in  the form of "emission 
certificates"  (see  e.g.  HEISTER/MICHAELIS/MOHR(1990)).  This  distinction  between  a 
"permanent" right and a right "per unit" is of particular relevance as far as the issue of "new entrants" is 
concerned. (iii) 
(iv) 
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amount  or  would  have  to  guarantee  an  equivalent  amount  of 
reforestation  to  be  undertaken  in  order  to  absorb  the  additional 
amount of emissions. 
Bubbles:  Under  this  mechanism,  several  (regionally  grouped) 
emission sources are treated as if they were enclosed in an imaginary 
bubble. Only the total emissions (i.e. the sum of the different sources) 
that leave  the  bubble  are set by  regulation.  Thus,  in  essence,  the 
sources  are  free  to  choose  the  emission  control  measures  among 
different discharge points as long as the overall emission (reduction) 
target is respected. In the C0:2 context, for example, the Community 
could be considered as one "bubble" as it is  of no importance for the 
atmosphere whether the COz is  emitted in Member State A  or in 
Member  State  B.  Only  the  total  amount  of emissions  has  to  be 
controlled. 
Banking: Polluters are allowed to 'store' emission permits that have 
not been 'used' either for future use or sale. Due to the long life-time 
of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, banking would theoretically 
appear to be a plausible option as - within a broad range - the year of 
the emission is  of no importance for the climate. However, banking 
could  complicate  the  scheme  administratively.  Moreover,  permit 
"hoarding"  might  impair  sufficient  trading  of &ermits  thereby 
endan~ering the efficient functioning of the market.  Providing for the 
possibility  of  permit  leasing  would  probably  reduce  the  risk  of 
hoarding.) 
One of the most difficult aspects of any marketable permit scheme is the question of 
how  the  permits  should  initially  be  allocated  among  the  participants  (see  e.g. 
GRUBB/ SEBENIUS(1991) for the issue of permit allocation in the context of an 
international emission trading system). In principle, three main alternatives can be 
distinguished: 
allocation on the basis of the "grandfathering principle": in this case, permits 
would be distributed on the basis  of ~ast (or present) emissions.  Initially, 
there would therefore not be an immediate need to trade, while gradually the 
gains from trading could be realized. However, this allocation principle has 
the characteristic that, implicitly,  those polluters that have already made a 
significant  effort  to  reduce  their  emissions  in  the  past  are  put  at  a 
disadvantage compared to heavy polluters. In addition, the question of how 
new producers should be dealt with has to be decided. 
allocation on the basis of indicators: such a solution allows the use of one or 
more indicators  (e.g.  population and  GDP internationally or employment 
and production at the national level) for devising an allocation mechanism. 
allocation by  auctioning permits: in such a  scheme, permits are auctioned 
publicly, thereby immediately creating a market (which is not necessarily the 
case for the other two allocation principles). 
Concerning the use of a tradable permit scheme in the context of a policy to reduce 
COz  emissions,  a  few  general  comments  are  required.  Theoretically,  tradable 
permits are a very appealing instrument for reducing COz emissions. It is not only 
an economically efficient scheme, but has also the additional advantage of signalling 
the scarcity  of natural  resources  to  the  individual  economic  agent.  While  taxes -38-
follow Pigou's idea of internalising external costs into the price of goods, tradable 
emission  rights  follow  Coase's  approach  of  allocating  property  rights.  These 
property rights can then be traded. 
Like  taxes,  tradable  permits  can  be  applied  either  at  the  national  or  the 
international level (see section 7.1.2.). At the national level, for example, one could 
even envisage auctioning the ri~ht to produce or import a specified amount of COz 
in the form  of fossil  fuels.  Thts  amount could  be lowered over time  in order to 
reduce  COz emissions.  Thus,  the quantity of emissions  could be easily adjusted. 
Moreover,  contrary  to  the  case  of  taxes,  a  permit  scheme  guarantees  that  a 
quantified overall emission target is  resP.ected,  provided, of course, compliance is 
ensured (see DUDEK/ TIETENBERG(1991), for example, on the monitoring and 
enforcement of greenhouse gas  trading).  Due to the fact  that tax  elasticities are 
uncertain, tax rates probably would have to be adjusted several times in a trial-and-
error process in order to attain the specified target. This is an important aspect, as 
there often appears to be,  in the political sphere, an affinity with the concept of 
quantitative targets. 
On the other hand, there are some arguments that could speak against a tradable 
permit scheme:. 
First, transaction costs could potentially constitute an obstacle to the efficient 
functioning of a tradable permit scheme. In this context, the experience with 
emission trading in California appears to suggest that while transaction costs 
are significant (10-30% of total costs), they do not ap{>ear to be responsible 
for paucity of trading (see DWYER(1991)). Transaction costs may  explain, 
however,  why  most  trading  so  far  has  been  (company)  internal  and  not 
external. Generally,  the  Californian experience illustrates the obstacles for 
creating an ideal, competitive market. For these reasons, marketable permits 
are likely to be best suited to situations where the number of participants is 
high  enough  to  avoid  problems  of monopoly  or  oligopoly,  but  also  low 
enough to keep transaction costs small. 
Second, unless auctions are used for allocating permits, a permit scheme for 
existin~ sources could pose a problem for new entrants. While the auctioning 
of emission  rights  at  the  national  level  aEpears  to  be  a  strai~htforward 
solution (see e.g. HEISTER/MICHAELIS fMOHR(1990)), it is hkely to be 
more difficult to accept at the international level (even if the equity aspect of 
the  permit  allocation  could  be  taken  into  account  by  an  appropriate 
redistribution of the auction revenues). 
Third,  while  the  likely  tax  burden  in  a  scheme  of emission  taxes  can  be 
relatively easily  assessed  in  advance,  the future  price  of permits might be 
difficult  to  forecast.  Companies  (and  probably  also  countries)  might 
therefore prefer taxes to tradable permits. 
Fourth,  a tradable permit scheme would  require a  monitoring mechanism 
(including possibly a system of fines for cases in which emissions exceed the 
allowed  amount). Such  control mechanisms  could  imply  the need for  new 
institutions. (b) 
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Other market creation and market enhancement measures 
One of the major categories of attempts to exploit the existing economic potential 
for  reducing  energy  demand  and  consequently  energy  related  greenhouse  ~as 
emissions at the nat1onallevel - mainly in the utility and residential sector - consists 
of concepts  like  "least-cost  planning",  "demand  side  management",  "all  sources 
bidding",  "contracts  for  energy  management"  or  "third  party  financing".  The 
underlying philosophy of all these concepts is to install or to strengthen the market 
mechanism in areas where - for institutional, behaviourial or other reasons - it did 
not (sufficiently) apply before. As these types of instruments mainly focus  on the 
specific area of energy conservation, they will be discussed in detail in section 5.3.1. 
As a conclusion of the above discussion of the choice of policy instruments, there is a strong 
a  priori  reason  to  suggest  that  market-based  instruments  are  a  particularly  useful 
component  of an instrument-mix  addressing  the  problem of global  warming  (see  also 
BARRETI{1991b) and BERTRAM/STEPHENS/WALLACE on this issue).14 In addition 
to the general efficiency arguments given above, three further arguments support this view: 
First, there are no direct negative effects of COz emissions (e.g. health hazards etc.) 
that would call for a regulatory intervention. 
Second, the regional location of the emission source is of no importance, i.e. there is 
no so-called hot-spot problem. 
Third, basically all  areas  of economic activity  are involved  in the emission  (and 
sometimes also the absorption) of carbon dioxide due to the combustion of fossil 
fuels. The combination of a large number of economic agents with a large number 
of technologies  of energy  use  in  fact  suggests  the  use  of broadly-based  policy 
instruments rather than individual regulation. 
However,  this should not be interpreted as  implying that market-based instruments are 
necessarily J?referable  under all  circumstances.  There are indeed cases,  for  example  in 
situations With  very high transaction costs of market-based instruments or with very low 
price elasticities, where regulatory means are superior, also from the economic point of 
view. Thus, the optimal policy-mix is often likely to consist of a combination of regulatory 
and market-based instruments and would be accompanied by  other policies (e.g.  in the 
fields of transport, energy, research and development, training and education, development 
etc.). 
5.2.  Addressing  the  issue  by  choosing  the  "top-down"  approach:  using  the  price 
mechanism 
Following the above  emphasis  on the  role  of the price  mechanism also  influences the 
choice of the overall approach to the COz emission limitation question. In this context, the 
so-called  "top-down"  approach  takes  a  more  aggregate,  macroeconomic  view  of  the 
problem. Its underlying philosophy can be explained as follows:  The starting point is  the 
observation that the actual quantity of emissions  exceeds what is  considered  to be the 
14 Although, unfortunately, there are very few studies directly comparing the costs of using "command-
and-control" instruments as opposed to market-based policy instruments, the above presumption is not 
only theoretical. This becomes clear not only from TIETENBERG's analysis of the efficiency gains 
from tradable permit schemes, but it is also implicitly revealed by those studies quantifying the costs of 
C02 emission limitation policies not using the market mechanism (e.g. CSIS(1991)). -40-
equilibrium amount. In market economies this is an indication of the fact that the "price" of 
emissions is too low. The reason for this lies in the existence of externalities or social costs: 
to the extent that the price of, say, fossil fuels paid by each individual economic agent does 
not cover the full  cost (i.e. also the long-run environmental cost) of using this energy, the 
amount of energy used exceeds the social optimum. 
From this  analysis  it is  concluded that the most obvious way  to  reduce emissions is  to 
increase the pnce of emissions by  internalizing the social costs.  In the context of energy 
related emissions  (where,  to a  certain extent,  a  market for  emissions  implicitly already 
exists in form of a market for fossil fuel products - even if the price of the emissions may 
currently be zero),  the aim is  to ensure that energy prices equal the long-run marginal 
social cost of energy supply (or use). The general policy instrument for achieving this is 
taxation (table 5 gives an example of converting a carbon tax into energy price changes). In 
the  absence  of reliable,  monetized  estimates  concerning  the  social  cost  of energy  (in 
particular fossil fuel) use, a more pragmatic procedure is often used. In this case, the s1ze of 
the tax rate is  determined merely on the basis of what is  required to reach a (politically 
predetermined) overall emission reduction target. 
5.2.1.  What tax/  charge rates are required to reach given emission targets? 
There already exist a considerable number of studies that have addressed this question (see 
table 6 for a survey of those studies focusing on carbon taxes). These studies not only cover 
a wide range of individual countries or world regions, but also apply analytical methods of 
different  de?.f.fes  of  sophistication.  Generally,  three  types  of  approach  may  be 
distinguished: 
the ~rice elasticity of energy demand approach 
partial equilibrium models 
general equilibrium models 
When evaluating the results of those approaches or models that are based on the past, it 
should  be  kept in  mind  that a  change  in behaviour could  also  significantly  change the 
conclusions in terms of required tax rates. In particular, there has never been, in the past, 
an  occasion  where  energy  was  subject  to  a  declared  long-run  progressive  increase  in 
taxation. If energy price expectations were altered by such a predictable change in taxation, 
then  apparent  price  elasticities  of  demand  calculated  from  past  behaviour  could 
underestimate the possible demand response. The reason for this is that, in reality, demand 
behaviour for energy consuming durable equipment is to a significant extent determined by 
price expectations, while statistical price elasticities are usually estimated on the basis of 
actual  and  not  of expected  prices.  Nevertheless,  past  behaviour  constitutes  the  best 
available scientific guide to what might be behaviour 1n the future. On the other hand, most 
studies assume  technical progress  to be exogenous. It is  quite likely,  though, that in the 
long-run an ecological reorientation of the economic sphere would also tend to change the 
direction  of  technical  progress.  As  elasticities  depend,  among  other  factors,  on  the 
available technological options, such a change in the direction of technical progress would, 
in the long term, also change the observed energy price and substitution elasticities. 
15 BOERO/CLARKE/WINTERS(1991) use a somewhat broader distinction between theoretical models, 
statistical  models  and  simulation  models.  Concerning  simulation  models,  the  authors  distinguish 
between  resource  allocation  models  (general  equilibrium  models,  restricted  general  equilibrium 
models, partial equilibrium models, bottom-up models) and macroeconometric models. T
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(a)  The price elasticity approach 
The price elasticity approach is both the most easily applicable and the least sophisticated 
approach. On the basis of price elasticities of energy demand estimated with data from the 
past, is calculated the increase in prices that would be required to reach a given fossil fuel 
use and therefore_ C~  emission target. For the United Kingdom, BARRETI (1990b) has 
calculated the tax rates that would be required to reduce carbon emissions by 20% in the 
short- and in the long-run. On the basis of the elasticities he used, he derived tax rates of 
151% on coal, 119% on oil and 57% on natural gas in order to reduce emissions in the 
short-run, implying a tax of £86 per ton of carbon. In the long-run, the~  rates would only 
have to be 40%, 32% and 15%, respectively (£23 per ton of carbon).1  These estimations 
do, however, exclude the transport sector from the analysis. 
PRICE ELASTICITIES OF FINAL ENERGY DEMAND IN THE EC 
COUNTRY  SHORT TERM  LONG TERM 
Belgium  -0.26  -1.05 
Denmark  -0.16  -0.63 
Germany  -0.11  -0.44 
France  -0.10  -0.41 
Italy  -0.14  -0.55 
Netherlands  -0.16  -0.62 
United Kingdom  -0.10  -0.42 
USA  -0.09  -0.38 
Japan  -0.09  -0.35 
Source.:  MITTELSTADT (1983) 
(b)  Partial equilibrium models 
Althou~h the elasticity approach described in the previous section requires relatively little 
effort,  tt has  the  senous disadvantage  of neglecting  any  feed-back  mechanisms.  Partial 
equilibrium models (which  can be econometric, linear  programmin~ or process-oriented 
models)  aim at integrating at least some of such  mechanisms. Theu characteristic is  to 
focus on one or more, but not on all aspects of the problem. Only for those markets under 
16 The importance of distinguishing the short run from the long run is also dearly illustrated in table 7 by 
the markedly higher long run price elasticities of aggregate energy demand compared to the short run 
elasticities. -44-
explicit consideration "is  a market clearing mechanism analysed, while other variables are 
treated as exogenous. The most widely used partial equilibrium models in the context of 
C02 policies are models either only representing the energy sector or only focusing  on 
macroeconomic variables. Partial equilibrium models are, compared to ~eneral equilibrium 
models, particularly suitable for analysing the medium-term economy-Wide or energy sector 
adjustment dynanncs in response to a carbon tax (even if they normally do not contain the 
high degree of  sectoral detail of input-output models). 
One such model has been used by KOUV  ARITAKIS(1989) to analyze policy options to 
reduce  energy-related  COz  emissions  in  the  OECD  region.  The  carbon  tax  scenario 
imposes a  tax  at a level equivalent to  $50  per tonne of coal  equivalent,  approximately 
representing a  price rise  in the order of 100% for coal and 40-60% for crude oil and 
natural gas  (compared to  1988/1989 figures).  The results of the simulation indicate not 
only that most of the emission reduction is  in the first five years, but also that emissions 
only fall by around 12% compared to the baseline in 2005. In spite of the fact that large-
scale dislocation of energy intensive production to non-OECD countries has. been excluded 
in the model, total world emissions are only 4% below the baseline. (This again illustrates 
the importance of a  global  solution.) The overall  conclusion  of the  KOUV  ARITAKIS 
study is that measures would have to be large scale and costly in order to seriously affect 
long-term atmospheric C02 concentrations. 
Within the framework of a broader study on a "Green Europe", DRI(1990) has simulated 
the effects of a tax of ECU 300 per ton of carbon for  the European Community (major 
four). In terms of energy prices, the maximum effect of the tax on the level of energy prices 
is 49% for France, 52% for Italy, 71% for the United Kingdom and 75% for Germany. The 
effects of this tax, which is gradually phased in during the 1990s, is to nearly stabilize C02 
emissions by the year 2000. There 1s, however, no reduction in emissions compared to the 
1988 level. Moreover, in order to sustain the stabilization, further carbon tax increases are 
necessary. 
Another analysis focusing  on the Community has been undertaken in the c  ·1text  of the 
Commission's exercise "Energy for a new century" (COMMISSION(1990a)). ln a scenario 
named "high prices" (scenario 4  ),  the effects of the introduction of a carbon tax on fossil 
fuels and of an expansion in nuclear energy capacity has been investigated. The carbon tax 
represents a once-and-for-all increase in the price of coal of 100%, in the price of oil of 
40% and in the price of natural gas of 30%. Economic ~rowth is assumed to be similar to 
the rate assumed in the baseline. In terms of C02, emissions stabilize around the year 2000 
at their 1987level and decline thereafter to be 19% lower in 2010.  · 
For  the  United  Kingdom  and  within  the  framework  of  the  JOULE  programme, 
CAPROS/KARADELOGLOU/MENTZAS(1990) have combined two partial equilibrium 
models, one energy (MIDAS) and one macro-sectoral (HERMES) econometric model, to 
study  the  impact of a  carbon  tax.  Four different  types  of scenario were  distinguished, 
depending  on whether structural  adjustment in the power generation sector (notably  a 
doubling of the nuclear and natural gas investment programmes  b~ the year 2005) were 
included  or  not,  and  whether  the  carbon  tax  was  additive  (hke  excise  duties)  or 
multiplicative (like VAT, which turns out to be less effective). The general conclusion of 
the study is that carbon taxes have to be drastic (several hundred J?ercent) in order to reach 
ambitious COz reduction targets. In fact,  the· elasticity of emission reduction per unit of 
mean energy price increase is very small and only in the order of -0.17. The major part of 
the  emission  reduction  is  achieved  by  a  decrease  in  total  energy  demand,  while  fuel 
substitution is only of secondary importance. The results show that structural adjustment in 
the power generation sector is  of crucial importance for the scope of emission reduction. 
However, even with such an adjustment, it proves impossible to (realistically) reach the 
Toronto target.  When interpreting the  results  of this  study,  it has  to be kept in  mind, -45-
however,  that,  in the  model  version  used  by  the  authors,  investment  decisions  in the 
electricity  generatin~ sector are treated as  exogenous. Thus, the important aspect of fuel 
substitut1on in electncity generation has not been captured satisfactorily. 
A second study simulating the effects of a carbon tax for the United Kingdom has recently 
been undertaken by  BARKER(1990).  Barker simulated an ad valorem tax on domestic 
fossil  fuel which is  modulated according to the carbon content and rises  each year by  3 
percentage points  in order to  minimize  adjustment costs  (see below  the  discussion  on 
timing).  The  tax  is  imposed  unilaterally  and  is  fully  compensated  by  a  corresponding 
reduction in VAT in order to keer. the average consumer price level unchanged. The main 
conclusion of the study is that whlle the costs of stabilizing C02 emissions by 2005 at their 
1990  level  are relatively small,  proportionally greater efforts  are required  to reach the 
Toronto target. Due to the fact that the easy substitution possibilities are exhausted before 
the year 2000, the tax rate has to increase by almost 10 percentage points per year in order 
to come close to a 20% reduction of emissions by 2005. 
Also for the United Kingdom, but only for the manufacturing sector, INGHAM and ULPH 
studied  what  level  of taxes  on C02 emissions  would  be  required  to  reduce  the  UK 
manufacturing sector's emissions to 80% of their 1988 level by the year 2005. On the basis 
of a vintage model of factor demands, the authors find that the required carbon tax level 
would be substantial: under a broad range of assumptions, the taxes on coal would have to 
be in the range of 123%-277% by the year 2005, on oil 57%-128% and on natural gas 71%-
160%. 
Concerning  France,  preliminary  work  undertaken  by  the  COMMISSARIAT  A 
L'ENERGIE ATOMIQUE(1990) analyzes the introduction of a progressively phased in 
tax on fossil fuels (oil and coal). The tax rate is constant in real J?rices and amounts to FF 
850 per ton of oil equivalent. Two variants were simulated, one without any recycling of tax 
revenues and one in which employers' social security contributions are reduced in order to 
compensate for the effect of higher energy prices on the production cost of companies. In 
terms of emissions, C02 emissions are between 19% (revenue raising) and 13% (revenue 
neutral) below the baseline by the year 2010.  It is  interesting to note that SOz emissions 
decrease by even more (38% and 28%, respectively). 
For the Federal Republic of Germany, PROGNOS(1989) analyzed the effects of higher 
energy prices and taxes  on COz emissions.  Compared to the status-quo projection, it is 
assumed that (real) oil prices progressively rise to $ 35 per barrel by the year 2010 instead 
of 25  $/b. In addition, the energy tax rates on fossil  fuels are doubled with respect to the 
baseline. These price effects are combined with accompanying measures to promote energy 
saving. This sensitivity scenario results in a primary energy demand 10% below the baseline 
and a reduction in COz emissions of the same order. 
(c)  General equilibrium models 
The short-coming of partial equilibrium models of neglecting important interactions has 
led  to  the  development of (computable) general equilibrium models.  In fact,  a  general 
equilibrium  framework  endogenously  inte~rates all  key  economic  sectors  and  permits 
economic agents in all sectors to optimize JOintly. The integration of the main feed-backs 
and  interrelationships  between  the  different  economic  sectors  allows  the  model  to  be 
solved for the general equilibrium of the entire system. In order to adequately assess not 
only the direct but also the indirect costs and effects associated with global environmental 
issues,  a general equilibrium framework integrating economy, energy and environment is 
essential.  However,  for  computational  reasons,  the  present  generation  of  general 
equilibrium models only focuses on a comparative static analysis of two or more equilibria. -46-
Thus, although they are particularly suitable for an investigation into the long-run welfare 
effects of the introduction of a carbon tax, for example, they give little or no insight into the 
dynamics of the adjustment path. 
One of the empirical attempts at applying the general equilibrium approach (although not 
yet  a  computable  general equilibrium)  at the worldwide  level  has  been undertaken by 
MANNE  and  RICHELS  (1991).  The  authors  use  a  model  distinguishing  five  major 
geopolitical groupings (Global2100) to analyze the impacts of policies to reduce worldwide 
C02 emissions (-75% compared to the baseline by the year 2100). These overall reductions 
are brought about by emission reductions (20% compared to 1990) by the US, the rest of 
the OECD and Eastern Europe including the Soviet Union, while  developing countries 
(incl. China) are allowed to increase their emissions to twice their 1990 level. The main 
conclusions of this study can be summarized as follows: 
The long-run equilibrium size of the carbon tax required in each region to reach the 
emission reduction target would be $250 per ton of carbon. 
There  are  significant  regional  differences  in  the  time  path  to  the  long-run 
equilibrium, reflecting the different emission reduction possibilities. This illustrates 
the potential gains from allowing international trade in emission rights. 
Some of the regions  (or countries) face  considerable losses in GDP, representing 
the  costs  of  the  emission  reduction  policies.  The  costs  differ,  because  some 
countries/regions find  it more difficult  than others to decouple GOP and energy 
growth.  Moreover,  as  the low-cost carbon-free energy options  are exhausted, the 
macroeconomic consequences begin to mount. As a result, OECD countries other 
than the USA would only incur overall GOP losses of less  than 2 percent, while 
China would face GOP losses of approximately five times this amount. 
The crucial role of China is becoming apparent. If China is permitted to quadruple 
its emissions between 1990 and 2100 (instead of a doubling), then all other countries 
would  have  to  r.yduce  their C02 emissions  to zero  in order to attain the global 
emission target.1 
Also at the worldwide level, William CLINE(1989) has conducted preliminary simulations 
with a model developed by Jae Edmonds and John Reilly in order to examine the size of 
energy taxes that might be required to achieve a stabilisation of C02 emissions. Imposing 
an arbitrarily set tax of 150% on coal, 100% on oil and 50% on natural gas, he finds that 
worldwide emissions can be cut from 9.6 billion tons of carbon in his baseline for the year 
2050 to only 4.1 billion tons. Cline's results also show a large reduction in total energy use, 
suggesting that fuel substitution would be difficult and costly. 
Another study of the costs of worldwide C02 emission reduction policies has recently been 
presented by BURNIAUX/MARTIN/ NICOLETTI/MARTINS(1991). On the basis of a 
7-region world  model  and  focusing  on a  35-year  time  horizon,  the  authors  simulate  a 
''Toronto-type" agreement in which  industrialized countries (OECD and USSR) cut their 
emissions, by the year 2010, to 20% below their 1990 levels and stabilize them thereafter. A 
less  stringent constraint is  applied in China and the energy-exporting LOCs. Under this 
scenario, the level of the carbon tax averages $215 per ton of carbon by the year 2020. The 
tax rate varies widely  across regions, from only approximately $60 tjC in China to over 
$950  in the Pacific region.  This wide  dispersion across regions -reflecting differences in 
economic growth,  the relative structure of fossil fuel prices and the mix  of fossil  fuels  in 
17 For comparison: worldwide COz emissions approximately quadrupled in only 45 years, between World 
War II and today. -47-
energy demand - clearly illustrates the scope for  a trade in emission riq;hts.  In a second 
scenario,  all  countries are therefore assumed to  be endowed with  an tnitial  amount of 
emission rights  and trading of such  rights  is  allowed.  As a result,  the common tax:  rate 
amounts to only $152 t/C in 2020, compared to an average of $215 in the scenario without 
trading. 
For the United States, the CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE(1990)  has  recently 
published a study  evaluatin~ the effects of a carbon charge/tax on the basis of different 
partial and general equilibnum models (for the short-run: PCAEO, DRI and DGEM; for 
the long-run: Edmonds-Reilly). The simulations focused on a carbon tax phased in over a 
period of ten years. The tax starts at $10 per tiC in the first year and reaches its maximum 
of $100 t/C after ten years. By the year 2000 ten emissions are between 8 and 16% below 
their  baseline  level,  depending  on  the  mode[ Over  the  longer  run,  the  effects  are 
significantly larger. Depending on the assumptions concerning the future trends of energy 
efficiency and new energy technologies, the tax rate required to keep emissions at 80% of 
their 1988level varies between $100 and $250 per ton of carbon. 
Another  study  applying  the  general  equilibrium  approach  has  been  undertaken  by 
GLOMSRQD/VENNEMO/JOHNSEN(1990)  for  the  case  of  NoiWay.  The  analysis 
focused on the (unilateral) introduction of a tax on oil (which is  the predominant type of 
fuel used in Norway). The tax revenues were redistributed in a lump-sum fashion. These 
revenues are rising over time, indicating that fuel taxation for environmental reasons can 
prove  to  be  a  stable  source  of income  for  the  government.  In order to  stabilize  C02 
emissions at their level in 2000, fuel prices have to rise steadily and attain a level of  roughly 
100% of the baseline level in the year 2010. This relatively high tax level notably reflects 
the  comparatively  modest  fuel  substitution  possibilities.  The  study  at  the  same  time 
demonstrates that the stabilization of C02 emissions also gives additional benefits in terms 
of a considerable reduction in the emission of other air pollutants. 
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Concerning  Belgium,  PROOST/VAN  REGEMORTER(1990)  have  analysed  the 
feasibility and the effects of a carbon tax aiming at a 30% reduction in C02 emissions by 
the year  2005  compared  to  the  baseline.  Assuming  a  national  carbon  tax  applying  to 
Belgium only, the carbon tax rates required to reach the emission target are $189 per ton of 
oil  equivalent  (toe)  for  natural  gas,  $257  per toe  for  oil  and  $322  per toe  for  coal, 
respectively. The level of the C02 excise corresponds, on average, to a doubling of energy 
prices for oil. 
Summing up the existing studies concerning the effects of carbon taxes on emissions, it is 
possible  to  derive an approximate  average figure  of the effectiveness  of such  taxes  for 
reaching different C02 reduction targets. Such a function between the carbon tax rate and 
the level of C02 emission reduction has been calculated by NORDHAUS(1991b) in form 
of a "consensus" marginal cost/tax rate curve presented in graph 11. 
5.2.2.  What are the main economic effects? 
(a)  The macroeconomic effects18 
As  far  as  the  macroeconomic  effects  of carbon or energy  taxes  are concerned, it is  of 
crucial importance to consider the question of what happens with the tax revenues. If no 
change in expenditure or in revenue other than carbon;  energy taxes is envisaged, virtually 
all  studies  show  a  significant  reduction  in  GDP as  suggested  by  the  above  theoretical 
analysis.  However,  if the tax  revenues are redistributed, i.e.  if the tax is  budget-neutral, 
most econometric models result in only small GDP losses or, in a few cases, even a small 
positive effect. 
Preliminary simulations using the HERMES models for Germany, France, Italy and the 
United Kingdom  can illustrate  this  point (see  DETEMMERMAN/DONNI/ZAGAME 
(1991)). The simulation exercise compares the (macro)economic effects of a tax on energy 
products  calibrated  so  as  to  increase  ex  ante  energy prices  by  20%  with  and  without 
redistribution of the tax revenues. If the tax is not revenue neutral, the level of real GDP is 
approximately between 1-2 percent lower than in the baseline after five years (on avera~e -
1.6; see table 8). If,  on the other hand, tax revenues are redistributed to households VIa a 
reduction in income taxes, real GDP is even slightly higher than in the baseline in three of 
the four  countries  (-0.1  to  0.5%).  A  similar  observation can be made in the case  of a 
redistribution  of  energy  tax  revenues  via  employers'  social  security  contributions. 
KAUFMANN/PAULY/  THOMPSON(1991)  recently  came  to  similar  conclusions, 
showing that, in the case of revenue distribution, the loss in GNP growth is only 1/3 of that 
observed in the case of a tax designed to improve the budget balance. 
Most  other  studies  are  broadly  in  line  with  these  conclusions  (see  e.g. 
BYE/BYE/LORENTSEN(1989),  BARKER(1990),  COMMISSARIAT  A  L'ENERGIE 
ATOMIQUE(1990),  DRI(1990),  CHANDLER/NICOLLS(1990),  GLOMSRQD/ 
VENNEMO/  JOHNSEN(1990),  BRINNER/SHELBY  /Y  ANCHAR/CRISTOF  ARO 
(1991)). To give an idea of the broad order of magnitude, a 20% reduction (compared to 
the baseline} in C02 emissions by  recurring to budget neutral changes in the tax system 
could have as a consequence that, after ten years, the level of real GDP could be between 
0.5-1.5%  lower  than in  the  baseline.  Expressed  in terms  of annual growth  rates,  GDP 
growth  would  be  between  0.05-0.15  percentage  points  lower  than  in  the  reference 
18  For  a  comprehensive  analytical  survey  and  a  recent  up-to-date  survey  of  the  macroeconomic 
consequences  of controlling greenhouse  gases,  see  BOERO/CLARKE/WINTERS(1991). See  also 
HOELLER/DEAN/NICOLAISEN(1991) for a recent survey of empirical studies. -49-
scenario.19  As can be expected,  the more ambitious  the emission  reduction target,  the 
higher the GDP losses are (see table 6). 
Overall, therefore, these estimates of GDP losses appear to be comparatively smal1.20 They 
clearly show that emission reduction is not necessarily in conflict with economic growth and 
prosperity. On the contrary, if the starting point is a situation with a sub-optimal tax system, 
the Introduction of a carbon/  energy tax and the accompanying reduction of other, highly 
distorting taxes (in the revenue-neutral case), then GDP may actually be higher after the 
introduction of the carbon tax than it would have been otherwise. 
Despite these arguments, it is legitimate to analyze whether the possible GDP losses are a 
cause for concern from the economic policy point of view.  After all,  they normally imply 
losses in both income and employment. However, it should not be forgotten that GDP is 
only  an  imperfect  welfare  indicator.  As "gross  domestic  product"  only  counts  market 
transactions, it neglects an important part of what determines human welfare. To give an 
example, it is suite possible that increased pollution raises GDP in the short-run. This is 
because  buildings  have  to  be  renovated,  forests  replanted,  hospitals  staffed  etc. 
Nevertheless, few would argue that social welfare has increased. Note in this context that 
MANNE and RICHELS, who  come up with high GDP losses of C02 reduction policies, 
clearly state in their paper that they do  not attempt to estimate the benefits of slowing 
down the rate of global warmin~. Indeed, GDP losses would per se be no sufficient reason 
for rejecting an emission reduction policy. Only if these GDP losses correspond to losses in 
social  welfare  is  the  corresponding  policy  undesirable.  However,  as  has  already  been 
mentioned above,  some studies (e.g. GLOMSRQD/VENNEMO/JOHNSEN) estimate 
the  benefits  from  C02 control  policies  other  than  mitigated  global  warming,  i.e.  the 
benefits in terms  of improved  health conditions  du~ to improved  air quality etc.,  to  be 
roughly 2/3 of the calculated GDP loss of such policies. 
As the employment effects of carbon taxes are usually cldsely linked to. the macroeconomic 
consequences in terms of GDP, they need not be discussed in detail here. Suffice it to say 
that the (negative) employment effects of the introduction of a carbon or energy tax could 
be mitigated if not over-compensated  if the tax  revenues were used  to reduce  taxes  or 
charges on labour. 
Concerning the impact of the carbon/  energy tax introduction on the general price level, it 
is necessary to disttpguish the price level effect from the real income effect. While a rise in 
energy  taxes  woul4  generally  tend  to  raise  consumer  prices  (to  the  extent  that  cost 
increases are passeq on to consumers and are not compensated for by corresponding value 
added tax cuts) and itherefore affect the measured rate of inflation, this does not necessarily 
represent  a  purch!a.sing  power  loss  for  consumers,  provided  the  tax  revenues  are 
redistributed to  co-n-sumers  via  the income  tax  system.  Moreover, as  long  a~ there is  no 
19 This is also broadly in line with the results by JORGENSON and WILCOXEN(1990a), who calculated, 
in form  of "cQunter-factual" scenarios using a general equilibrium model, the reduction in the annual 
GDP growth ~,te resulting from the historical oil price trends since 1972 to be in the order of 0.2% for 
the United States. However, as has been argued above, this experience was neither revenue neutral nor 
gradually phased in!) 
20 It might be appropriate, at this point, to remind the reader that there are many examples of policies 
which are likely to incur such GDP costs (e.g. "energy supply security'' measures). These (short-run) 
GDP losses are nevertheless considered acceptable in view of the expected long-run gains.  One could 
therefore ask whether- in the light of the fact  that almost 80% of Community citizens who are aware 
of the issue consider the greenhouse effect to be very  serious (see EUROBAROMETER(1990)) -a 
reduction in the GDP growth rate by 0.1% p.a. would not be considered by many to be an acceptable 
"insurance premium". -50-
price-wage spiral,. prices would only rise once and there would be no permanent rise in 
Inflation. However, the macroeconomic effects of the price level increase depend crucially 
on the monetary policy stance. Should monetary policy accommodate the price increase, 
output effects are likely to be very small. If,  on the other hand, monetary policy remains 
unchanged, the resulting rise in interest rates could lead to noticeable output losses. 
MACROECONOMIC IMPACTS OF DIFFERENT TAX SCENARIOS FOR EUR4 
Tax plus  Tax plus  Tax plus 
Revenue  energy saving  reduction in  reduction 
raising  invest.  employers'  in personal 
tax only  subsidy  soc.sec. contr.  taxes 
GDP  1991  -1.47  -0.15  -0.53  -0.35 
1995  -1.55  -0.06  0.11  0.18 
GFCF  1991  -0.78  7.03  0.28  -0.16 
1995  -:t.57  5.16  0.32  0.04 
Cons.  1991  2.56  2.71  1.57  2.57 
prices  1995  3.69  4.10  2.00  4.12 
Final  1991  -3.69  -4.07  -2.98  -2.74 
energy  1995  -5.67  -9.72  -4.40  -3.78 
cons. 
S.Qurg:_:  DETEMMERMAN /DONN//  ZAGAME (1991) 
(b)  The structural and sectoral effects 
More important, quantitatively,  than the macroeconomic impacts are the structural and 
sectoral effects. Although the purpose of a carbon tax is precisely to encourage structural 
change away from carbon intensive fuels and energy intensive {>roducts  or processes, it is 
here that the adjustment costs arise (quite apart from the political sensitivities). A priori, 
energy intensive sectors will  be affected most by  an increase in their total cost and the 
corres{>onding deterioration in competitiveness as a consequence of energy/  carbon taxes. 
Thus, It is not only the energy sector that is directly concerned, but also some branches of 
basic industries (notably iron and steel, chemicals etc., see DRI{1990)) and, in particular, 
the transport sector (see also table 9). 
On the other hand,  the amount  of emission reduction achieved  in different sectors by 
imposing a uniform (carbon) tax depends not only on the ener~  intensity~ bu,t in particular 
on the price elasticity of energy demaJ1.d,  reflectii~.~  g both techmcal substitutio~ possibilities 
and· behavioural responses.  In the DRI study on "Green Europe",  for  ex~ple, the two 
areas in which emissions decrease drastically in response to a carbon tax are Industry and 
the domestic and residential sector. This contrasts with only modest reductions compared 
to the baseline in the power generation sector and the transport sector. Although some 
argue for sectorally differentiated taxes in the light of these findings, such a conclusion is 
difficult to justify economically.·. From the economic point of view, the main advantage of a 
'  \ (8) 
-51-
uniform tax is precisely that emissions are reduced where this is easiest. There is no reason 
why all sectors of economic activity should reduce emissions by the same amount. 
:.TABLE:9_::  ... 
::·  :·. 
. ··=-
SECTORAL OUTPUT EFFECTS OF A CARBON TAX IN NORWAY 
Manufact. of industrial chemicals 
Manufact. of pulp and paper 
Petroleum refinin~ 
Manufact. of non-tndustrial chemicals and mineral articles 
Wholesale and retail trade 
Manufact. of metals 
Domestic transport 
Manufact. of metal products etc. 
Finance and insurance 
Other private services 
Printing and publishing 
Manufact. of food 
Manufact. of timber and wood products 
Production of electricity 
Construction 
Manufact. of textiles 
Housing 
Source:  GLOMSR(/JD /VENNEMO I JOHNSEN (1990) 
-33.3% 
-20.8% 
-14.8% 
-14.7% 
-6.7% 
-6.1% 
-5.3% 
-4.9% 
-4.4% 
-2.9% 
-2.5% 
+ 0.3% 
+ 1.5% 
+ 1.7% 
+ 6.4% 
+ 7.0% 
+ 8.4% 
In this context, it is also necessary to distinguish between domestic effects and effects due 
to international competition. At the domestic level, the economic sectors that are hit the 
hardest are those where fossil  fuel  represents a high share in total production cost and 
where substitution possibilities are limited (e.g.  the chemicals industry). In the context of 
an open economy and a unilateral tax, on the other hand, industries open to international 
competition are likely to be the most negatively affected. It is, therefore, not surprising that 
in the case of a small, open economy like Belgium, for example, the sectoral output effects 
are much larger if the carbon tax is introduced unilaterally compared to a situation where it 
is introduced internationally (see table 10). For large countries like the United States or 
trading blocks  like the European Community,  the difference between unilateral or joint 
international action can be expected to be much smaller. 
Moreover, one could argue that there are also industries that are likely to gain in the long-
run from an early reorientation of research efforts and business strategies. The producers 
of  energy  efficient  investment  and  consumer  goods  and  their  international  market 
opportunities  might  serve  as  an  example.  This  "first-mover-advantage"  could  be  very 
significant in the case of a uni-directional trend towards higher fossil fuel prices. -52-
SECTORAL OUTPUT EFFECTS OF A CARBON TAX IN BELGIUM 
Energy sectors 
Energy intensive industries 
Non-energy intensive industries 
Tertiary sector 
Belgium only 
-17.7% 
-16.2% 
+2.3 
+0.4 
Belgium 
and ROW 
-10.8 
-3.4 
- 0.5 
+0.0 
Source:  PROOST  /VAN  REGEMORTER (1990) 
(c)  The distributional effects 
One aspect that has been subject to relatively little empirical analysis is the question of 
distributional effects. In particular, no study is available yet on whether these distributional 
effects  differ  strongly  between  Commumty  Member  States.  Generally  speakin&,  these 
effects can occur at the same time nationally and internationally. Concerning theomestic 
income distribution, empirical studies are available for only a few  countries. The United 
Kingdom has been the subject of some analysis  by the Institute for  Fiscal Studies (see 
PEARSON/SMITH(1990)  and  JOHNSON/McKAY/SMITH(1990)).  This  analysis  has 
shown two main results that are of importance when devising a tax policy to reduce CDl 
emissions: 
First,  it  confirmed  the  hypothesis  that  the  share  of income  spent  on  energy 
decreases with the level of income. Thus, while households of the lowest income 
decile spent around 13% of their gross income on energy, the figure is only close to 
3% for those belonging to the highest ten percent of the income pyramid (see table 
11). 
Second, it illustrated that the share of the different fuel types used by the different 
income  groups  is  far  from  uniform.  This  is  of particular  importance  for  the 
evaluation of the effects of introducing a carbon tax.  In the United Kingdom, for 
example, over 70% of the households of the highest income decile use gas central 
heating (which would only be subject to a low carbon tax rate), while the same share 
is only 30% for the lowest income group. 
On the basis of these observations, there is the presumption that a carbon tax is likely to be 
somewhat regressive as far as domestic energy use is concerned. Preliminary results from 
an  analysis  undertaken  by  SYMONS/PROOPS/GRAY(1991)  even  indicate  that  the 
negative impact on low-income households in the United Kingdom could be significant. 
With respect to the United States, two studies investigated the impact of the introduction 
of  carbon  taxes  on  different  income  roups.  CHANDLER/NICHOLI.S(1990)  also 
confirmed  the  inequitable  distribution  o  the  tax  burden  among  income  classes.  The -53-
authors note that this effect derives from a relatively high reliance on oil and electricity by 
lower income families and the comparatively higher tax that would be applied or passed 
through to these secondary energy products. They also point out different types of equity 
impacts  arising from  the specific form of compensating for  the undesired distributional 
effects of carbon taxes (e.g. earned·income tax refunds, redistribution through the welfare 
system, per·capita rebate of the tax revenues, rebate of corporate income taxes). 
POTERBA(1990),  on  the other hand,  has  recently  looked more closely  at the  issue  of 
carbon tax regressivity. Although  he also finds  a  high degree of regressivity when using 
consumer income surveys, the regressivity is much smaller when the comparison is  based 
on household expenditure surveys. Poterba's argument is, in fact, that a household's annual 
income  may  be  an  unreliable  indicator  of its  actual  well-being,  as  income  may  vary 
significantly from year to year while expenditure is more predictably based on life-cycle and 
permanent-income considerations. The empirical observations indeed seem to confirm this 
hypothesis (see table 12). While in terms of income a $100 per ton of carbon tax represents 
around  10%  of the  income  of the  lowest  income  decile,  but only  1.5%  of the  hi~hest 
income decile, the corresponding shares are only 3.7% and 2.3% of outlays, respectively. 
Thus, although these results support the view that a carbon tax may to a certain extent be 
regressive, the findings based on the expenditure measure of incidence are less  dramatic 
than those based on income ranking. 
A recent analysis on the basis of Norwegian data has added to this cautious evaluation of 
the potential regressiveness of carbon taxes  (see ECONOMIC SURVEY(1991)). In fact, 
this  study  came  to  the conclusion that, in Norway,  a carbon tax  does  not appear to  be 
regressive. 
Although these findings therefore constitute no fundamental objection to the use of energy 
or carbon taxes to reduce CD2  emissions, they nevertheless emphasize the need to find 
ways  of compensating possible regressive  effects.  A priori,  this  could  either be done  by 
lowering  the  income  tax  threshold  or,  alternatively,  by  paying  direct  income  transfers. 
However, if the aim were to ensure that no individual household were worse off after the 
introduction of the tax,  the compensatory expenses could possibly exceed the carbon tax 
receipts. 
With respect to international income distribution, the effects of the imposition of a carbon 
or energy tax not only depend on whether the tax is introduced unilaterally or jointly, but 
also on how precisely such an international tax is designed. This issue will be discussed in 
chapter 7  .1.2 .. 
Two conclusions emerge from  the above analysis of the economic effects of an emission 
reduction strategy based on taxation. First, although the aggregate, macroeconomic effects 
of such a change in relative prices appear to be small, the structural and sectoral effects are 
likely to be significant. These structural changes would not only occur in the private sector, 
but could  also  imply  a far-reaching  shift  in the tax  base  away  from  labour and capital 
taxation, towards environment and natural resource taxation. The associated changes in the 
structure of public finances should not be underestimated. D
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5.2.3.  How can the different results be explained? 
The above discussion of the presently available studies evaluating the use of taxes as 
instruments  to  reduce  C02 emissions  has  revealed  a  certain  degree  of divergence 
concerning the size of the required tax rates (see also table 6). The question therefore 
arises of how these differences can be explained. Eight main categories of factors have 
to be distinguished: 
(a)  Assumptions concerning baseline emissions 
For those studies analyzing the costs of future emission reductions by reference to the 
amount of emissions In  a  certain reference year in the past (e.g.  1987),  the tax  rate 
req_uired  to  achieve  a  given  reduction  target  obviously  depends  on  the  trend  of 
ennssions without policy measures (baseline, business-as-usual or conventional-wisdom 
scenario),  i.e.  implicitly  on  the  assumed  future  trends  in GDP,  population,  energy 
prices, technologies etc  .. As can be seen in table 3 and graph 5. these baseline forecasts 
differ significantly between Community Member States, indicating that, for this reason 
alone, the efforts required to reduce emissions by  a given percentage compared to a 
base-year in the past are likely to diverge strongly. 
The important role of the baseline has been forcefully illustrated by a study undertaken 
by the US Congressional Budget Office (CB0(1990)) which compares the results of a 
simulation with the Edmonds-Reilly model with a comparable simulation undertaken by 
Manne and  Richels.  While  in  the  Edmonds-Reilly  model  simulation,  a  $100  tax  is 
sufficient to reduce US carbon dioxide emissions in the year 2100 by 20% compared to 
the present level, Manne and Richels calculate a tax rate of $250  to reach the same 
target. One of the main reasons for  this dramatic difference lies in the fact  that the 
Edmonds-Reilly  baseline  emissions  for  the  US  in  2100  an1ount  to  8.2  billion  tons 
whereas  the  Manne-Richels  emissions  exceed  10  billion  tons.  (Incidentally,  the 
differences with respect to the worldwide emissions in 2100 are even larger: Edmonds 
and Reilly assume 22.6 billion tons versus 42.6 billion in the Manne-Richels baseline). 
(b)  The choice of the model parameters 
The analysis of the different simulation exercises presented above reveal that there are 
mainly three sets of crucial parameters: 
First, elasticities. This concerns (own) price elasticities of energy demand, (cross-
price)  substitution  elasticities  between  different  types  of fuels  and  between 
energy and other production factors and income elasticities of energy demand. 
Ceteris paribus, the higher the price elasticity, the lower the tax rate has to be to 
reach a given emission reduction target. Table 7 gives  some indication of the 
range of elasticities normally found  in  the literature.  On the other hand,  the 
lower the cross price elasticities between different types  of fossil  fuel  and the 
higher the cross price elasticities between energy and other production factors, 
the higher is  the emission reduction effect of a carbon tax with any given own 
price elasticity of one type of fossil fuel. Thus, for a full evaluation of the power 
of a  tax,  the  entire  set  of elasticities  has  to  be  considered.  It  has  to  be 
emphasized in this context that a small change in just one elasticity of the entire 
set of elasticities can significantly affect the power of a carbon/energy tax (see 
BARRETT(1990c) for details). 
BURNIAUX/MARTIN/NICOLEITI/MARTINS(1991)  have  evaluated  the 
sensitivity of the  GREEN model simulation  results to  changes  in  certain key 
elasticities. By changing the inter-energy substitution elasticity, for example, from 
1.2  in the baseline to  2.0  and  by  raistng  the supply  elasticity  of "carbon-free" -57-
energy sources from 0.2 to 0.5, the tax rate required to reach a Toronto-type of 
emission target is cut by half ($109 instead of $215). 
Concerning the income elasticities of energy demand, both macroeconomic and 
microeconomic aspects have to be considered. At the macroeconomic level, the 
policy objective is  to decouple economic growth and  ener~ demand. Thus,  an 
Income elasticity of zero is aimed at. At the microeconomic level, on the other 
hand,  certain  energy  consuming  economic  activities  can  have  high  income 
elasticities.  A  case  in  question  is  private  individual  road  transport.  Past 
experience has shown, in fact,  that the income effect can sometimes even be so 
high  as  to overcompensate  the  fall  in  energy  demand stemming from  energy 
efficiency improvements. 
Second, exogenous (energy saving) technological progress. Analysis of the above 
mentioned study by MANNE and RICHELS (1991),  for  example,  reveals that 
the strong increase in future  ener~ demand is  largely due to  the assumed low 
rate  of rutonomous  (i.e.  not  pnce-induced)  energy  efficiency  improvement 
(AEEI)2 • If, as some authors (e.g. WILLIAMS (1990)) argue, the rate assumed 
by Manne and Richels (0.5 per year for the OECD countries) is extraordinarily 
low, then the carbon tax rate that would be required to reach a given reduction 
target  could  be far  lower  that  the  calculated  $250.  To  illustrate  the  crucial 
importance of the assumed rate of autonomous energy efficiency improvement, 
Williams  has  calculated that assuming  a  rate  1 percentage  point higher  than 
Manne and Richels would  result in an energy demand at the  end of the 21st 
century of only 1/3 of the corresponding Manne  /Richels estimate. 
Responding  to  the  criticism  by  Robert  Williams,  MANNE  and 
RICHELS( 1990b)  have  simulated  alternative  parameter  values  for  ABEl 
(rangin~ from 0 to  1.5  p.a.). In the extreme case of an annual improvement in 
energy ' efficiency" of 1.5, the energy requirements by the end of the next century 
would only be 20% of the AEEI=O scenario. Consequently, the required carbon 
tax rate and therefore the economic costs differ significantly between these two 
extreme  cases.  The  crucial  role  of this  parameter has  also  be confirmed  by 
sensitivity tests with the OECD's GREEN model (see BURNIAUX/MARTIN/ 
NICOLETTI/MARTINS(1991)). The result of these tests was that halving the 
rate of autonomous energy efficiency improvement from  1% p.a. to 0.5% p.a. 
almost  doubles  the  carbon  tax  rate  needed  to  attain the  emission  reduction 
target ($401 instead of $215). 
Third, available technologies. A~ain, it is useful to illustrate this point using the 
MANNE/RICHELS  study.  Using  the  same  formula,  WILLIAMS(1990)  has 
calculated an equilibrium carbon tax rate of only $59 (1/4 of the MANNE and 
RICHELS fi~re), by adopting different assumptions (based on existing but not 
yet commercially available technologies) concerning the future cost of producing 
methanol  from  coal  and  biomass.  In  general,  these  assumptions  concerning 
technologies  (e.g.  with  respect  to  renewable  energy  sources)  become  more 
important (and,  in view  of the  existing  uncertainty,  also  more debatable),  the 
further the analysis reaches into the future. This is of particular relevance with 
respect to the issue of backstop technologies. 
21 BOERO/CIARKEfWINTERS(1991) have recently criticised the use of this expression as, in the 
Manne-Richels model, the parameter is defined as energy demand per unit of output and therefore 
not only captures technical progress, but also changes in the sectoral composition of output, i.e. 
changes in energy intensity. -58-
(c)  The revenue use 
The importance of the type of tax revenue use for determining the economic impact of 
the introduction of a carbon/energy tax has already been stressed in sections 5.1.2.(a) 
and 5.2.2{a). In particular, the crucial role of whether the tax revenues are recycled to 
the economy or not has generally been confirmed. As to the precise way of revenue 
recycling, no unequivocal picture emerges from the available studies. While generally a 
reduction in labour taxes (notably employer's social security contributions) appears to 
result  in  comEaratively  favourable  economic  effects  (see  e.g. 
DETEMMERMANjDONNI/  ZAGAME(1991)  and  BRINNER/SHELBY/ 
YANCHAR/CRISTOFAR0(1991)),  no  such  consensus  appears  to  exist  as  to  the 
precise effects of a reduction in income taxes. This may either be due to differences in 
the specifications of the econometric models used, or it may reflect the specific situation 
of the country under investigation. Further research is  required to shed some light on 
this issue. 
(d)  Non-linearities 
Economic analysis suggests that the marginal costs of C02 emission reduction rise with 
the abatement level. Thus, the more ambitious the abatement level, the higher the costs 
per ton of carbon not emitted.  Although few  models  have  been used for  explicitly 
analysing this  issue,  the analysis undertaken bY.  BERGMAN(1990) on the basis of a 
general equilibrium model for Sweden clearly Illustrates these non-linearities in terms 
of the tax rate required to reach different abatement levels (see table 6). Other models 
come to similar conclusions. 
(e)  Joint versus isolated action 
For the macroeconomic effects of tax policies to reduce energy related C02 emissions, 
it may be of importance whether the carbon or energy tax is Introduced in an isolated 
way or simultaneously by all the main competitors. If the  introduction of the national 
tax leads to an increase in the costs of production, this country's products would - at 
least in the short-run and ceteris paribus- be less competitive on world markets with the 
corresponding repercussions on trade balance and domestic production. The higher the 
energy  intensity  of production,  the  more this  will  be so.  If,  on the  other hand,  all 
competitors introduce a carbon tax,  or if the average tax burden remains unchanged, 
then there is no general negative competitiveness effect. Nevertheless, countries with a 
comparatively  energy  intensive  production  pattern  will  be  faced  with  a  structural 
reduction in demand. 
With respect to the quantitative evaluation of the differences between joint and isolated 
action, preliminary simulations with  the HERMES model seem to suggest that these 
differences appear to be relatively small (e.g.  of the order of 0.1% of GDP after five 
years), both for revenue neutral and revenue raising taxes. It is interesting to note, in 
this context, that coordination generally appears to amplify the macroeconomic effects 
of the measures, either in the negative sense (in the scenario without redistribution of 
the tax revenues) or in the positive sense (revenue neutral tax). The main reason for this 
phenomenon is  the fact that (at least in HERMES) the income effect dominates the 
competitiveness effect. Thus, if the introduction of a  carbon tax leads to GDP losses 
(compared to the reference scenario), export demand may actually, depending on the 
respective elasticities, be higher if the major trade partners do not follow this policy. 
Nevertheless, joint action is, of course, desirable for several reasons. Firstly, the purpose 
of introducing a carbon tax is to slow down global climate change. It is evident that no 
individual country can achieve this task on its own. It is, therefore, not surprising to find -59-
that studies investigating the effects of unilateral action, for example by the European 
Community, come to the conclusion that such action, although economically harmless 
overall, would also be environmentally ineffective (see e.g. PEZZEY(1991)). Secondly, 
as has been discussed in the context of the sectoral effects, the unilateral introduction of 
a carbon/  energy tax can be expected to imply a much stronger impact on the sectoral 
composition of output than a  unilateral  tax  (see  table  10).  To the extent that the 
unilateral introduction of a carbon/  ener~ tax leads to a dislocation of industries, the 
economic costs incurred by  the country Introducing the tax are not even matched by 
corresponding environmental benefits. 
One aspect that has been the subject of comparatively little modelling analysis to date is 
the likely impact of joint action on world market prices for oil and natural gas. As a 
multilateral tax would have  a  much stronger impact on (aggregate) world fossil  fuel 
demand than a unilateral tax, world market J?rices for energy could be expected to fall, 
thereby  ·both  the  economic  and  the  envuonmental  impact  of  the  tax  (see  e.g. 
CB0(1990)). 
(f)  The timing 
Although there are both theoretical and empirical reasons for arguing that the timing of 
(tax) ,policies to reduce greenhouse gas emissions is very important, few studies have 
attached  great  importance  to  this  question  and  systematically  analyzed  different 
possible time paths. The notion of timing used here is a broad one, encompassing at the 
same time the size of changes and the predictability of changes. Thus, the argument is 
that different assumptions concerning the time profile of taxes and the way these tax 
changes are anticipated and perceived can explain part of the differences found in terms 
of the economic effects. · 
From a  theoretical  point  of view,  the  at~osphere can be considered  as  a  natural 
resource  among  others  (exhaustible  or  renewable)  that  serve  as  "inputs"  in  the 
production process. Its "oftimal" rate of depletion can therefore be analyzed using the 
corresponding  theoretica  tools  (see  e.g.  NORDHAUS(1982)  and  DEUTSCHER 
BUNDESTAG(1990b)). Applying this framework, most analysts come to the conclusion 
that the ,carbon tax rate would have to rise over time. SINCLAIR(1990) has argued, 
however,  that when taking into account fossil  fuel  supply behaviour, expectations of 
falling  energy  taxes  are what are needed to  reduce  extraction rates and thereby to 
postpone C02 emissions. Generally, the higher the potential demand for emissions due 
to economic and population growth,  the higher the tax  rate has to be to respect an 
upper limit on the atmospheric concentration of  C~. 
~rom the  empirical  point  of view,  JORGENSON  and  WILCOXEN  (1990a)  have 
calculated  in  their  study  on the  effects  of energy  prices  on the  US  economy  that 
approximately two thirds of the GDP losses they ascribe to the historical development 
of oil prices since 1972 are due to the price shocks and only the remaining third is due, 
to  the  price  rise.  In  addition,  a  seqond  aspect  to  be  considered  is  the  issues  of 
retrofitting and accelerated scrapping. As in some areas, e.g. the building sector,~ it is up  I 
to ten times more expensive to reduce energy consumption by retrofitting than l)y using 
the correspondin~ technologies in the initial construction, a gradual implementation of · 
such  measures  IS  bound  to  be  considerably  less  costly  compared  to  a  sudden  . 
implementation.  It  should  be  mentioned  in  this  context  that  it  is  also  easier  to 
implement new technologies  in periods of economic growth compared to periods of 
stagnation. 
In the business  sector,  on the other hand,  the profitability of investments depends, 
among other things, on whether the expected economic life-time is realized. If suddenly, 
by  virtue  of the  introduction  of a  high  energy/  carbon  tax,  the  existing  production 
equipment becomes economically obsolete although it had not yet reached the end of -60-
its life, this constitutes a high (private) cost to the company ("sunk cost"). If, instead, the 
future tax increase is known in advance and therefore Integrated into the calculus of the 
investment decision, no such adjustment costs of accelerated scrapping occur. 
Analogously,  a  similar  argument  holds  for  the  household  sector.  Households  buy 
durable consumer goods on the basis of an expected length of life of the froduct. The 
life-time of the product in turn determines the turn-over in the stock o  equipment. 
Unexpected  price  changes  either  lead  to  premature  obsolescence  and  therefore 
represent a welfare loss for consumers, or they are largely ineffective due to the low 
turnover in the stock of equipment. 
Moreover, there is one additional argument in favour of predictable policies: contrary 
to 'surprise policies', they allow the supply side to adjust to the new situation. To give an 
example, if energy prices were suddenly to triple, eXIsting consumer as well as producer 
goods would be economically inefficient. However, as the design and production of new 
energy efficient products takes time, private economic agents would in effect be unable 
to immediately adjust their stock of equipment, even if they wished to do so. 
For the above  mentioned reasons,  one could  tentatively conclude for  the design  of 
greenhouse gas policies that the "optimal" time profile of a carbon tax is likely to consist 
of an initial tax rate that is significant enough to change energy users' behaviour, but 
low enough to avoid major economic disruptions and high adjustment costs. The tax 
rate should then gradually and predictably rise, in order to create stable expectations by 
signalling to market participants an increasing scarcity of natural resources. 
(g)  The type of model used 
As  has  been set out in section  5.2.1.,  different  t)'J?es  of models  are used  to·  study 
carbon/  energy tax policies. However, the model cho1ce to some extent also influences 
the simulation results.  In general,  computable general equilibrium models assume a 
much higher degree of flexibility than traditional, partial equilibrium macroeconometric 
models. A  greater degree of flexibility,  in turn,  implies lower costs of C02 emission 
reduction. The importance of this factor becomes apparent when looking at table 6 and 
comparing  the results  obtained  by  the  JORGENSON/WILCOXEN(1990b) general 
equilibrium  model  with  the  results  from  the  DRI  macroeconometric  model 
(CB0(1990)). 
(h)  Country specificities 
Most multi-country or multi-region model simulations clearly bring out the important 
role  of national  or regional  specificities.  Thus,  factors  like  the  composition of the 
domestic fossil fuel base, the industrial structure of the economy, past efforts in terms of 
energy efficiency etc. imply that the effort needed in order to reduce emissions by a 
certain amount varies considerably between countries or regions. This phenomenon can 
be illustrated by reference to a simulation exercise undertaken by Alan MANNE(1991) 
using  the  GLOBAL 2100  model  and  simulating  a  "comparable  effort"  in reducing 
emissions compared to the (regional) baseline. This analysis,  assuming a  reduction in 
the annual growth rate of C02 emissions by 2% compared to the emission growth in the 
baseline, reveals  that significantly  different tax rates are required in different world 
regions, i.e. that the marginal abatement costs vary considerably (see table 13). -61-
CARBON TAX  RATE  REQUIRED TO  REDUCE THE ANNUAL  GROWIH RATE  OF 
C~  EMISSIONS BY 2% COMPARED TO THE GROWIH RATE  IN THE BASELINE 
(US$ It  c) 
2000  2020  2040 
USA  135.4  299.4  224.5 
OtherOECD  135.4  244.0  208.9 
USSR  135.4  277.2  754.1 
CHINA  257.0  154.9  219.1 
REST OF THE WORLD  227.8  293.8  552.4 
Sou.rc.e.:  MANNE (1991) -62-
5.3.  Addressing  the  issue  by  choosing  the  "bottom-up"  approach:  identifying  the 
emission reduction potential 
The above discussion of the available studies applying the "top-down" approach to the issue 
of COz emission reductions has not only highlighted the potential efficiency of the price 
mechanism in bringing  about  emission  reductions,  but also  the  limitations  of such  an 
approach. Several studies have come to the result that - at least in the short-run - taxes 
alone will not allow ambitious emission reduction targets to be reached, unless very high 
tax rates (several hundred percent of present energy prices) are applied. By definition, the 
price mechanism can only be an optimal policy instrument if there ts a functioning market. 
However,  in  situations  of  market  failure  or  even  market  inexistence,  other  policy 
instruments are more efficient. It is undisputed that such market imperfections exist In the 
context of the energy related emission of greenhouse gases.  The "bottom-up"  approach 
attem.Pts  to  identify  these  areas  and  to  design  the  appropriate  policy  instruments  for 
explotting  the  corresponding  emission  reduction  potentia[  The  "bottom-up"  approach 
therefore takes a more micro-economic point of view, based on detailed technological and 
engineering information. By  aggregatin~ the costs associated with the measures to exploit 
the available emission reduction potential, an aggregate emission reduction cost curve can 
be established which can then be used for deciding upon an aggregate emission reduction 
target. 
Before identifying the available COz emission reduction or energy saving potential, it is 
·necessary to briefly define the notion of "potential". In fact, five different types of emission 
reduction potential can be distinguished (see also graph 12): 
the theoretical potential defines the limit to the reduction of emissions set by the 
laws of physics (as known to us); 
the technical  potential  defines  the  amount of emission  reduction that  could  be  · 
obtained with presently available technologies; 
the socially  profitable potential specifies  the  amount of emission  reduction that 
would be economically viable from the point of view of society; 
the privately profitable potential is  smaller than the socially  profitable potential 
where market prices do not reflect the full cost of using fossil fuels; 
the  actually  achievable  potential,  finally,  represents  what  can  be  realistically 
expected to be achievable when taklng into account transition lags,  imperfections 
etc.; 
In order to be comprehensive, the "bottom-up" approach does not only have to cover all 
sectors  of  economic  activity,  but  also  all  available  technologies  and  all  available 
instruments. Otherwise  impor~ant energy conservation potentials might be missed. Thus, 
there is  an enormous amount of information that has  to be processed.  Concerning the 
mechanisms by which an energy-related emission reduction could be attained, three main 
classes can be distinguished analytically: 
(i) 
~
'")  !!.)  111 
energy  conservation  through  increased  energy  efficiency  (end  use  and 
conversion); 
substitution between different ~es  of fuels; 
reduced level of energy services 
22 This option will not be treated in the present note for the following reasons: Undoubtedly, energy cor· · 
be  saved  if vehicle  drivers  reduced  their  maximum  speed  on  the  motorway,  if average  roG  .. ,  ... -63-
GRAPH 12: TYPES OF ENERGY SAVING POTENTIAL 
(Purely llluatratlve) 
Theoretical potential 
100~ 
Technical potential 
Socially profitable potential  __... 
External 
costa 
Privately profitable potential  __... 
Specific 
barrier• 
Actually exploited potential  __... 
0~ 
5.3.1.  The energy efficiency potential 
The starting point for any discussion of the potential for energy efficiency is the following. 
Individual  economic  agents,  households  as  well  as  companies,  use  energy  in order to 
benefit from the services it provides (e.g. warming up or lighting a room, transporting a 
good etc.). However, only about one third of the primary energy input is actually available 
as  useful energy providing the energy services. The rest is  lost in different stages of the 
conversion  process.  The  aim  of improving  energy  efficiency  or rational  energy  use  is 
therefore to provide the same energy services with a reduced amount of primary energy 
input. 
(a)  What is the potential? 
Ideally,  the  assessment  of  the  economic  potential  for  reducing  energy-related  C~ 
emissions in different economic sectors should be based on sectoral emission reduction cost 
curves. In practical terms, however, most studies only focus on the potential evaluated on 
the basis of "current prices". Thus, the following discussion will only give "point estimates" 
for the potential in different sectors, rather than cost curves allowing the determination of 
the economic emission reduction potential as a function of energy prices. 
One of the most important, economical emission reduction potential is considered to exist 
in  the household or residential sector. This includes,  on the one hand,  the potential of 
temperatures were lowered etc  ..  However, this would require a change in people's preferences which 
cannot, as already explained in section 3.1., be the scope of economic analysis. -64-
electricity saving associated with li2bting  (e.~. through the switch to fluorescent light bulbs) 
or household appliances (more efficient refngerators, washing machines etc.). On the other 
hand, it covers the  lar~e potential of improving energy efficiency in the domain of room 
and water heating.  It 1s  generally recognized that the technical potential for  improving 
energy efficiency (and therefore for reducing C9z emissions) is very large in this sector. In 
particular with respect to space heating, the emission reduction potential is estimated to be 
between  50%  (DEPARTMENT  OF  ENERGY(1989))  and  90%  (DEUTSCHER 
BUNDESTAG(1990b)). Many of the required measures (notably roof and wall insulation) 
have short payback periods,  even in the case of retrofitting (see e.g. SKEA(1990)). The 
same is  true for the areas of hot water boilers, lighting and electricity use by household 
appliances. Only double glazing requires a longer payback period. 
On the other hand, the residential sector is characterized by a comparatively low turn-over 
in the stock of buildings. Thus, within the next 10-20 years the main contribution to energy 
saving will  have  to  come  from  retrofitting.  Taking  all  these  aspects  together,  it would 
appear  to  be reasonable  to  conclude  that  measures  to  promote  energy  saving  in  the 
residential sector could hel:p to reduce overall C02 emissions by about 6% in the next 10-
20 years without incurring significant net economic costs (see e.g. COMMISSION(1990b)). 
There is  also  an important energy efficiency potential in industry, probably close to or 
perhaps slightly smaller than the potential in the domestic sector. One major mechanism by 
which energy efficiency could be increased significantly is the combined on-site generation 
of  heat  and  power  (CHP).  In  addition,  efficiency  improvements  in  space  heating 
(insulation), water heating (more efficient boilers) and process heat as well as a better use 
of residual heat are of some importance. 
Concerning the service sector (market and non-market), the characteristics appear to be 
between those in the domestic and in the industrial sector. While the largest energy saving 
potential can be identified in the field of (space or water) heating and electricity use as in 
the domestic sector, the decision-making process with respect to energy efficiency measures 
resembles more that observed in industry. 
The transport sector represents one of the most difficult sectors of economic activity to 
deal with in the context of policies to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. On the one hand, 
the technical COz emission reduction potential is evaluated to be of the order of 50-60% of 
present emissions (see DEUTSCHER BUNDESTAG(1990b)). In addition, the existence 
of significant  external  costs  of road  transport  im:plies  that  private  road  transport  (in 
particular heavy goods transport) is heavily underpnced thereby driving a wedge between 
privately and socially profitable emission reduction measures. 
On the other hand, the experiences of the past .have revealed the difficulties of reducing 
emissions  from  cars.  Not  only  were  the  improvements  in  energy  efficiency 
overcompensated by a higher demand for road transport services and more powerful cars, 
but also all the evidence points towards very low price elasticities of the demand for private 
individual  transport.  The situation is  aggravated  by  the  fact  that future  C02 emissions 
stemming  from  the  transport  sector  are  forecast  to  increase  markedly  in  response  to 
increased economic integration (especially in response to the developments in Central and 
Eastern Europe  an~the creation of the Internal Market; see e.g.  TASK FORCE(1989)) 
and hi~her incomes  . Overall, therefore, tax rates would have to be very high in order to 
result 1n significant emission reductions. (It should be mentioned, though, that this analysis 
neglects a possible supply side response on the part of car producers.) It needs to be kept in 
23  The high income  elasticity of private individual  transport is  likely  to present a special problem  in 
developing countries where aspirations  are high  and  car ownership is  far from  reaching  saturati'~ . 
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mind, however, that the efficiency requirement implies that (carbon) tax rates should be 
equal for all types of fossil fuel use. Thus, from the economic point of view,  it does not 
matter where consumers decide to reduce emissions and where they prefer to pay the tax 
instead. 
The analysis of the likely causes of the observed low response to price changes (i.e. of the 
apparent difficulty in e~loiting the energy efficiency potential) reveals two major issues of 
importance. First, the difficulty of attaining a significant shift in the mode of transport from 
private vehicles to public transport can be due to an insufficiency in the available supply of 
public  transport  services.  Second,  it  can  be  the  result  of the  prevailing  structure  of 
mdividual  preferences,  which  gives  a  high  weight  to  individual  mobility  and  powerful 
engines. As argued above, it cannot be the economist's task to change preferences. It is, 
however, the economist's task to ensure that the price of road transport paid by the user 
reflects the full cost of this mode of transEort. This can be achieved by different types of 
taxes  (e.g.  fuel  taxes  or vehicle  taxes  differentiated  depending  on the  degree  of fuel 
efficiency) or other specific measures. Aiming at an emission reduction beyond this socially 
optimal point (e.g. by  forcin~ citizens to use public transport) implies welfare losses and is 
therefore economically inefficient. 
In the energy sector, finally, the potential for improving energy efficiency not only concerns 
the end use,  but most  importantly the conversion  of energy.  In the field  of electricity 
generation, new technologies (like, for example, integrated gasification combined cycles or 
fluidised  bed combustion for  coal)  could increase the conversion efficiency  by  over  10 
percentag~ points (see e.g. COMMISSION(1987), SKEA{l990) and the preliminary results 
of the  Community's JOULE  pro~ramme). In addition,  there could  be some  scope  for 
reducing. losses in energy distribution. It should be noted in this context, that inefficiencies 
are markedly higher in Eastern Europe (incl. USSR) and the Third World (see chapter 7). 
{b)  Why is the energy efficiency potential currently not exploited? 
The above  analysis  has  shown  that there is  a  significant  potential for  reducing energy 
related CO~  emissions that appears to be economically viable not only from the point of 
view of society,  but often even when seen from the standpoint of the private economic 
agent, i.e. when using present market prices.24  The question therefore arises of why  this 
apparent potential is currently not exploited. 
The  main  reasons  for  this  failure  to  exploit  the  full,  apparently  economical  energy 
efficiency potential are associated with market failure and institutional impediments. The 
major causes are the following: 
(i)  Lack  of  information  and  {hidden)  transaction  cost:  there  is  little 
disagreement concerning the fact  that consumers in particular are far from 
being the fully informed economic subjects of economic theory. Thus, often 
buyers are unaware of the fact that they could reach their aim at less cost and 
energy users are either unaware of the amount of energy wasted or lack the 
technical knowledge  for  reducing this  inefficiency.  This is  particularly  the 
case  for  private  households  and  small-sized  companies  (see  e.g. 
JOCHEM/GRUBER{1990)).  (For  example,  consumers  usually  fail  to 
recognize the economic advantages of fluorescent light bulbs compared to 
the traditional incandescent lamps.) However, from the individual point of 
24  This  importance  is  also  reflected  in  the  Community's  energy  policy.  See  for  example  the  1987 
Communication  on  energy  efficiency  (COMMISSION(1987))  and  the  recently  adopted  SAVE 
programme. (ii) 
(iii) 
(iv) 
(v) 
(c) 
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view, it might be costly to search for the corresponding information. If the 
monetary gains from energy saving amount only to a small absolute amount 
per year, it would be 'irrational' for the consumer to invest time and money 
In the search for the necessary information. It is, therefore, difficult to decide 
a  priori  whether  such  investments  would  be profitable  or not  from  the 
individual point of view. It is nevertheless clear that they would be profitable 
from the point of view of society. 
Purchaser is not the user: this can be easily illustrated by takin~ the example 
of rented accommodation. If the house owner is not the occupier, he has an 
economic interest in keeping the investment cost low, as the correspondingly 
higher running costs are borne by the tenant. The tenant, on the other hand 
has no interest in undertaking energy saving investments as they would go 
over into the property of the house owner when the tenant moves out of his 
apartment.  Thus,  the  separation  between  the  expenditure  in  energy 
conservation  and  the  benefit  from  such  a  conservation  can  constitute  a 
powerful barrier against energy saving investments. 
Discount rate  differences:  it is  well  known  that  consumers  tend to  have 
extremely high discount rates, ranging between 30% and 200% per annum 
(see e.g. the references in BARRETT(1990c)). This means that they require 
'investments' in energy saving to have a pay-back period that rarely exceeds 
three years and sometimes not even reaches one year. On the other hand, the 
social discount rate for investments is usually evaluated to be in the order on 
5% p.a  ..  Thus  there  is  an  enormous  potential  for  energy  saving  in  the 
household sector that would not only be {>rofitable from the point of view of 
society,  but  even  from  the  point  of view  of other  market  participants. 
However,  institutional  and  behavioural  barriers  presently  Impede  the 
exploitation of this potential. 
Capital constraints: especially in the case of low-income households, capital 
constraints can impair energy conservation investments, as these households 
neither own the required capital themselves nor would it be easy for them to 
get the corresponding bank credits.  From the point of view of the energy 
system,  on the other hand, it could be argued that reliance on lar~e-scale 
energy supply technologies (such as for example nuclear) leaves less financial 
resources  for  either alternative,  decentralized  small-scale  technologies  or 
energy saving measures. 
Supply strateEies: several aspects are of importance in this context. First, the 
pnce structure adopted by electricio/ suppliers  frequently does not give an 
Incentive for energy saving (e.g. by ~Iving rebates to large-scale users). Often, 
notably in many developing countnes, energy prices are lower than the long-
run  marginal  cost  of energy  supply.  Second,  electricity  and  gas  utilities 
themselves  normally  lack  economic  incentives  to  encourage  energy 
conservation  (see  the  next  section).  They  also  lack  incentives  to  allow 
independent sources of electricity supply (e.g. from cogeneration in industry) 
access to their distribution grid. Third, suppliers of enerEY  consumin~ EOods 
rarely have marketing strategies focusing on the aspect of energy efficiency. 
What can be done to exploit the potential? 
For the discussion of the policy  options that exist for  exploiting the available  emission 
reduction potential, it is  useful to take up the distinction between the different types of -67-
reduction potentials ·set  out above.  Generally speaking,  the dispersed  character of the 
emission  reduction  opportunities  renders  public  action  more  difficult  and  requires  a 
carefully designed package of different measures. 
The first question is:  how can the existing energy efficiency (and therefore C02 emission 
reduction) potential be used which  already appears  to be profitable  at current market 
prices, but is not yet exploited? 
(i) 
(ii) 
A first  class  of measures designed to exploit the privately profitable potential of 
energy  efficiency  gains  uses  more  traditional  policy  Instruments.  Two  main 
instrument sets are of importance: 
economic measures to improve penetration rates: on the basis of the above 
discussion,  two  main mechanisms  could  be considered. On the one hand, 
direct  financial  assistance  to  low  income  households  for  energy  saving 
measures (e.g. grants, tax rebates, "soft loans" etc.). On the other hand, fiscal 
incentives  to  substitute  energy  efficient  equipment  for  energy  inefficient 
equipment.  However,  experience  has  shown  that  such  financial  support 
measures  are·  often  less  cost-effective  than  other  policy  measures,  for 
example due to important free-rider effects  (see JOCHEM/GRUBER) or 
high administrative costs. 
improvinK  information:  as  has  been seen,  not  only  consumers  are  often 
unaware  of  the  profitable  scope  for  improving  energy  efficiency.  One 
relatively easily applicable and cheap way to improve consumers' information 
is the introduction of energy efficien\9' labellinK. Such labels would not only 
drastically  reduce  the  energy  consctous  consumer's  transaction  cost,  but 
could also serve prominently tn new marketing strategies. Other information 
improvement  measures  relate  to  education  and  professional  training.  A 
further  (information  improving)  instrument  that  frequently  attains  even 
higher benefit-cost ratios  than investment subsidies  is  the subsidisation of 
energy efficiency consultinK. 
voluntazy aireements with producers: if the number of producers of certain 
types of fossil fuel using equipment is small, voluntary agreements between 
the  government  and  the  producers  can  in  some  cases  be  preferable  to 
traditional regulations.  Not  only  are the administrative  costs  likely  to  be 
smaller, but the flexibility is also in general higher. 
A second class of measures relates to what has been called regulatory  /institutional 
reform to install or enhance the market mechanism (see section 5.1.3.).1t consists of 
measures  called  least-cost  planning,  third  party  financing,  contracts  for  energy 
management etc  .. 
Least-cost  or  inteirated  resource  planning  is  a  practice  that  has  mainly  been 
developed for  the utility sector in the United States. The basic idea of least-cost 
planning starts from the observation that in most countries utilities in the electricity 
and gas sector are regulated in a way that more or less allows them to determine 
prices by  adding a mark-up on costs. Thus, profits grow with the volume of sales, 
thereby constituting a disincentive to promote energy saving. 
The  fundamental  principle  of  least-cost  planning  is  to  change  the  regulatory 
framework applying to publicly controlled utilities in the sense that these companies 
no longer see their main purpose as supplying energy, but rather as supplying energy 
services.  Thus,  as  already  set out above,  the baste premise  is  that the  utilities' -68-
customers are interested in energy services and not  ener~ for its own sake.  The 
instrument to implement these changes is to require utilities to explicitly compare 
the costs of investing in additional supply capacity with the costs of energy efficiency 
investments  (see  e.g.  BROWN(1990)).  If it  is  cheaper  to  meet  the  additional 
demand for  energy services by  investing in energy efficiency than by  investing in 
additional supply capacity,  least-cost planning ffquires utilities  to  opt for  energy 
efficiency (so-called demand side management). 
The experience  made with  this  "traditional''  approach to  least-cost planning has 
recently led to the discussion of several refinements and extensions: 
One of the main short-comings of the "traditional" regulatory approach to 
least-cost planning is that it requires utilities to undertake least-cost planning 
without, however,  offering them an economic incentive for  doing so.  As a 
result, utilities tend to pay attention to  ener~ conservation measures only 
when faced  with  supply  (expansion)  constraints.  In the present context of 
significant  over-capacity  in  the  electricity  generation  sector  in  the 
Community, utilities have no economic incentive to promote energy saving. 
In order  to  remedy  this  problem,  attempts  are  now  being  made  (in  the 
United States) to reform utility re~lation  so as to ensure that a utility's least-
cost plan - including the promotion of energy conservation - is  at least as 
profitable as other courses of action for the utility, namely the expansion of 
the technical supply capacity. This is done by allowing the utility to keep part 
of the money that is  saved by energy conservation measures as  a return on 
such measures. 
Among ideas to extend and improve least-cost planning, the concept of "all-
sources-biddin~" figures  prom1nently.  Again,  the  underlying  idea is  fairly 
straightforwar  (see e.g. WWINS(1989)): assume, for example, an electrical 
utility  (which  can  also  be  the  distribution  company  in  a  vertically 
disintegrated energy market!)  is  faced  with  an expected demand increase. 
This utility could call for  bids to meet this additional demand. On the one 
hand,  an electricity generating  company  can offer  to  supply  the required 
amount  of  electricity  at  a  price  that  reflects  the  costs  of installing  the 
additional supply capacity.  On the other hand, private companies (see the 
next paragraph) could offer to undertake electncity conservation measures 
that would save the same amount of electricity (these companies would offer 
'saved megawatts', so-called "n"egawatts ). The electrical utility would accept 
the  bid  th~t has  the  lowest  cost  per kw  /h, independently of whether it is 
"generated" by  supply-side  or by  demand-side measures.  Moreover, such  a 
bidding procedure could also be used for integrating environmental concerns. 
This could be done, for example, by regulating the bidding procedure such as 
to  multiply  the  offered  bid  price  by  a  coefficient  reflecting  the  external 
(environmental) costs of the offered energy (e.g. on the basis of a specified 
set  of  characteristics).  Attempts  to  install  such  a  "full  (social)  cost 
dispatching" are currently under way in the United States. 
Linked to the question of how the existing energy efficiency potential could 
be exploited is  also the concept of third party financinK  or contract eneri)' 
25 The importance of these cost differences can be illustrated by reference to those experienced in the 
United States. The utility company NEW ENGlAND ELECfRIC(1989), for example, has compared 
the  cost-effectiveness  of  energy  efficiency  versus  power  supply  alternatives.  The  result  of  this 
comparison  showed  that  efficiency  measures  were  approximately  twice  as  cost-effective  as  the 
installation of new gas turbines. (i) 
(ii) 
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mana&ement. The basic idea of such a scheme is to allow specialized private 
companies with the required capital and technical expertise to exploit the 
economic potential for energy conservation that is presently not used either 
due to market imperfections or due to institutional barriers (for details see 
e.g. ASSOCIATION  (1988) ). 
The economically most appealing way is  to ensure that the prices which form the 
basis for the economic calculus of private economic agents reflect all social costs. 
This  implies  that the social  costs  of fossil  fuel  use  are internalized into  market 
prices. It is clearly here that the policy instruments discussed in the above section on 
the "top-down"  approach, in particular taxes and charges,  have their comparative 
advantage,  both  in  static  and  in  dynamic  terms  (e.g.  in directing  private  R&D 
efforts). 
At the same time, such an internalization of the social cost of fossil fuel use would 
not only increase the economic potential for energy conservation measures in the 
private sector, but it could also encourage the exploitation of the existing potential 
by increasing the financial incentive and thereby overcoming possible thresholds of 
perception. 
In cases where such a recourse to the market mechanism is impossible, the public 
sector should either undertake the corresponding emission reduction measures or 
rely on the traditional regulatory instruments. 
The third question, finally,  is: what can be done to narrow the gap between the theoretical 
and the socially profitable emission reduction potential? Evidently, in static terms there is 
no economic justification to take measures to close the gap. In dynamic terms, however, it 
is important that the public sector's investment decisions are based on the expected social 
rate of return. In this context, public financial support for basic research and development 
of energy efficient technologies can have a significant role to play. 
5.3.2.  The fuel substitution potential 
(a)  What is the potential? 
In order to evaluate the greenhouse ~as emission reduction potential stemmin~ from fuel 
substitution, it is necessary to distinguish the two classes of substitution possibilities: 
(i)  Substitution between fossil fuels 
As illustrated in table 4, coal has a carbon emission factor approximately 70% higher than 
the emission factor for  natural gas  and almost 30% higher than the emission factor for 
crude oil. A substitution of coal (and to a lesser extent of oil) by natural gas could therefore 
reduce COz emissions without requiring a reduction in overall energy use. Evidently, the 
potential is highest in those countries where the share of coal in total energy is at present 
comparatively high.  For Germany, for example, the technical potential of COz emission 
reductions through fuel substitution is estimated to be of the order of 20% of present C02 
emissions (see DEUTSCHER BUNDESTAG(1990b)). -70-
For the Community as  a whole, the potential scope for fossil fuel substitution as an option 
for  reducing  emissions  can  be  illustrated  by  the  following  rough  calculation  (see 
COMMISSION(1990b)). The present fossil  fuel-mix used in European power stations is 
67% coal and lignite, 16.5% petroleum, 11% natural gas and 5.5% other fuels. If, in a kind 
of "thought-experiment", the respective shares of gas and coal were interchanged, i.e. if the 
share of gas were 67% and the share of coal 11%, then carbon emissions by  the power 
generation sector would be approximately 29% lower. 
However,  several  factors  complicate  the precise  economic evaluation of the fossil  fuel 
substitution potential. 
First, the size of the economic potential depends on the coal prices used for  the 
evaluation.  While  on the  basis  of the high  European coal  prices  the  economic 
potential for fossil  fuel  substitution is  considerable, such a  substitution would be 
costly when judged on the basis of the low world market prices for coal. 
Second, in the case where there would be a worldwide shift towards natural gas, 
world gas prices could be expected to rise. Moreover, a strategy relying on a large-
scale  shift  towards  natural gas  could in certain cases imply  adverse effects  on a 
specific country's energy supply security. 
Third, coal reserves constitute by  far the largest share of total fossil  fuel reserves. 
This is particularly important for countries like the United States and China. A shift 
towards  natural gas would  require these countries to import gas  instead of using 
domestic coal. 
Fourth, in the context of a possible large-scale substitution of coal by natural gas, it 
is  again  necessary  to  adopt  a  more  comprehensive  approach  considering  all 
greenhouse gases. The issue at stake here is  methane emissions. Two independent 
aspects have to be taken into account. On the one hand, coal mining contributes 
significantly  to  methane  emissions.  (In  the  Federal  Republic  of Germany,  for 
example, coal mining is  responsible for over 40% of methane emissions.) On the 
other hand, natural gas usually consists to at least 90% of methane. Any leakages in 
the production or transport of natural gas would therefore tend partly to offset the 
~ains in terms of radiative forcing achieved through a reduction of CD2 emissions by 
1ncreased  methane  emissions  (remember  that the  global  warming  effect  of one 
molecule of methane is  about twenty times as  high as for one molecule of carbon 
dioxide).  There  is,  however,  broad  agreement  that  this  effect  is  not  important 
enough to fully compensate for the gains from reducing C02 emissions, in particular 
when  taking  into  account  the  shorter  life-times  of  methane  molecules  in  the 
atmosphere. 
(ii)  Substitution between fossil and non-fossil fuels 
Renewable ener2Y sources (e.g.  hydropower, geothermal, solar, wind,  biomass, hydrogen) 
have an important role to play in a strategy against global warming. Although some amount 
of COz is emitted in the production process of the equipment required for using renewable 
energy sources, the (sustainable) use of these sources themselves does not increase net 
COz emissions (even in the case of biomass, the COz released in the combustion process 
has previously been absorbed by  the plants during their growth phase). In addition, the 
available technical potential of renewable energy sources is practically unlimited. -71-
The detailed economic potential for using renewable energy sources, on the other hand, is 
difficult to quantify. First, this potential is  highly location specific (for example duration 
and  intensity  of sunshine,  wind  etc.).  Second,  concerning  the  future  potential,  much 
de.Pends not only on fossil fuel prices, but in particular on the pace of technical progress in 
th1s  field.  Generally speaking, the cost of renewable energy sources are decreasing with 
time (for some promis1n~  technolo~ies even rapidly), while the cost of fossil fuel is forecast 
to  rise.  Thus,  the  prec1se  point  1n  time  at whtch  renewable  energy  technologies  are 
competitive depends on the shape of these two  cost curves. From this point of view,  it is 
useful to distinguish between mature technologies  (e.g.  hydropower, geothermal, passive 
solar in buildings), technologies that have or are entering the market (e.g.  wind,  ethanol 
from corn, active solar in buildings) and advanced technologies for future supplies (e.g. bio-
derived  methane,  transportation fuel  from  energy crops,  grid-connected photo-voltaics  ). 
(For details see SOLAR ENERGY RESEARCH INSTITUTE(1990).) 
In the light of these technological considerations, it appears that renewable energy sources 
are only likely to contribute modestly to a reduction 1n C02 emissions by the year 2005, 
provided  energy  prices  develop  as  in  the  business  as  usual  scenario  and  provided  no 
decisive policy act1on is taken. However, the further the horizon reaches into the future, the 
larger the greenhouse gas  emission reduction potential represented by  renewable energy 
technologies.  In particular  in  the  case  of ambitious  COz  emission  reduction  targets, 
renewable energies have a significant role to play. 
A second class of energy technologies to be considered in the context of fuel substitution 
consists of nuclear energy technologies (fission and fusion). However, independently of the 
acceptance issue, the question of the size of the economic potential of these technologies is 
subject  to  much  dispute.  Without  entering  into  too  much  the  detail  here,  the  answer 
strongly depends on what is  included in the cost calculation. This not only concerns the 
research and development cost and the cost of decommissioning old power plants; it also 
concerns the cost of a possible radioactive contamination and the welfare cost if this type of 
energy technology is imposed against the will of an important part of the population. 
Even  when  abstracting  from  these  issues,  nuclear  energy  is  unlikely  to  contribute 
significantly to a C02 emission reduction in the next 10-15 years. This is s1mply due to the 
time required to convince the population of the need for nuclear energy as well as to plan 
and build such power stations. 
(b)  What can be done to exploit the fuel substitution potential? 
The most evident and at the same time the most important mechanism for encouraging a 
substitution of carbon intensive fossil  fuels by fuels with low or zero carbon content is a 
lasting change in relative prices, such that prices reflect the full social cost of fossil fuel use. 
In addition to changing relative prices, governments can aim at removing institutional as 
well as  technological constraints to the use of renewable energy. In this context, .Public 
financing of basic research and development in renewable energy sources can significantly 
accelerate  substitution  in  the  long-run.  The effectiveness  of this  mechanism  has  been 
demonstrated  in  a  study  undertaken  in  the  United  States  (SOLAR  ENERGY 
RESEARCH INSTITUTE(1990)). Two  different scenarios were analyzed. In the first,  a 
"technology-push"  approach  was  adopted,  accelerating  public  funding  of research  and 
development in order to hasten the development of cost-competitive technologies. In the 
second  ("market-pull")  scenario, it was  assumed that the hetghtened concern about the 
externalities  of  conventional  energy  production  leads  to  a  price  premium  for  clean 
technologies. The results of the analysis indicated that in the medium-term (30-40 years), 
the R&D intensification strategy would lead to a higher amount of installed renewable -72-
energy capacity than the price premium scenario. However, after this period both strategies 
tend to give similar results. The study also revealed that such an R&D strategy could allow 
the  doublin~ of the share of renewable energy in 2020 compared to the business-as-usual 
scenario. It IS important to emphasize, however, that in view of the long lead times such an 
R&D intensification has to start now in order to attain such a significant increase in the 
share of renewable energy by the first decades of the next century. Thus, what is needed 
now is a consistent long term strategy. 
5.3.3.  The aggregate: emission reduction cost curves 
As has been shown, there is an important potential of economically advantageous measures 
to reduce  energy related COz  emissions.  However,  in order to devise  an economically 
optimal  emission  reduction policy,  it  is  necessary to  integrate  the individual potentials 
identified above. Thus, for a rational choice of measures to exploit the different emission 
reduction potentials,  it would  be desirable to have what one might  call  "a social  COz 
emission reduction supply curve". Ideally, such an aggregate supply curve is the result of the 
(horizontal) aggregation of  disaggre~ated, sectoral emissions reduction potentials, ordered 
according to their respective unit emission reduction costs. 
What do such aggregate emission reduction cost or supply curves usually look like? 
In view  of the  enormous informational requirements, it is  not surprising that few  such 
curves have been elaborated yet.  In addition, due to the fact that the exploitation of one 
individual  potential  is  not  always  inde{>endent  of the  measures  undertaken  to  exploit 
another potential, it is not sufficient to s1mply aggregate the individual potentials in order 
to  arrive  at  an  aggregate  curve.  Nevertheless,  the  available  matenal  suggests  some 
interesting conclusions. 
Concerning  world-wide  aspects,  McKINSEY  &  COMPANY(1989)  has  attempted  to 
specify, in an indicative way, emission reduction cost curves for three regions of the world. 
The authors conclude that due to limited low-cost opportunities available in the developed 
nations of the OECD, global cooperation is needed to exploit a large, low-cost potential in 
developing countries. 
For the Community Member States, the Community's JOULE programme is  aiming at 
constructing aggregate  emission reduction supply  curves.  The first  preliminary and still 
incomplete (industry and services are not yet included) results of this study are presented in 
graph  13  for  ten Member States. The message  emerging from this  analysis  1s  clear: the 
present  energy  system  in  all  Member  States  contains  a  number  of inefficiencies  and, 
therefore,  does  not  constitute  the  least-cost  solution  to  providing  the  required  energy 
services.  Provided  these  inefficiencies  are  removed,  it is  therefore  possible  to  reduce 
emissions without incurring additional net costs compared to the present situation, even if 
the individual  emission reduction measures  represent additiona  costs  compared to  the 
optimal least-cost energy system. The results for four countries (Belgium, the Netherlands, 
Germany  and  the  Un1ted  Kingdom)  shall  be  briefly  summarized  here  (see 
COHERENCE(1991) for details and other Member States): 
In Belgium,  the combination of energy saving  measures with  additional  investments  to 
reduce C02 emissions would appear to allow energy related COz emissions to be reduced 
by  approximately 15% in 2010  compared to 1988 emissions. The total discounted energy 
system cost of such an emission reduction by approximately 24 mill.  tons of CO?. in 2010 
has  been evaluated  at 70  billion BF (approx.  4  bill.  ECU) compared to the feast-cost 
solution. (In this context, it is interesting to note, however, that even with a 15% emission 
reduction the  total  (discounted) costs  of the energy system would  be lower than in t: -73-
reference scenario due to the higher degree of energy efficiency in the emission reduction 
scenario.).  Moreover,  here  as  elsewhere,  the  calculation  does  not  even  yet  take  into 
account the monetized environmental benefits from reducing emissions. When considering 
the fact that Belgium's emissions in the "conventional wisdom"  scenario are projected to 
increase by only 4% between 1990 and 2010 (see table 3), the overall emission reduction 
potential appears to be noticeably smaller than in some other Community countries (see 
below).  It seems  impossible  to  reach  the  emission  reduction target without  expanding 
nuclear energy. 
With respect to the Netherlands, it appears that a C02 emission reduction of only a little 
over 5% between 1988 and 2010 could be achieved without any net discounted costs. The 
major part of this emission reduction can be attributed to changes in the power generating 
sector (notably a  switch from  coal to natural gas).  An expansion of the nuclear energy 
capacity  is  not required.  When taking  into  account  the  forecast  increase  in  emissions 
contained  in the  "conventional  wisdom"  scenario,  the  results  suggest  the  possibility  of 
producing  2010's  GDP  with  approximately  20%  less  COz  emissions  than  in  the 
conventional wisdom scenario without any net economic energy system costs. 
The JOULE programme results can be compared with two other studies focusing on the 
Netherlands.  On  the  basis  of  a  dynamic  linear  programming  model,  KRAM.  and 
OKKEN(1989) studied the scope for cost efficient COz emission reduction oetions in the 
Netherlands. The authors start off with two baseline scenarios, one scenario Illustrating a 
nuclear supply-oriented all-electric strategy, the other a demand oriented gas strategy. They 
then calculate the cost of reducing emissions in accordance with the Toronto target (i.e. 
aiming  at a  20%  reduction by  the year 2005  and a  50%  reduction by  2020).  The cost 
(investment, operating, maintenance and salvage cost) of attaining these targets lies in the 
order of Dfl 36-42 per ton of avoided emissions. This represents less than 0.5% of Dutch 
GNP. In the study, a modest carbon charge (between Dfl15-23 per ton of COz) is imposed 
in order to finance the COz emission reduction expenditure. 
A  third  study  focusing  on the  situation  in  the  Netherlands  has  been  undertaken  by 
McKinsey (WINSEMIUS(1990)). The main conclusion of this evaluation is that measures 
to ensure a stabilization of COz emissions by  the year 2000 would only imply relatively 
modest costs. If financed by an increase in energy prices, prices would have to nse by 1-3% 
in order to cover the additional costs. Thus, the JOULE programme results appear to lie 
somewhat at the pessimistic end of the range of results for the Netherlands. 
For the Federal Republic of Germany, the JOULE programme estimates indicate that a 
reduction in C02 emissions of the order of 25% compared to 1988 by the year 2010 would 
be possible,  even without an increased reliance on nuclear energy.  The net discounted 
energy system costs of such a reduction are evaluated at less than DM 30 billion. The major 
contribution to this emission reduction takes place in the :power  generation sector. It is 
interesting to note that an emission reduction by only 20% Instead of 25% is only half as 
costly and is, moreover, calculated to be associated with a net economic ~ain compared to 
the reference case. When looking at the sectoral breakdown of the additional expenditure 
required for achieving a 25% emission reduction, it can be noticed that the main financial 
gain would  be located  in the  coal and  oil  supply  sectors,  a  result of the reduced  fuel 
consumption in those sectors. On the other hand, the additional expenditures needed in 
order to implement the energy conservation measures are mainly occurring in the tertiary 
and domestic sectors, where the main energy saving potential exists. -74-
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Although  for  Germany  no  alternative  set  of emission  reduction  cost  curves  has  been 
established, the results of the studies undertaken for the Parliamentary Commission allow 
comparison with  at least  one  point on such  a  curve.  This point estimate concerns the 
economic cost of a  reduction in C02 emissions by  about 30% between 1987  and 2005. 
These costs consist of the necessary investment and operation costs and are evaluated to be 
of the order DM 5 billion per year, less than DM 100 per capita in 2005  (for details see 
DEUTSCHER BUNDESTAG(1990b)). Even if one were, on an ad hoc basis, to add to 
this figure the same amount reflecting transaction costs, according to this study, the total 
net  cost  of the  emission  reduction  would  only  be  around  DM  12  billion  per year, 
approximately DM 55  per ton of avoided COz emission. This appears to be significantly 
lower than the costs arrived at on the basis of the above-mentioned JOULE programme 
results, which arrive at an average cost of approximately twice this figure per ton of COz. 
(Again, these figures do not take into account the economic benefits from mitigating global 
warming.) As expected, the elimination of barriers to the efficient use of energy, evaluated 
on its own, can be expected to lead to a considerable net economic gain (DM 27 per ton of 
avoided C02 emission). 
Concerning the United Kingdom, the preliminary JOULE results suggest that a reduction 
of C02 emissions in the order of 30% between 1988  and 2010 is  not only feasible, but 
would even be associated with a net economic gain (see graph 13). This finding can mainly 
be explained by the presently high share of coal (comparable to the situation in Germany). 
Compared to most other Community countries, the share of renewable energy sources IS 
relatively high in the UK emission reduction scenario. 
Two  other studies  have  tried  to  construct  such  aggregate  cost  curves  for  the  United 
Kingdom.  JACKSON and ROBERTS(1989) have surveyed the costs of measures to cut 
C02 emissions. Their main conclusion is that it would be possible to achieve the Toronto -77-
conference target of reducing emissions by 20% by the year 2005. In the authors' view, the 
target can be comfortably  achieved  usin~ energy  efficiency,  combined  heat and  power 
(CHP), fuel  switching  and renewables, Without  even taking into account  the reductions 
possible in the transport sector. The average reduction costs would in fact be negative (i.e. 
there would be a net jain), although the marginal cost of reducing emissions by more than 
200 million tons of CUz would clearly be positive. 
The second  study  (LEACH  and  NOWAK(1989))  attempting  to  evaluate  the  emission 
reduction potential in the United Kingdom analyzed a scenario aiming at a 23% reduction 
compared to 1987. The results showed that just over half of the emission reduction would 
come from changes in energy demand,  mostly due to improved energy efficiency, but also 
some from fuel  switching.  Transport came out as  the most difficult sector for  effecting 
emission reductions, given the expected large rise in traffic assumed in the baseline. 
Why do aggregate emission reduction cost curves differ between different studies and what 
conclusions can be drawn from these analyses? Aggregate emission reduction cost curves 
not only differ between countries (reflecting the different circumstances), but also between 
different studies concerning one specific country. 
Concerning  the  differences  between  countries,  graph  14  compares  the  marginal  C02 
emission reduction  costs  for  ei~ht Member States  of the European Community.  These 
differences reflect at the same t1me country-specific factors (like the present fuel-mix and 
the availability of alternative energy sources) and differences in basehne emission growth. 
As such, these data clearly demonstrate the economic costs of adopting a "Toronto-type" 
emission reduction scheme (without allowing for emissions trading). -78-
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As to the differences in the results for one individual country, four main reasons can be 
given for such differences: 
(i) 
(ii) 
(iii) 
(iv) 
Modernity of technologies assumed:  due to rapid technical progress, using 
data that are already a few  years old can significantly overstate the cost of 
energy saving measures. 
Accounting differences: this does, among other things, concern the question 
of the base year {which might have particular characteristics) and the choice 
of the discount rate. 
Methodological  differences:  for  example,  whether  reduced  maintenance 
costs are taken into account, whether multiple benefits are captured or what 
is assumed with respect to the speed of diffusion / penetration rates. 
Level of detail, both in terms of the number of options considered and in 
terms of the size of savings counted. 
As to the conclusions to be drawn from the above analysis,  there seems to be a general 
consensus, first, that our present energy systems do not represent the least-cost solution to 
providing  the  present demand  for  energy  services  (due  to  existing  inefficiencies)  and, 
second, that in some countries the costs of emission reduction rise steeply from a certain 
reduction level onwards. -79-
5.4.  "Bottom-up" versus "top-down": some tentative conclusions 
When comparing the results obtained on the basis of the "top-down"  approach with the 
results  gained  by  adopting  the "bottom-up"  approach,  the  impression  ts  that the  latter 
approach  is  clearly  more  "optimistic"  as  far  as  the  economic  potential  for  emission 
reductions  is  concerned.  How  could  this  be  explained  since,  ideally,  "micro-"  and 
"macroeconomic"  analysis should arrive at similar conclusions? A priori, two  - mutually 
compatible - reasons could be offered as an explanation: 
First,  although  there  undoubtedly  exists  a  potential  for  economically  efficient 
emission  reduction  associated  with  energy  efficiency  improvements,  top-down 
studies usually "define away"  this potential by assuming perfect markets. However, 
in real life, this "efficiency gap" (see GRUBB(1990) and GRUBB et al.(1991)) is of 
weat importance for devising least-cost or "no regrets" policies. What has to be kept 
tn mind  here is  that,  due to the  existence  of market imperfections,  part of the 
existing emission reduction J?Otential  cannot be exploited by relying on traditional 
forms  of taxation.  Thus,  it ts  not surprising  that reliance  on only  one particular 
instrument is  insufficient  to  exploit  the  full  potential.  By  definition,  the  market 
mechanism can only  play  its  role where  a  market exists  and functions  properly: 
Hence  the  need  for  an  appropriate  instrument-mix  of taxes  and  other  policy 
instruments. 
Second, the ''bottom-up" approach could overstate the emission reduction potential 
that can already be profitably exploited from the point of view of private economic 
agents by neglecting "hidden costs". This is of particular importance with respect to 
the  household  sector,  where  search  and  information  costs  may  be  high. 
Alternatively, private economic agents might not be the rational subjects supposed 
by  economic  theory.  To  that  extent,  the  "real"  potential would  be smaller  that 
appears at first sight.  It has to be stressed, though,  than it would nevertheless be 
profitable from society's point of view to use this potential. 
What can be concluded from the above discussion? The main conclusion must be that the 
cheapest way of rapidly reducing emissions consists undoubtedly of promoting the rational 
use of enerey. As ts  illustrated by the preliminary JOULE programme results (see graph 
15), the profttability or costliness of C02 emission reduction policies depends crucially on 
the exploitation of the  available  scope  for  energy  efficiency  improvements.  There  is  a 
considerable  amount  of information  suggesting  that  an  important  emission  reduction 
potential exists,  the exploitation of which would offer clear economic benefits to society, 
even  when  abstracting  from  the  environmental  benefits.  It  is  the  exploitation  of this 
potential that leads to the "negative cost" part of the emission reduction cost curve which is 
so abhorrent to an academic economist's mind. Although the evidence is only sketchy, this 
potential  might  tentatively  be  estimated  to  be  of the  order  of at  least  15%  of  the 
Community's  forecast  COz emissions  in  2010.  The only  question is,  how  much  of this 
potential can be exploited by implementing appropriate policy measures? If one adds to 
this figure the potential for substttuting fossil fuels with htgh carbon content (e.g. coal) by 
fossil  fuels  with low  carbon content (e.g.  natural gas)  or non-fossil  fuels  (e.g.  renewable 
energy sources), preliminary work suggests that cost-effective emission reduction policies 
should  in  principle  allow  emissions  in  2010  to  be  some  20-25%  lower  than  in  the 
conventional  wisdom  s~nario (i.e.  10-15%  lower  than  in  1987),  without  excessively 
burdening the economy. 
26 Michael GRUBB (1991) and his co-authors arrive in their analysis at the conclusion that, on the basis 
of known technologies, reductions in C02 emissions of the order of roughly 1% per annum might be -80-
However,  a  few  cautionary remarks are necessary.  First,  as  has been noted above,  the 
potential differs significantly between countries, implying the need for a differentiated and 
flexible objective setting. Second, a small difference in the amount of emission reduction 
can imply a much larger change in costs. Third, this is only the socially profitable potential. 
To fully  exploit this potential, significant {>Olicy  chan~es along the lines discussed in this 
paper are required. Only the implementation of efficient and comprehensive {>Olicies will 
allow  the  gap  to  close  (or at least  narrow)  between this  economic  potential  and  the 
achievable  emission  reduction  potential.  Aiming  at  a  high  reduction  target  without 
undertaking these policy changes could indeed be costly. 
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obtained in many developed economies at little if any net economic cost, if appropriate policies were 
adopted. -81-
6.  DEFORESTATION AND AFFORESTATION 
6.1.  The importance of  forests in the context of  the Greenhouse problem 
Forests play an important role in the context of global warming.  Next to oceans, they 
represent the second largest storage of carbon. Moreover, forests play an active role in the 
atmospheric C02 cycle. It is therefore necessary to address this issue briefly. Usually, in an 
undisturbed, mature forest, the absorption of CD2 equals the release of  CO~. Thus, in the 
long-run, such a mature forest is- contrary to the oceans- not a net C02 "stnk". However, 
changes in land use accompanied by deforestation or afforestation can alter the net C02 
balance with the atmosphere. 
As  to  the contribution of deforestation  to net CD2  emissions,  it is  difficult  to  obtain 
reliable data. Estimations indicate that deforestation could contribute between 7-30% of 
worldwide.carbon dioxide emissions. (For com\)arison, the Community's share in total C02 
emissions is close to 13%.) Net deforestation ts particularly important in tropical areas of 
South America, Asia and Africa (see table 14 ). The last internationally comparable figures 
for tropical deforestation relate to the year 1980, when some 11.1 million hectares (an area 
greater than the size of Portugal) were lost (COMMISSION(1990c)). For some tropical 
countries,  the  share  of co~ emissions  stemming  from  deforestation  even  exceeds  by 
several times the CO? emisstons related to fossil fuel combustion. (Brazil, for example, is 
considered to emit stx  times as  much C02 through deforestation as  through fosstl  fuel 
combustion. (See, e.g. FIA  VIN(1989)).  I 
DEFORESTATION AND REFORESTATION IN THE WORLD IN THE 1980s 
Average annual 
deforestation 
1980s 
Average annual 
reforestation 
1980s 
Region  ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Africa 
North and 
Central America 
South America 
Asia 
Oceania 
Extent· 
(in 1000 ha) 
3.822 
1.251 
11.180 
4.405 
26 
Percent of 
existing 
forests 
0.6 
0.1 
1.3 
0.9 
0.0 
Source:  WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE (1990) 
Extent 
(in 1000 ha) 
355 
2.552 
760 
5.708 
117 -82-
6.2. Measures to halt deforestation 
As the causes of deforestation in tropical countries are numerous, approaches to halt this 
process cover a wide range of measures. These range from birth control via land reform, 
better forest management, more efficient fuel use and fuel substitution to measures which 
help poor countries to improve their financial situation. In the following paragraphs, the 
feasibility and economic efficiency of three frequently proposed measures to promote the 
end  of deforestation,  Debt for  Nature  Swaps,  direct  transfer  payments  to  rain  forest 
countries and trade restrictions for tropical timber will be briefly assessed. 
6.2.1.  Debt-for-nature swaps 
The  debt-for-environment  or  debt-for-nature  swap  (DNS)  offers  to  highly  indebted 
countries the possibility of exchanging part of their debt a~ainst the preservation of forests. 
Although  debt-for-nature  swaps  have  not  been  conceived  as  a  way  to  address  the 
greenhouse issue, they could nevertheless have a useful role to play in this context. The 
underlying idea is  that in reducing their debt burden, forest countnes are not obliged to 
export wood to pay off their debt. In practice, a Non-Governmental Organisation (NGO) 
buys  part of the  debt from  a  creditor  bank and  transfers  it  to  the  debtor  country  in 
exchange for the obligation to take action in protecting the forests. 
From  a  theoretical  point  of  view,  debt-for-nature  swaps  contain  a  fundamental 
contradiction. If the debt were the main cause for the deforestation in a country, a direct 
remission of debt or a moratorium would be a more direct and efficient way to achieve the 
goal.  However,  the causal  relationship between debt and deforestation seems far  from 
being  that clear-cut.  Hence  DNS  can be considered  as  a  debt reduction scheme with 
environmental  conditionality  where  the  causal  chain  debt/  deforestation  is  only  of 
secondary importance. 
Furthermore, debt-for-nature swaps do not (or at least not directly) address the developing 
countries' main preoccupation, namely the lack of new credits ("fresh money"). Only to the 
extent that the reduced debt burden improves a country's credit rating or otherwise frees 
resources for development and investment DNS correspond to development needs. In the 
absence of such an effect, debt-for-nature swaps are only likely to be acceptable for tropical 
forest countries if direct transfer payments compensate at least partly for the opportunity 
costs of forest conservation (lost revenue from timber exports and of agricultural products 
grown on cleared forestland). 
In addition, countries with  tropical forests  but only  a  small  debt burden like  Malaysia, 
Burma and Indonesia would have no economic incentive to participate in the DNS scheme. 
On the contrary, if DNS could be executed on a consistently  lar~e scale with  high  debt 
countries,  less  Indebted countries would  tend  to increase their timber exports  as  world 
market prices would rise due to a reduction of supply from highly indebted countries. 
Practical experience with DNS has not proved to be very favourable either. Until now, the 
volume of DNS operations has been insufficient to ensure a significant reduction of LDCs' 
debt. Furthermore, the acquisition of debt on secondary finance markets tends to raise the 
price of these bonds which  makes  this way  of debt reduction more expensive  and less 
feasible. However, from a conceptual point of view, the idea of debt-for-nature swaps by no 
means has  to be limited to private debt being bought by  NGOs on secondary markets. -83-
Governments could also negotiate such swaps inv£lving public debt, thereby considerably 
raising the potential amount of resources involved. 7  · 
6.2.2.  Direct transfer payments to tropical forest countries 
Direct transfer payments  to tropical forest  countries would be tied to the obligation to 
undertake action in preservin~ forests.  Although such payments would appear to be not in 
line with the polluter pays pnnciple when only seen from the COz emission point of view, 
such a  scheme which compensates for global external effects  of deforestation would be 
economically desirable if It  increases global welfare.  This is  particularly the case if the 
benefits from  avoidin~ a loss in biodiversity accrued to all countries (i.e. also to industrial 
countries).  .  . 
Theoretically, the optimal amount of a transfer payment is determined by the shape of two 
cost-curves, the marginal opportunity cost of forest preservation (lost revenue from timber 
exports  and other agricultural products grown on cleared forest land as  well as  cost of 
substitution of firewood by other energy sources) and the marginal cost of environmental 
damage caused by deforestation. The underlying idea of such transfer payments is to give 
tropical forest  countries an incentive  to reduce forest  clearing to a  level where its lost 
revenues from forest clearing equal the global social costs of deforestation and not only 
national social costs. The size  of the transfer is  bounded by  the benefits for the paying 
country on the one hand, and the loss of economic value to the recipient country,· on the 
other.  ·  . 
Practically, the quantitative determination of the cost curves, especially 'the marginal cost 
curve of environmental damage caused by  deforestation, is  far from being evident. The 
estimation of environmental damage  like  global  climate change  is  particularly difficult 
because deforestation is only one of several causes of global warming. Furthermore, as has 
been discussed in chapter 4, the quantitative evaluation of costs and benefits is complicated 
by the difficulty of valuing the social costs of species losses. 
As to the institutional organisation of the transfer scheme, two different approaches can be 
distinguished, a bilateral and an international one (e.g. an environmental fund or facility). 
A  syste~ of bilateral  transfer  payments  has  the  disadvantage  that  it would  increase 
economic  dependencies  between ·  tropical  forest  countries  and  certain  industrialized 
countries. An· international solution via a global environmental fund could, on the other 
hand, guarantee an equal and just transfer mechanism. The conception of the scheme must, 
however, allow for an earmarking of the funds in order to ensure that the money is really 
used for  forest conservation measures. By  listing tropical forestry as  one of the five  key 
areas for environmental aid in LOME IV, the Community and ACP countries have already 
demonstrated· their willingness to use new resources in this sector. 
The  financial  resources  for  an  international  environmental  fund  should  come  from 
industrialised countries according to the part each country contributes to the global costs of 
environmental damage. The evaluation of the regional distribution of such costs could be 
difficult.  In such a  case a  distribution according to the GNP of each country could be 
envisaged. Concerning the amount of resources required, it is argued that even on the basis 
27  A  similar  idea  is  currently being explored  in  the context  of a  proposal by the Polish government 
concerning a debt-for-environment swap. The proposal is to set up an environment fund to be fmanced 
by a swap agreement between Poland and (some of) its Paris club creditors. According to the proposal, 
part of the Polish debt service payments would be allocated to the environment fund,  which would 
exclusively  focus  on  measures  to  reduce  Poland's  contribution  to  global  environmental  problems, 
including the greenhouse effect. -84-
of conservative estimates, the need for forestry aid by development agencies may exceed $ 
1.2 billion a year, about twice the 1988 level (see e.g. COMMISSION(1990c)). This would 
be significantly more than the $ 4 billion over a five year period suggested in the original 
outline for the Tropical Forestry Action Plan (TFAP, see COMMISSION(1989a)). 
6.2.3.  Trade restrictions for tropical timber 
Trade  restrictions  for  tropical  timber  are  sometimes  considered  as  an  alternative 
instrument to curb deforestation.  The aim of such measures is  the reduction of tropical 
timber consumption through a limitation of the world timber trade.  These measures can 
take several forms: 
import stops or prohibitive import quotas 
customs duties or indirect taxes 
moral persuasion of importers and consumers to reduce timber consumption. 
These instruments can only be successful if the export share of economically used tropical 
timber is  sufficiently  hi~. First, it must be said that timber cutting is  only one cause of 
tropical deforestation; fire clearing in order to obtain agricultural land seems to be at least 
an equally important one. Moreover, only 14% of cut wood in tropical forest countries is 
used as timber (DEUTSCHER BUNDESTAG(1990a)). Of this timber, one third is being 
exported, so exports cover only around 4% of the wood cut. These figures demonstrate that 
simply  for  quantitative reasons  trade  restrictions  for  timber would  only  have  a  limited 
effect on tropical forest  countries and can therefore not be considered as  an option for 
slowing down global climate change. 
Further  conditions  for  successful  timber-import  restrictions  must  be  met.  First,  the 
elasticity of demand in importin~ countries must be sufficiently high in order to guarantee a 
substantial reduction of timber Imports when prices rise in response to a supply reduction. 
This will  not be true in the case of tropical timber used for luxury furniture.  The price 
elasticity of demand is low in this case due to the snob effect. Second, it must be ensured 
that all importing countries apply the restrictions, as  otherwise trade will  be diverted to 
countries which do not adhere to Import restrictions. 
Finally, apart from the low effectiveness of protectionist measures, timber trade restrictions 
lack legitimacy from the point of view of distributional justice. A worldwide import stop for 
timber would  deprive  tropical  developing  countries  of their  right  to  exploit  a  natural 
resource,  even  if  such  an  exploitation  were  undertaken in  a  sustainable  way.  This  is 
especially hard for  countries where timber is  the most important resource for  financing 
economic development. 
As a conclusion, it can be said that the three considered measures to halt deforestation 
show  conceptual  and  practical  drawbacks.  This  is  particularly  true  for  debt-for-nature 
swaps and timber trade restrictions. Direct transfer payments to tropical forest countries 
could, however, prove to be efficient under certain conditions even though at times they 
may not be in line with the Polluter Pays Principle. In any event, it is important to ensure 
that the  transfer payments  are  conditional  on domestic  policy  adjustments  required  to 
eliminate  or at least  reduce  the  underlying  economic,  social  or Institutional  causes  of 
deforestation. -85-
6.3. Afforestation 
One way  of increasing the net COz uptake of the biosphere is  by enlarging the stock of 
biomass through afforestation. Estimations of the land area requued to plant the forests 
needed to sequester 2.9 billion tonnes of carbon annually vary between 300 million ha (a 
landmass the size of Zaire) and 600 million hectare. The size of the area required depends 
on the species of trees considered for afforestation. As a matter of fact, the carbon uptake 
of different species diverges considerably (between 8 t C/ha and 37 t C/ha according to 
ERL{1990)). The corresponding economic costs of afforestation measures consist mainly of 
the establishment costs for forest plantations and the cost of land procurement. Estimations 
for these costs vary considerably from one source to another. 
Most  studies  come to  the  conclusion,  however,  that such  measures  are generally much 
more likely to be economically advantageous for tropical rain forests  than for forests  in 
temperate zones.  McKINSEY  &  COMPANY(1989),  for  example,  estimate the  costs  of 
forest management, afforestation and reduction of deforestation to range from $5 per ton 
of carbon conserved ($43 per hectare per year) in the tropics to $28 (140ha/year) in OECD 
countries  other  than  the  USA.  NORDHAUS{1990a)  concludes  that  the  total  costs  of 
carbon sequestration lie between $41  per tonne of carbon in the tropical countries and 
$114 in the United States. This picture IS also broadly confirmed by a study undertaken by 
ERL{1990) assessing the cost effectiveness of selected options to reduce C02 emissions in 
developing countries. 
SEDJ0(1989), on the other hand, presents comparatively more optimistic estimates of the 
cost effectiveness of afforestation programmes. He evaluates the total costs to be of the 
order of $ 400 per hectare in tropical zones and $800 per ha in temperate zones. Over an 
average maturation period of forests of around 40 years, these costs would be equivalent to 
$10 hafyear ($2 per tonne of carbon sequestered) in the tropics and $20 ($4 t of carbon) in 
temperate regions. 
Concerning the differences between different cost effectiveness studies covering the same 
region, these differences are largely due to three main factors: 
the assumed olfoortunity cost.  If, for example, it is assumed that the alternative to 
using the land  or forests is of highly productive agriculture, reforestation is rarely 
economical. On the other hand, when assuming unproductive use, forests can also 
be a viable alternative from the economic point of view. 
the assumed economic benefits from forests.  While some studies only include wood 
in the cost effectiveness study of forestry projects, others find that receipts from non-
wood forest products in the tropics (fruit, medicinal plants, etc.) can even be ten 
times as  high as the receipts from sustainable wood harvest (see e.g.  ERL(1990)). 
Moreover,  this  latter  calculation  still  neglects  the  environmental  benefits  from 
halting deforestation (reduced soil  erosion, protected biodiversity, reduced global 
warming). 
the  assumed  cost of land procurement for  afforestation measures. The estimated 
costs of land procurement In temperate zones, for example, vary in different studies 
from $100 to $400 per ha. The prospects of finding a sufficient area of land suitable 
for  afforestation  appear  to  be  good.  According  to  different  sources,  the  area 
potentially  available  is  estimated  to  lie  between  100  and  400  million  ha  (see 
HOUGHTON(1988)  and  McKINSEY(1989)).  Although  this  area  might  not  be 
sufficient to completely meet the land requirements {300 to 600 ha) to sequester the 
entire annual increase in C02 emissions,  it would  still allow the execution of an 
ambitious afforestation programme. -86-
A final question has to be discussed in the context of an afforestation strategy: What to do 
with the timber produced? As long as afforestation. is only seen as an option "to buy time" 
by slowing down the increase in atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide until other 
options become available (so-called peak-shaving), the problem will  not arise in the next 
30-50 years.  If,  however,  afforestation were  to be seen as  part of a  long  term strategy 
against global warming, ways have to be found to use the wood of mature forests without 
releasing C02 (e.g. without burning the wood). 
It  can  be  concluded  from  this  discussion  that  afforestation  and  sustainable  forest 
management programmes seem to have certain advantages in terms of cost effectiveness in 
comparison  to  other  greenhouse  gas  emission  reduction  options.  At  the  least,  such 
programmes  should  be  part of a  comprehensive  package  of measures  to  address  the 
greenhouse problem. Moreover, action tn  this· area will  bring about other environmental 
benefits on a local or regional scale (such as, for example, maintained biodiversity). -87-
7.  THE INTERNATIONAL DIMENSION 
7.1. Defining common and/or individual targets 
7  .1.1.  Reaching an agreement on a common policy 
As  already set out in chapter 3,  the greenhouse problem is  a  clear case of a  problem 
requiring global action. No individual country or even country group is in a position to halt 
global warming by taking measures in an isolated way.  The question therefore arises of 
whether and how a global agreement can be reached that is necessary to assure an effective 
policy. 
A priori, economic theory suggests that it will be difficult (though not impossible!) to reach 
such  an agreement.  The reason for  this  lies in the fact  that emission reduction is  an 
extreme  case  of  what  economists  call  a  public  good:  while  an  individual  country 
undertaking emission  reduction investments . (beyond  the.  amount which  is  justified  on 
purely national economic grounds) has .to carry the full cost of this measure, the benefits 
from such an action will not only be small for this country, but will also accrue to all other 
countries. Each country has thus an economic incentive to avoid such investments and to 
benefit from the reduction investments undertaken by other countries (e.g. a subgroup of 
countries that have :.;eached an agreement). If, however, too many countries attempt to act 
as free riders, it is unlikely that any country would be  willi~g to undertake such measures or 
to sign a respective agreement. 
In the context of the greenhouse issue, this dilemma is furthermore aggravated by the fact 
that some might think that they would even gain from global warming. It is therefore useful 
to look briefly at what can be learned from game and negotiation theozy as well as from the 
e  erienc  with o h  r  nvironm  n al a  reements in  he  ast. Both types of analysis show 
the  importance  of having  the  right  economic)  incentives  for  reaching  an  (optimal) 
agre.ement (see e.g. BARRETI(1989) and BARRETI(1991c)). Moreover, there is the risk 
that international agreements are designed in such a way as to give  countr~s an (implicit) 
economic incentive to look for ways to avoid emission reduction. measures.  However, the 
evidence  presented jn this  study  has  illustrated  that  there  are likely  to  be  important 
possible gains from an international solution. If, for example, the cost of reducing energy 
related C02 emissions in industrialized countries were of the order of $20-50 per ton of 
carbon, while the cost of avoiding emissions from deforestation in developing countries was 
only approximately $6, then it becomes clear that the economic gains from an international 
solution  could  be  enormous  and  the  question  of how  these  potential  gains  can  be 
distributed to create incentives. to participate. becomes predominant. It is important in this 
context to distinguish the efficiency asJ?ects; of an economically sound international solution 
from this equity aspect of the distribution of gainS and costs. 
The above discussion has clearly demonstrated that the issue of how deyelopin~ountries 
could receive the (economic) incentives to participate is of central importance.  is is not 
only due to the C02 sequestering potential of tropical forests and to the COz emissions 
due to deforestation, but also to the drastic rise in energy related greenhouse gas emissions 
forecast for the next century (see the example of China!). This forecast sharp rise is mainly 
the  consequence  of continued' strong  population  growth,  high  and  at present  largely 
28 To give an example, if  an agreement were to state that all low-cost emission reduction measures should 
be undertaken, countries might be tempted to invest more effort in trying to prove that they have only 
high-cost options available than in trying to identify low-cost options. A similar. problem could arise in 
cases  where  an  aggregate  emission  reduction  target  has  to be allocated  among  countries,  giving 
countries the incentive to plead for low reduction targets in their specific case (see GRUBB(1989) on 
this issue). -88-
unsatisfied economic welfare asJ?irations and a coal dominated fossil fuel base. It has to be 
recognized in this context that, 1n view of the pressing short-run economic problems many 
developing  countries face  today,  expensive  emission  reduction measures  can hardly be 
expected· from these countries. This is particularly true as the benefits from such measures 
would only accrue to future generations, generations that in all likelihood will be better off 
economically than present generations. 
One should not forget,  however, that present energy use in these countries is  much less 
efficient than in industrialized countries: electrical transmission and distribution losses are 
twice as high as for OECD countries, energy efficiency in industrial processes is sometimes 
only half the rate common in developed countries (see e.g.  LAWRENCE BERKELEY 
LABORATORY(1989)). It is estimated (ASSESSMENT(1990)) that, on average and only 
covering visible and attainable opportunities, 20-25% of energy use in LDCs could be saved 
by taking measures with a payback period of two years or less. Thus, even when allowing 
for higher economic growth aspirations, the emission reduction potential in less developed 
countries  is  significant.  The  exploitation  of this  potential would  be  in the  interest  of 
developing countries as well as in the interest of the international community as a whole. 
For these reasons, the issue of financial  transfers as  well  as  of technology transfer is  of 
crucial importance. Without such transfers, it is unlikely to prove possible to reach a broad 
international agreement allowing  the exploitation of the available potential of low  cost 
emission reduction.  29  This transfer of resources could be organized on a bilateral basis, 
within  a  Global  Environmental  Facility  (jointly  managed  by  UNEP,  UNDP  and 
Worldbank) or within a new Global Climate Fund. 
7  .1.2.  Deriving targets for individual countries 
Assuming  that  despite  the  above  described  problems  a  group  of countries  (e.g.  the 
Community Member States or even all  UN Member States)  agree  on the  need for  a 
common emission reduction policy,  either by agreeing on a  global quantitative emission 
reduction target (e.g. of the Toronto type) or by reference to a common cost threshold for 
emission reducing investments (represented, for example, by a corresponding tax rate), the 
next  question  is  what  the  global  agreement  implies  operationally  for  the  individual 
participating countries. Basically, it is useful to distinguish between the following possible 
schemes (for a comprehensive analysis of these issues see also GRUBB(1989)): 
(a)  Tax based schemes 
A uniform carbon tax at the national level: Theoretically, all countries could agree 
to levy the same tax or charge on fossil fuels (or on C02 emissions in general). If the 
tax  rates  were  identical  and  the  revenues  remained  at  the  national  level,  no 
international  resource  transfer  or  distorted  competition  issues  would  arise. 
Moreover, if pre-tax energy prices were similar internationally (i.e. a single market 
for  energy)  and  provided  the  scheme  ensured  that  countries  were  unable  to 
compensate  the  tax  effects  by  paying  subsidies,  an  economically  efficient 
international emission reduction could be achieved. (However, there are a number 
of practical difficulties, not least the question of how tax rates could be defined and 
monitored in the presence of exchange rate fluctuations etc.) 
29 In principle, all the ideas evoked in section 5.1.3.(b) on measures to create markets for exploiting the 
energy efficiency /  emission reduction  potential could also be transposed to the international issue. 
One  could,  for  example,  envisage  a  scheme  of  "international  third  party  fmancing".  S · 
HOURCADE/SHUNKER(1990) for details.) -89-
A new emission tax at the international level:  In principle, two ways of organizing 
such a tax could be envisaged. The first option would be that countries pay a tax on 
their (aggregate) net CDl emissions (for details see e.g. HOEL{1990)). The tax rate 
would be agreed internationally and the tax revenues could be redistributed to the 
countries according to some allocation rule. Each country would be free to choose 
its preferred way to attain the nationally optimal emission level (e.g. by regulation, 
tradable permits  etc.). The second  option would  consist  of an agreement to  tax 
emissions  internationallY.  at the microeconomic  level,  for  example  in form  of an 
international tax on fossil fuels. In both cases, a new international institution would 
be required to administer (and to enforce) the tax scheme. However, while countries 
(or governments) would  be subject to the tax in the first  case,  private economic 
agents would be subject to the international tax in the second case. 
WHALLEY  and  WIGLE(1990  and  1991)  have  investigated  this  aspect  by  simulating 
different  policy  instruments with  the help  of a  computable general equilibrium model. 
Their analysis illustrates the importance of the rule for distributing the revenues from an 
international  tax.  In  the  two  extreme  cases  that  are  studied  (national  collection  and 
distribution of taxes versus collection and distribution by an international agency), the low 
income  region  incurs  a  welfare  loss  of about  5% of GDP in  the  first  case  (national 
consumi?tion  tax),  while  it  receives  a  welfare  gain  as  hi~h as  3% in  the  case  of an 
international revenue  distribution proportional  to  population.  In addition,  if the  tax  is 
collected and redistributed nationally, for some regions of the world (e.g. oil producers) it 
is  of significance whether an international  tax  (but with  national revenue  collection) is 
levied  on  energy  production  (advantageous  for  oil  producing  countries  due  to positive 
terms of trade effects) or as a consumption tax (advantageous for oil consuming countries). 
In general terms, the amount of revenues generated by an international tax might in fact be 
an  obstacle  for  reaching  an  agreement  on  such  a  scheme  (WHALLEY  /WIGLE,  for 
example, estimate the revenues generated in a 50% emission reduction scenario to be of 
the order of $600 billion, several percent of world GDP). 
(b)  Quantity based schemes 
Basically three alternative approaches could be envisaged: 
Fixed  national  emission  quotas:  all  the  countries  participating  in  the  common 
emission  reduction  scheme  would  have  to  agree  on  a  framework  for  deriving 
individual country targets from the overall emission reduction target. In its simplest 
form,  such quotas are set by reference to a base year (e.g. "Toronto-type" targets). 
Alternatively, such a framework would probably be an algorithm based on a number 
of economic and other indicators (e.g.  technological options). From the economic 
point of view, it is essential that this set of indicators not only includes variables like 
population, GDP etc., but also indicators concerning the costs of emission reduction 
measures.  Unless the indicator set reflects  the differences in the relative  cost  of 
reducing emissions between different countries. fixed  national emission quotas will 
be economically inefficient. This also implies that uniform reduction targets for all 
countries are likely to be the economically most inefficient solution (see graph 15). 
Although they give the impression of being "just", they in fact place a higher burden 
on those countries that have already made significant efforts to reduce emissions or 
that, due to objective circumstances, have only costly options of doing so. 
Fixed  per-capita emission  ceilings:  from  an equity point of view,  it  may  appear 
preferable  to  allow  an  equal  amount  of  emissions  per  adult.  Less  developed 
countries could thereby more easily be convinced to participate in an international 
emission reduction scheme. Industrialized countries, on the other hand, would have -90-
to cut their emissions  drastically.  Several objections can be raised against such  a 
scheme. First, as long as there are no controls on population growth, the per-capita 
(net) emission ceilings would have to be adjusted regularly if a fixed target in terms 
of atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases were aimed at. Second, there is 
no reason to believe that the energy conservation potential is smaller in the LDCs 
than in the industrialized countries. Third, as  has been illustrated by  WHALLEY 
and WIGLE, such a policy could lead to a severe distortion of trade patterns, with 
the production of energy intensive products shifting from the high income to the low 
income countries. Thus, fer-capita emission ceilings are not a cost-effective solution 
to the challenge of globa  climate change.  . 
Tradable  emission  permits:  in  this. case,  all  participating  countries  would  be 
allocated  a  certain  quantity  of C02 emission  permits.  Although  the  allocation 
mechanism has to be agreed beforehand, no country would be physically restricted 
in -its emissions. Instead, each country .can decide for itself whether it is cheaper to 
reduce  emissions  or to  buy  emission  permits  from  other countries.  Total world 
emissions would be unaffected by this individual choice. 
Such a tradable emission permit scheme has several advantages. First, permits are a 
particularly efficient instrument in cases where it is important to respect an overall 
emission target and where the number-of participants is not so large as to imply high 
transaction costs. Taxes, on the other hand, would probably have to be adjusted in a 
trial-and-error  process  to  exactly  attain  the  target.  (If the  target  has  not been 
attained, the question will then arise of whether this is due to an inability to find the 
right tax rate or due to unwillingness to undertake the required measures.) Second, 
tradable permits are an almost ideal instrument for a decentralized policy approach 
based on the subsidiarity principle  as  they give  each participant the freedom to 
decide  on the  precise  measures  to  be  taken  in  order  to  respect  the  allocated 
emission  rights.  Third~ tradable  permits  can  be  imple.mented  "on  top"  of other 
agreements.  If,  for  example, countries could  agree on individual,  country-specific 
and quantitative emission reduction targets, these could be subject to  tradin~ at a 
later stage  (thus, in fact,  they would  constitute  the  initial  allocation  of ennssion 
permits). No country would be worse off with such a scheme, while some might gain 
significantly. Initially, such trading could even be more or less informal via a type of 
"clearing house". Thus, immediate full trading is not required, but bilateral trade is 
possible (see e.g. ECON(1991) on this issue). Regional trading schemes could then 
easily be established (see e.g. HANSEN/ROLAND(1990)). 
On the other hand, it has to be noted that to date there has been very little practical 
experience ·of tradable  permit schemes  in  the  Community.  This  might  render a 
large-scale  implementation  in  the  near  future  unlikely.  In  addition,  there  are 
difficult issues of permit allocation and monitoring to be addressed. 
One can conclude from this discussion that quantity based schemes have both  advanta~es 
and disadvantages over tax/  cost based schemes. If It is important to ensure that a specific 
quantitative target is reached, taxes are unlikely to be the best instrument and a emission 
permit scheme appears preferable. Moreover, the economic policy experiences of the past 
few  decades  have  clearly  shown  the  difficulty  of reaching  precise  quantitative  national 
targets with  the help of traditional policy instruments (the so-called "fine-tuning" debate 
with respect to the traditional targets of full employment and price level stability). 
On the other hand, national emission rights or emission quotas would probably accentuate 
the difficulties of dealing with the international exchange of goods and services (e.g.  the 
energy  content  of exports,  the  issue  of international  air  and  sea  transport,  electricity 
exports/imports etc.). Although these issues would implicitly also arise in the case of taxes, -91-
quotas  are  likely  to  complicate  the  adjustment process.  With  respect  to  both  tax  and 
quantity based schemes, an important issue relating to the implementation concerns the 
amount of resources transferred internationally. Further attention therefore has to be given 
to this aspect when designing an international scheme by looking for ways of limiting the 
amount of international financial transfers while nevertheless exploiting the efficiency gains 
associated with such international emission reduction schemes. 
7  .2.  Instruments,  subsidiarity  and  the  issue  of  international  compatibility  of 
instruments 
As stressed above, the C02 issue (and indeed the greenhouse issue in general) calls for an 
agreement that, ideally, encompasses all emitters of these gases.  However, this does not 
imply that all participating countries have necessarily to use the same policy instruments. 
As in other policy areas, individual countries should only be restricted In their free choice 
of policy instruments if a  common instrument leads to superior results  in  attainin~ the 
target (subsidiarity principle). The question is then, whether- and if yes where- this 1s the 
case with respect to policies to reduce CDl emissions. 
Although the discussion here cannot be exhaustive, it is  necessary to briefly analyse the 
subsidiarity question concerning the choice of C{h-policy instruments in the context of the 
single market, both with respect to taxes and standards. A priori, the problem appears to be 
less  acute in the case  of instruments directed at {production) processes or non-tradable 
goods and services. As all policy instruments are bound to be associated with some form of 
costs (e.g. either the tax payment or the compliance cost of regulations), there appears to 
be  no  important  trade  distorting  effect.  However,  in  dynamic  terms,  different  policy 
instruments could have different repercussions on the direction of research & development 
and therefore of technical progress in different countries. Such an impact could, in turn, 
reduce the potential economic gains of having one large European market. 
Concerning tradable goods, on the other hand, there could well be a conflict between the 
free movement of goods and the efficiency of a national environmental policy. This can be 
easily illustrated by reference to the example of vehicles: if one European Member State 
relied on a carbon tax while another Member State chose engine efficiency standards, this 
would either require restrictions on the trade with cars (because otherwise the cheaper cars 
not  meeting  the  standards  would  gain  a  competitive  advanta~e in  the  country  with 
standards) or the national instruments would be environmentally Ineffective and thus also 
economically inefficient. 
In the same vein, it is highly doubtful whether it is economically efficient and, indeed, even 
operationally feasible to have one Community Member State adopting a tradable emission 
permit scheme, while  others rely  on  ener~ taxes.  Thus there would  appear to be clear 
economic advantages to be had from adoptlng a Community-wide approach. -92-
8.  EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND POLICY CONCLUSIONS 
On the  basis  of the  available  scientific  literature  and  the  research  undertaken by  the 
Commission's  own  services  (in  particular  the  results  of  the  Community's  JOULE 
programme,  the  preliminary  results  of an assessment  prepared  for  the  Commission's 
Cellule de Prospective by the Institute for Prospective Technological Studies of the Joint 
Research Centre and DG XVII's "Energy for a new century" exercise), economic analysis 
allows  a  number  of conclusions  to be  drawn  that  are  of significant  importance  when 
defining economically efficient response strategies in the context of global climate change. 
These conclusions concern both the appropriate methodology of approaching the problem 
and the main empirical findings. 
1. 
2. 
Before presenting  the  economic  conclusions,  the  general  background  has  to  be 
briefly sketched. It is generally recognized that a continuation of present trends in 
worldwide energy use would drastically increase worldwide COz emissions: in the 
''business-as-usual'' scenario prepared by  the  Inter~overnmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC), for example, worldwide COz emissions are projected to increase by 
roughly 60% in only 20 years. It is considered to be certain that this would lead to a 
substantial  increase  in atmospheric  concentrations  of greenhouse  ~ases, thereby 
enhancing the greenhouse effect and resulting, on average, in an additional warming 
of the earth's surface. 
From the point of view of economic theory, the optimal way to define policy targets 
in this context would be by making a comprehensive comparison of the costs and the 
benefits of different policy options. This comparison would also have to take into 
account factors such as uncertainty, the rights of future generations and the dangers 
of irreversible damage to the environment. In principle, such a comprehensive cost-
benefit analysis would make it possible to determine at the same time the quantity 
of the desirable emission reduction and the costs (or benefits) associated with such a 
reduction. 
However, it is highly doubtful whether the information available to date allows such 
a comprehensive and quantitative cost-benefit analysis to be made with any degree 
of reliability. In this situation, there are basically two approaches that may serve as a 
guideline for defining greenhouse gas policies: 
the  "absorption  approach",  assuming  that  the  earth's  eco-system  (and 
therefore also our economies) can only absorb a certain amount of global 
warming  (in  absolute  terms  or  per  decade).  Some  authors  argue,  for 
example, that the earth's eco-system could only manage a warming of not 
more than 0.1  o per decade. Provided such a limit can be defined scientifically, 
policies would  have  to  be designed  so  as  to  ~arantee the corresponding 
quantity of emission reduction, theoretically Without  explicit analysis of the 
associated economic costs. 
the "insurance approach", arguing that, in the absence of reliable knowledge 
concerning the impacts of global warming, it would be rational to undertake 
not  only  all  emission  reduction  measures  that  can  at the  same  time  be 
justified on other ~rounds ("no regrets policy"), but also that society invest in 
further measures JUSt  in order to reduce the risk of the worst case scenario 
occurring.  Thus  a  certain  amount  of financial  resources  would  be spent, 
theoretically more or less independently of the size of the resulting emission 
reduction. -93-
3.  Concerning  the  first  approach  {absorption},  the  crucial  question  is  whether  the 
absoretive  capaciry  of  the  eco-system  with  respect  to  global  warming  can  be 
quantified  scientifically  or  not.  If it  can  be specified,  economic  analysis  is  not 
required for  defining quantitative emission reduction  tar~ets. Instead,  the task of 
economic  analysis  becomes to  identify  the least-cost pohcy instrument settin2 to 
attain the scientifically defined reduction targets. 
4.  With respect to the second approach (insurance), the role of economic analysis is to 
evaluate and  uan i  he  os  of reachin  if£  r  n  mi  i  n r  uction t  r  ets. The 
lower the aggregate costs of emission re  uction, the  hi~her the amount of emission 
reduction that  can be reached with  the  amount of financial  resources  society  is 
willing to spend. 
5.  Two  alternative  approaches  are  generally  used  for  the  economic  evaluation  of 
greenhouse gas  emission reduction policies: the ''bottom-up" analysis and the "top-
down" analysis. 
6.  The  "bottom-up"  approach  attempts  to  identify  the  costs  of attaining  different 
emission reduction targets by aggregating the microeconomic costs derived from a 
detailed  analysis  by  technology  and by  economic sector. The aggregate  emission 
reduction cost  curve  can then be  used for  deciding upon a possible quantitative 
emission reduction target. 
7.  The  available  empirical  studies  conducting  a  "bottom-up"  analysis  indicate  the 
existence  of a significant  emission  reduction potential,  the  exploitation of which 
would appear to offer clear (short-run) economic benefits. In fact,  the exploitation 
of this  emission  reduction  potential would  in principle  be profitable for  private 
economic  agents,  even  at  current  market  prices.  This  potential  is  currently  not 
exploited due to market failures, institutional barriers or hidden transaction costs. 
Examples  of  these  different  types  of  barriers  are  capital  constraints,  lack  of 
information, discount rate differences, utility regulation, separation of expenditure 
and  benefit  of emission  reduction  investments,  etc  ..  Moreover,  uncertainty with 
respect  to  future  energy  price  trends  might  often  constitute  a  further  "invisible 
barrier" to energy saving investments. 
In  addition  to  this  privately  profitable  emission  reduction  potential,  there  is  a 
further potential that should be exploited from the point of view of society, but that 
is  currently  not used.  Thus,  if market prices were  to  fully  reflect  all  social  (i.e. 
including  environmental)  costs,  the  potential  for  {privately)  rational  emission 
reduction measures would be even larger. 
Concerning  the  available  technological  options  for  reducing  C02 emissions,  it 
appears that the improvement of energy efficiency represents the most important 
economically justified and immediately available potential for emission reductions, 
followed by fuel switching towards fossil fuels with low carbon content. In the lon~er 
run,  renewable  energy  sources  could  represent  an  important  C02  emission 
reduction  potential  and  public  R&D  policy  can  help  accelerate  the  economic 
viability of such  technologies.  Certain renewable energy technologies are already 
cost-effective if C02 emission reduction targets are to be attained. 
8.  As to the size of the potential for economical (from the point of view of society) or 
"nearly economical" emission reduction measures, the exact amount differs between 
countries and economic sectors. For the Community as a whole, it could tentatively 
be estimated to  be at least of the order of 15-20%  of "business-as-usual" energy 
related COz emissions by the year 2010. -94-
In sectoral  terms,  it appears  that there  is  a  large  energy  saving  (and therefore 
emission reduction) potential in the residential and commercial sector (currently 
contributing approximately 24% to the Community's C02 emissions). In particular 
in the area of heating (space and water), potential energy efficiency gains of over 
50%  seem  to  exist.  Other  important  cost-effective  saVIngs  are  associated  with 
efficient lighting methods. There is also an important energy efficiency potential in 
industry (current share in emissions close to 20%  ),  probably of the same order or 
maybe  slightly  smaller  than  the  potential  in  the  domestic  sector.  The  main 
technological options consist of the combined on-site generation of heat and power 
(  CHP) and improvements in space, water and process heat generation. While in the 
transport  sector  (current  share  in  emissions  roughly  23%  ),  the  potential  for 
increasing energy efficiency (mainly by increasing engine efficiency and reducing the 
car body weight) is estimated to be high (economic potential possibly around 20%  ), 
past experience has shown the difficulty of attaining emission reductions in the area 
of road transport. In the power generation sector (the source of approximately 30% 
of present C02 emissions), finally,  cogeneration (  CHP) and advanced combustion 
technologies could increase conversion efficiencies by over 10 percentage points. In 
addition, emissions could be reduced by means of fuel switching. 
9.  Exploiting this existing economic emission reduction potential 
is in the economic interest of each country, provided policies are desi~ned to 
be economically efficient.  It is  therefore a prime example of a pohcy that 
should  be  undertaken  even  when  abstracting  from  the  advantages  of 
mitigating global warming eno regrets policies"); 
therefore  usually  requires  no  international  agreement  (although  such  an 
agreement  could  provide  additional  momentum),  thus  representing  an 
immediately  available  first  step  in  a  long-term  response  strategy  towards 
global climate change; 
will  require significant efforts and policy  chan~es. Without such efforts, the 
exploitation of this economic emission reduction potential would either be 
costly or altogether unattainable. 
10.  Although  the  technical  potential  appears  to  exist  for  reducing  emissions  by 
significantly more than currently appears economically viable (sometimes a figure 
for the overall reduction potential of the order of 40% is  quoted), this  additional 
amount of emission reduction  may  imply  significant  economic  costs  (neglecting, 
however,  possible environmental benefits). These costs  are likely  to be markedly 
higher for isolated action compared to joint action. 
The desirable amount of emission reduction beyond the economic break-even point 
of what is currently economically viable depends on the risk aversion of society (or 
policy-makers). 
11.  In comparison to the "bottom-up" approach, the "top-down" approach, takes a more 
aggregate,  macroeconomic point of view.  Starting from  the  observation that the 
actual quantity of COz emissions exceeds what is considered to be the equilibrium 
amount, it concludes that the  obvious way  to  reduce emissions  is  to increase the 
"price" of emissions. By raising the cost the individual economic agent has to bear 
when emitting C02, more emission reduction measures become profitable for the 
private sector. -95-
One of the most a.Ppropriate policy instruments for  achieving this are taxes. The 
economic justification for  raistng  (or introducing) taxes on emissions or emission 
generatin~ activities is the existence of externalities (social costs exceeding private 
costs), whtch are internalized into market prices by means of taxation. Theoretically, 
the size  of the tax  rate therefore depends on the size of the externalities.  In the 
absence of a reliable, monetized estimate of these externalities, a more pragmatic 
procedure is  normally used. In this case, the tax rate is simply determined on the 
basis of what is required to reach a given overall emission reduction target. 
12.  The existing empirical studies based on a "top-down" analysis generally come to the 
conclusion that, in the short-run, tax rates on C02 emissions or, alternatively, fossil 
fuel use have to be relatively high (tax rates in the range of 50%-150% of present 
energy prices are often quoted in the literature), if the aim is  to attain emission 
reduction targets of, say, 20% (compared to a business-as-usual scenario) solely by 
relying on taxation. However, it is important to note that if energy price expectations 
were altered by a declared long-run progressive increase in taxation, then elasticities 
calculated from past behaviour could underestimate the possible demand response. 
13. 
Most  available  studies  also  show  that  - for  the  amount  of emission  reduction 
currently  under  consideration  politically  - the  macroeconomic  effects  of  such 
taxation are likely to be relatively small or even absent, provided the tax revenues 
are recycled to the private sector (e.g. by introducing a revenue-neutral tax). For a 
20%  emission  reduction  (compared  to  the  reference  scenario),  for  exam:{>le,  a 
possible cost in terms of GDP loss of the order of 0.5-1.5% is usually found tn the 
literature (i.e.,  when  spread  over  a  ten-year period,  a  possible  reduction  in  the 
annual rate of GDP growth of between 0.05  and 0.15 percentage points). Although 
these effects are likely to increase progressively with the level of emission reduction, 
this  is  nevertheless  an important  result  showin~ that controlling greenhouse  gas 
emissions is not per se incompatible with economtc growth. 
It has to be emphasized, in this context, that these potential GDP losses should not 
be interpreted as  the net costs  of a C02 reduction policy  (and therefore as  the 
"insurance premium"). Instead, the broader environmental and other (non-market 
valued) benefits  from  a  reduced  combustion of fossil  fuels  have  to be balanced 
against the economic costs of emission reduction measures before attempting any 
judgement on the likely welfare implications of a COz reduction policy (e.g. reduced 
S02 and NOx emissions and therefore reduced acid rain). 
Despite these arguments, there are likely to be sectoral and distributional effects of 
considerable  importance.  In  particular,  the  differentiated  effects  on  different 
household  income  classes  may  have  to  be  compensated  by  an  appropriate 
redistribution of the tax revenues. Also, certain energy-intensive industrial branches 
could be significantly affected (adjustment costs), notably in the case of unilateral 
action. On the other hand, other branches can be expected to gain,  at least in the 
medium  to  long term,  from  the timely  response  to global  environmental threats 
("first  mover  advantage").  Finally,  there  is  an  additional  distributional  aspect  of 
importance  in  the  context  of the  European Community:  the  distribution  of the 
effects  of  emission  reduction  policies  among  Member  States.  In  view  of  the 
differences in terms of the sectoral composition of output, the fuel mix, the climatic 
conditions etc., this distribution is likely to be unequal. 
A comparison of the empirical results arrived at on the basis of the "bottom-up" and 
the "top-down"  approach, respectively,  may appear to give  a somewhat conflicting 
message:  On the  one  hand,  a  large  and  economically viable  emission  reduction 
potential  and,  on  the  other hand,  high  tax  rates  (associated  with  GDP losses) -96-
required to reduce emissions significantly. Two arguments may help to reconcile this 
apparent contradiction: First, taxes have an important role to play, but on their own 
they are insufficient to exploit the full  emission reduction potential. By definition, 
market-based  instruments  like  taxes  can  only  be  economically  efficient  where 
markets exist and work efficiently. However, a microeconomic, "bottom-up" analysis 
illustrates the necessity of using a variety of instruments. Second, the existence of a 
large reduction potential does not by itself imply that it will be easy to exploit this 
potential. Thus, a technology-oriented bottom-up analysis is likely to underestimate 
the  difficulties  and  the  costs  of exploiting  the  existing  cost-effective  emission 
reduction potential, thereby overestimating the achievable emission reduction. 
14.  In view of the above discussion, it becomes clear that economically efficient policies 
to exploit the COz emission reduction potential should be a mix  of traditional. in 
particular regulatozy instruments and market-based instruments. In the Community 
context,  this  instrument  mix  also  has  to  reconcile  the  desire  for  decentralized 
policies with that for a single market. 
15.  Traditional. in particular regulatozy  instruments of environmental policy  have  an 
important role  to play  in a  comprehensive  response  strategy  a~ainst the  risk  of 
global  warming  in  particular  as  far  as  energy  use  in  the  residential  sector  is 
concerned.  Most importantly,  this  could  be in  the  form of regulations specifying 
maximum emission standards or minimum energy efficiency standards. On the other 
hand, voluntary agreements with producers have sometimes proved effective in the 
past.  In addition,  measures  to  Improve  energy  consumers'  information  (e.g.  by 
energy efficiency labelling and subsidisation of energy efficiency consulting) as well 
as other accompanying policies such as transport, industry, agriculture, research and 
development, training and education, etc. have a significant role to play. 
16.  From the point of view of static and dynamic efficiency, market-based instruments 
seem to be a particularly suitable component in a policy-mix aiming at a reduction 
in greenhouse  gas,  and in particular COz, emissions:  there are no  direct health 
hazards involved, the regional distribution of COz emissions is of no importance for 
the climatic consequences and practically all economic agents are involved. 
In particular, two classes of broad-based instruments using the market mechanism 
are of importance: fiscal  instruments, on the one hand, and instruments to create 
new markets or improve the functioning of existing markets. 
17.  Fiscal instruments are likely to have a central role to elay in any policy to reduce 
COz emissions. By internalizing the social costs of fossil fuel use, private economic 
agents are encouraged to take into account the scarcity of natural resources (fossil 
fuels  as  well  as  atmosphere) when taking  their decisions.  They thus  receive  the 
correct signals. 
Concerning the  choice between different  types  of taxes,  e.g.  a  carbon tax  or an 
energy tax, the precise policy objective is of crucial importance. If the objective is to 
mitigate global warming,  a  carbon tax  appears to  be  economically superior to a 
general energy tax.  Moreover,  a  revenue  neutral  introduction of a  carbon tax  is 
likely to minimize the risk of possible adverse short-run economic effects. A general 
energy tax,  on the other hand, is  sometimes seen as  having certain advantages in 
terms  of  broader  environmental  and/or  energy  policy  objectives.  Although 
economic analysis would  su~est promoting these objectives by using other policy 
instruments in combination with a carbon tax, political considerations might lead to 
the conclusion that a general energy tax could constitute a "second best" solution. -97-
The overall policy objective also determines the choice between taxes and charges 
(hypothecated  taxes).  In  general,  economic  reasoning  would  argue  against  the 
earmarking  of carbon/  energy  tax  revenues  as  this  would  introduce  undesirable 
budgetary rigidities. Moreover, if the political aim is not to raise the public sector's 
share in GDP, revenue neutral incentive taxes, introduced in the context of fiscal 
reform, seem to be the preferable solution. On the other hand, charges can be seen 
as having some political attractions. The fact of earmarking the revenues from a new 
tax for environmental purposes may,  for example, make the introduction of such a 
new  tax  more  acceptable  to  the  electorate.  Thus,  a  scheme  of revenue-raising 
emission  charges  for  financing  emission  reduction  measures  is  sometimes 
considered as an attractive policy option, in particular if there are low-cost emission 
reduction options which will  not be spontaneously exploited by private economic 
agents and which therefore might require some public funding. Nevertheless, it can 
be expected  that the  objective  of dynamic  economic  efficiency  is  unlikely  to  be 
attained in such a case. 
18.  The correction of market failures and the creation of new markets can significantly 
contribute to the reduction of emissions at least cost. The policies pursued in the 
past  have  indeed shown  that traditional  policy  instruments  only  allow  a  limited 
exploitation  of  the  existing,  economically  viable  energy  saving  and  emission 
reduction potential. Thus, innovative policy approaches are required. 
In this respect, least-cost or integrated resource planning in the utility sector 
could play an important role. The underlyin~ philosophy of this and related 
concepts  is  to  encourage  utilities  to  provtde  energy  services  instead  of 
supplying simply energy. By reforming utility regulation such as to guarantee 
an appropriate rate of return on energy saving measures, utilities,  in their 
least-cost strategy to meet the increased demand for energy services, would 
not only focus on expanding technical supply capacity, but would also exploit 
economical energy saving opportunities. 
Another  concept,  third  party  financing,  would  allow  specialized  private 
companies with  the requued capital and technical expertise to  exploit the 
economic potential for energy conservation that is presently not used either 
due to market imperfections or due to institutional barriers. 
These  and· other comparable  policy  instruments  could  help  to  exploit  an 
energy saving (and therefore emission reduction) potential that is difficult to 
explo1t  by  relying  only  on  traditional  fiscal  instruments.  They  necessitate, 
however, significant regulatory reforms and behavioural changes. 
A second class of market creation instruments consists of tradable emission 
rights or permits. The basic idea of tradable permits is  to limit the overall 
amount  of acceptable  (  COz)  emissions.  Each  emitter  receives  the  right 
(permit)  to  emit  a  certain  amount  of COz.  The  economic  efficiency  of 
tradable permits lies in the fact that each permit holder compares the costs 
of reducing emissions by an additional amount with the gains from selling his 
emission permit. Thus, the market would ensure that emissions are reduced 
where this is least costly. The permits could be allocated on the basis of past 
emissions, of indicators or by auctioning. 
Tradable permits are a particularly efficient instrument in cases where it is 
important to  respect  an  overall  emission  target (tax  rates would  probably 
have to be adjusted in a trial-and-error process to exactly attain the target) 
and  where  the  number  of  participants  is  not  so  large  as  to  imply  high -98-
transaction costs. Moreover, tradable permits are an almost ideal instrument 
for  a decentralized {>Olicy  approach based  on  the subsidiarity principle  as 
they give each participant the freedom to decide on the precise measures to 
be taken in order to respect the allocated emission target. As such, tradable 
emission rights  can be applied either at the international level (where the 
permit holders  are  countries)  or at the  national  level  (where  the  permit 
holders are individual economic agents). However, to date only few practical 
experiences  have  been  made  with  tradable  permit  schemes  in  the 
Community. Moreover,  in the present Community context,  the  creation of 
the  internal  market would  nevertheless  restrict  the  free  choice  of policy 
instruments for  individual  Member States.  In  addition,  there  are difficult 
issues of permit allocation and monitoring to be addressed. 
19.  Concerning the design of a comprehensive  and economically optimal greenhouse 
~'  the main conclusions are the following: 
In view of the importance of uncertainty, a policy approach has to be adopted 
that is  flexible enough to be adaptable whenever new information becomes 
available.  This  has  been  emphasised  by  the  IPCC's  Response  Strategies 
Working Group. 
Early.  gradual  and  predictable  action  reduces  adjustment  costs  for  the 
individual economic agent as well as for society as a whole. Early adjustment 
is  not  only  likely  to  reduce  the  cost  of adjustment,  but  can  also  offer 
significant  market  opportunities  for  those  producers  ahead  of the  trend. 
Gradual action implies that tax rates should initially be set at a level high 
enough to give a clear signal to market participants, but not so high as to lead 
to  excessive  adjustment  costs.  Tax  or charge  rates  should  then gradually 
increase  with  time  in  order  to  encourage  continued  emission  reduction 
efforts. Predictable policies, finally,  are economically more efficient as  they 
reduce uncertainty and allow market participants to form stable expectations. 
There  are  likely  to  be  significant  gains  from  coordinated  policies. 
Coordinated  action  avoids  not  only  distortions  in  competitivity,  but  also 
inefficiencies due to an international incompatibility of policy instruments. 
They also allow economies of scale to be realized in the field of technology. 
20.  The  more  ambitious  emission  reduction  targets  are,  the  more  can  be  gained 
economically from  adopting a  broad policy  framework.  Thus,  policies  should not 
only focus on energy related COz emissions in the Community, but also on: 
(a) 
(b) 
Carbon "sinks": Forests play a crucial role in sequestering COz. The available 
information  clearly  indicates  that  there  are  cases  in  which  halting 
deforestation or even promoting reforestation is  less  costly than particular 
measures  to  reduce fossil  fuel  combustion.  Moreover,  in view  of the rich 
variety of species living in tropical rain forests, halting deforestation could be 
seen as  one of the important "no  regrets"  strategies  in the  context of the 
greenhouse effect. 
ther  re  nhouse  ases:  There is  undoubtedly  a  point beyond  which  the 
marginal cost of re  ucing COz emissions exceeds the cost of reducing other 
greenhouse gas emissions (e.g. CFCs or methane from landfills) in order to 
attain the same result in terms of the influence on the earth's radiative (i.e. 
heat) balance. (c) 
-99-
Worldwide emissions: The potential economic gains from reaching a broad 
international  a~reement are extremely high.  Although precise quantitative 
figures are difficult to obtain, it is often estimated that the marg~nal cost of 
emission  reductions  can vary  by  a  factor  of even 5-10  between  different 
countries (e.g. between Western and Eastern European countries). 
21.  The greenhouse effect is a ~lobal problem, which cannot be resolved by one or two 
countries alone. An international agreement is therefore an essential Ingredient in 
any  response strategy.  However,  reaching such  an agreement will  be difficult  (in 
earticular in view of the temptation to act as a "free rider") and will only be  .POSSible 
If each potential participant is convinced that he/she will receive (econotmc) gains 
from it. Two issues are of particular relevance in this context: 
Within the Community, a common policy approach must be elaborated that 
takes into account the cost differences of CD2 reduction measures between 
Member States.  Quantitative  emission  reduction  targets  that do  not take 
these differences into account are economically inefficient.  As a matter of 
fact,  economic  theory would  lead  to  the  conclusion  that  only  a  uniform 
(carbon or energy)  tax  or a scheme  of tradable (emission)  permits would 
ensure economic efficiency. 
At the worldwide  level,  participation of  developin~ countries is  of crucial 
importance.  This  is  not  to  say  that participation  must  be  ensured before 
emission reduction measures are taken. On the contrary, the above analysis 
has  shown  the  existence  of  an  emission  reduction  potential  which 
industrialized countries should already exploit, because this would be in their 
own interest. In addition, industrialized countries have not only the financial 
but also  the technological  resources required to  fulfil  this task.  Moreover, 
they  are  largely  responsible  for  the  man-made  increase  in  atmospheric 
concentrations of greenhouse gases. 
However,  in  the long-run,  any  greenhouse gas  emission reduction strategy 
which  does  not  include  the  participation  of  the  main  fossil  fuel  using 
developing countries is  bound to fail.  In view  of the prevailing large-scale 
inefficiencies in the use of energy in most developing countries, some COz 
emission limitation would clearly be in the short term economic interest of 
these countries themselves (even when abstracting from the advantages for 
the  environment)~ However, should  the  risks  of global  climate change  be 
confirmed,  such  "no  regrets  policies"  will  not be sufficient.  It is  therefore 
necessary to develop mecharusms for the transfer of financial resources and 
technology that allow LDCs to face their task. 
By setting the example and showing that emission reduction is not in conflict with economic 
prosperity, the European Community, together with other OECD countries, could ensure 
the participation of countries like China, USSR or Brazil in a future agreement. In acting 
together, the Community would ensure that progress on the Internal Market is maintained 
and,  in  view  of  potential  international  market  opportunities,  the  Community  should 
strategically assess whether a first mover advantage exists. - 100-
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